International macroeconomic adjustment, 1987-1992 : a world model approach by King, Robert E. & Tang, Helena
Pollcy,  Planning,  and  Re"srch
WORKING  PAPERS
Economics  Analysis  and Prospects
International  Economics  Department





A World  Model  Approach
Robert  E. King
and
Helena  Tang
Three global econometric models produced the same conclu-
sion: that the global economy is most likely to improve through
fiscal expansion in Japan combined with fiscal contraction and
monetary easing in the United States. The same models forecast
a slowdown in 1988 and low growth in 1989/90 followed by US
recovery in 1991-1992.
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In forecasting key economic indicators for the  forecasts and the model results - and between
major industrial countries, the Bank's Economic  the model forecasts (using Bank assumptions).
Analysis and Prospects Division (IECAP) does
not rely on a completely linked global macro-  But given Bank assumptions, the three
economic model.  models agreed on the medium-term forecast:  a
small slowdown in 1988, low growth in 1989
Would IECAP forecasts be consistent with  and/or 1990, and recovery in the United States in
forecasts produc';d by linked models?  1991 and 1992.
To find out, researchers introduced Bank  Simulations on all three models also pro-
assumptions about exchange rates and commod-  duced the same conclusion about policy:  that
ity prices into three global models - under the  the global economy is most likely to improve in
auspices of the OECD, Project Link, and Whar-  1989/90 and stabilize in the 1990s through a
ton Econometrics (The WEFA Group).  combination of fiscal contraction and monetary
easing in the United States combined with fiscal
Differences existed between the IECAP  expansion in Japan.
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The  Economic  Analysis  and  Prospects  Division  (IECAP)  of the  World
Bank  produces  forecasts  for  several  key  macroeconomic  indicators  of the
major  industrial  countries. These  forecasts  are  then  used  as inputs  into
the  Capital  Flows  Model  (CFM),  which  produces  projections  for  some  90
developing  countries. In  addition,  several  divisions  in the  Financial  and
Operations  complexes  of the  Bank  use the  industrial  country  forecasts  as
inputs  in their  work.
IECAP  does  not  currently  have  a fully  linked  macroeconometric
model  of the  industrial  country  forecasts.  Are, therefore,  the IECAP
forecasts  consistent  with  the  forecasts  produced  through  the  use  of several
major  fully  linked  world  models? The  purpose  of this  paper  is to  explore
the  key differences  between  IECAP's  forecasts  and  those  of organizations
using  linked  models,  and  to  explain  why the  differences  occur.
Several  organizations  have agreed  to let  us use  their  models  for
this  purpose. This  paper  will  compare  simulations  using  OECD's  Interlink
Model,  University  of Pennsylvania's  Project  LINK,  and  Wharton  Econometric's
*  The  authors  would  like  to express  their  gratitude  to  Claudia  Riccardi
for  her  excellent  work in  drafting  portions  of this  paper,  as well  as
her  statistical  support. Our  thanks  also  to  Laurence  Klein,  Peter
Pauley,  Kiseok  Lee  and  HungYi  Li of Project  LINK,  Paul  O'Brien  and
Andrew  Dean  of the  OECD,  and  John  Green  and  Paul.  Holtgrieve  of  Wharton
Econometrics,  without  whose  support  this  research  would  not  have  been
possible. Cur  appreciation  also  to those  who  provided  comments  and
guidance,  especially  Paul  Armington  and  Sharokh  Fardoust. Any
remaining  errors  in form  or  content  are,  of course,  our  own.
MASS-11:KING:00061DMA1987-93:rk:February  25, 1988 14-OCT-8  10:10:00(WEFA)  World  Model. 1 The  next  section  explains  the  structure  of  each
model. Section  III  begins  the  process  of  explaining  and  elaborating  on the
differences  in  the  forecasts,  through  a  comparison  of  the  key  assumptions
used  in  each  model. Section  IV  pr vents  a  comparison  of the  IECAP  baseline
with  the  baseline  forecast  presented  by  each  organization.  Forecasts  of
the  same  general  vintage  are  used  for  research  purposes,  and  are  not  meant
to  reflect  current  thinking  by any  of  these  organizations. 2 In  Section  V,
the  results  of  model  simulations  using  IECAP's  assumptions  for  exchange
rates  and  commodity  prices  will  be  discussed.  In  Section  VI,  an  attempt  is
made  to  explain  the  differences  in  the  projection  results.  These
differences  to  a large  extent  depend  on the  simulation  properties  of  each
model. These  properties  may  in  turn  be examined  through  the  running  of
simulations  to test  each  model's  multiplier  effects.  Following  this,  a  set
of  alternative  scenarios  using  each  model  is  presented.  Finally,  in  the
last  section,  the  main  conclusions  are  presented.
1/  These  organizations  have  graciously  agreed  to  let  us  use  our  own
assumptions  in  running  their  models. They  bear  no responsibility  for
any  inconsistencies  in  the  output  and  the  results  should  in  no  way  be
interpreted  as  having  their  approval.
2/  For  Wharton,  this  is  the  December  1987  forecast.  For  the  OECD  and
IECAP,  this  is  the  January  1988  forecast.  For  Project  LINK,  this  is
the  March  1988  forecast.  Forecasts  of the  same  general  vintage  are
used  for  research  purposes,  and  are  not  meant  to  reflect  current
thinking  by any  of these  organizations.
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A.  Wharton  (WEFA)  World  Model
The  Wharton  World  Model  is  an  annual  model  which  links  24
industrial  cauntry  submodels  and  6  regional  submodels,  of  which  5  represent
developing  country  regions  and  one  that  of  the  centrally  planned  economies
(CPE)  which  include  China. These  models  are  linked  together  through  a
world  trade  matrix  which  consists  of  3  commodity  groups. The  three
commodity  groups  are: (i) fuels,  (ii) other  primary  commodities,  and
(iii) manufactured  goods. The  linkages  are  through  both  trade  flows  (the
real  goods  side)  as  well  as  through  capital  flows  (the  financial  side).
For  the  real  side  of  the  economy,  import  demand  and  export  prices
are  solved  endogenously  by the  30  submodels.  These  two  variables  are  then
inputed  into  the  world  trade  matrix,  which  in  turn  solves  for  the  export
demand  and  import  prices  facing  each  country.  The  solution  process  is  an
iterative  one  (a  modified  Gauss-Seidel  process)  which  ends  onlv  if  the
variables  at  both  the  submodel  and  world  levels  converge.
As for  the  financial  side  of  the  economy,  the  industrial  country
models  are  linked  to  the  rest  of  the  world  through  exchange  rates  and
interest  rates,  while  the  regional  models  are  linked  to the  rest  of the
world  mainly  through  interest  rates. Each  industrial  country  model  solves
endogenously  for  the  interest  rate,  inflation  rate  and  the  current  account.
These  in  turn  determine  the  exchange  rate  which  would  be faced  by the  rest
of  the  world  both  for  trading  purposes  as  well  as  for  debt  repayment
KASS-11:KXNG:OOO6I14U987-93:rk:February  25,  1988  14-OCT-88  10:19:00FIGURE  1
WHARTON  ECONOMETICS  WORLD  MODEL  SYSTEM
POLICY  COMMODfrY  PRICES
ASSUMPTIONS  r  EXCHANGE  RATES  ol0.  Agrlcltwe,
ishalr  nflUon  - -,  Metals
"  h~~lteresg flates 
_  - I  FINANCIAL  onws
couJNTRY  U^t;  LINKAGES  -b -qn-  REGIONAL
MODELS  MDL 
(24)  WORLD  TRADE
MATRIX  Arc 
IndustriaUed  (3 Commodity Groups)  A.Slca
Countrbs  TrTdd Flow_  Tted  f  Asia
-'*  _  _  _ _____Centraly  Plnned  I
Latin Ameria
E_  P___  __  _  Ex…port  Price  Middle  East
-40.  Other  AsiaI
Impotl__  Pries_  _  _P  _  _ce
DEMAND,  OUTPUT,  INCOMES,  PRCES,  EMPLOYLMENT,
FIANCIAL VARIABLES,  EXTERNAL  ACCOUNTS- 5 -
purposes.  In  addition  to  this  iidirect  linkage  via  the  exchange  rate,  the
interest  rates  of  the  industrial  countries  are  also  linked  directly  to  the
developing  countries  via  the  latter's  debt  service  payments.  They  would
therefore  also  have  the  secondary  effect  of  affecting  the  latter's  import
capability  and  hence  their  trade  flows  with  the  rest  of  the  world.
Turning  now  to  the  structure  of the  individual  submodels,  all  30
submodels  solve  endogenously  for  demand,  output,  incomes,  prices,
employment,  and  financial  variables,  as  well  as  the  external  accounts.  .c
exogenous  variables  used  in  the  models  differ,  however,  between  the
industrial  country  models  and  the  regional  models. The  industrial  country
submodels  take  for  their  exogenous  variables  policy  assumptions,  mainly
fiscal  and  raonetary.  The  regional  models,  on the  other  hand,  take  for
their  exogenous  variables  commodity  prices  (although  Wharton  is  in  the
process  of  endogenizing  commodity  prices).
B.  OECD's  Interlink  Mode1
The  OECD  Interlink  model  is  an integrated  world  model  which
combines  a set  of semi-annual  macroeconomic  models  for  24  OECD  member
countries  (Belgium  and  Luxembourg  are  combined)  with  a  reduced-form  balance
of  payments  and  trade  module  for  six  non-OECD  country  groupings. 3 These
non-OECD  groups  are:  (1) the  OPEC  1  absorption  countries;  (2) the  OPEC
high-absorption  countries;  (3) other  oil  producit:g  countries;  (4) the
newly  industrialized  countries;  (5)  low-  and  middle-income  developing
countries;  and  (6) the  Socialist  Bloc  countries.
2/  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  are  combined  in  the  system.
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Individual  country  models  vary  depending  on  country  size  and  data
availability.  Those  for  the  s,!1ller  OECD  countries  typically  contain  about
130-140  equations  with  50  or  so  equations  behavioral  in  nature,  while  the
larger  country  models  contain  200-250  equations,  of  which  about  100  are
behavioral.  Still,  despite  differences  in  the  number  of  equations  and  data
availability,  the  structure  of  the  models  is  very  similar.
On the  domestic  side,  each  model  reflects  a  basic  national
accounts  breakdown,  including  factor  demand,  nominal  and  real  GNP,  prices,
and  private  and  public  sector  accouncs.  Consumption  and  investment  are
handled  explicitly,  and  are  broken  down  into  various  public  and  private
sector  components.
The  domestic  side  of  the  model  contains  a supply  block,  which
covers  the  entire  economy  except  for  the  general  government  sector. This
block  combines  a three  factor  production  function  with  consistent  demands
for  factor  inputs,  labor  supply  and  participation  equations,  and  short-term
business  sector  output. In  addition,  the  domestic  side  includes  a  wages
and  prices  block,  a fiscal  block,  household  and  business  sector  accounts,
government  sector,  and  a  domestic  monetary  sector.  t
The  external  side  of  the  model  features  sections  on trade  and
non-factor  services,  trade  volumes,  trade  prices,  investment  income  flows,
and  exchange  rates. This  part  of  the  model  is  linked  to  the  six  non-OECD
country  regions.  Exports  of  goods  and  services  for  the  non-OECD  countries
KASS-11:KING:0006/TMA1987-93:rk:February  25,  1988  14-OCM-88  10:19:00are determined  by commodity  classification 4 in the  same way as for the  OECD
countries,  depending  on changes  in market  growth,  and, for  non-primary
exports,  price competitiveness.
Imports  of the developing  countries  are determined  as a function
of export  revenues,  adjusted  for  net interest  payments,  net changes in
transfer,  and financing  flows.  Spending  coefficients  and adjustment  speed
vary  across  country  groups.  Investment  income  provides  an important  link
between  monetary  conditions  in the  OECD and non-OECD  countries'  behavior.
Primary  goods  export  prices are linked  directly  to the commodity  price
submodel. Non-OECD  producers  are assumed  to  be price takers  for
manufactured  goods,  with prices  moving in-line  with average  OECD price
levels.  Energy  prices  are exogenous  and assumed  to  be constant in real
terms  during  the forecast  horizon.
C.  Prolect  LINK System
The LINK system is  a quarterly  model (for  the  OECD countries)  which
ties  together  the national  macroeconomic  models  of the  major countries  and
regions  of the  world through  a world trade  matrix.  Unlike the  Wharton
World  model in  which both real (traded  goods)  and financial  (capital  flows)
linkages  are included,  the LINK  system  only takes  into  account the real
side linkages,  that is,  goods traded  between the  countries,  and financial
i/  OECD  provides forecasts  for four  commodity  groups:  (i)  food, (ii)
agricultural  raw  materials, (iii) metals  and minerals,  and (iv)
tropical  beverages,  as well as for  manufactures.
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linkages  are  only  implicitly  taken  into  acc,ount.  Another  major  feature
which  distinguishes  the  LINK  model  from  the  Wharton  World  model,  as  well  as
the  Interlink  model,  is  that  instead  of  using  a prototypical  country  model
to  represent  all  the  industrial  countries,  the  LINK  system  consists  of
individual  country  models  which  are  unique  in  their  construction.  The
rationale  behind  this  feature  is  the  assumption  that  each  individual
country  modeler  knows  his/her  own  country  best.
As  mentioned  above,  the  key  to  the  linkage  is  the  trade  accounts,
the  design  of  which  are  identical  for  all  the  models. This  is  the  only
point  where  freedom  of  model  structure  ceases  to  exist. For  the  purpose  of
LINK  calculations,  the  trade  accounts  for  each  country  are  divided  into
four  major  commodity  groups,  which  are: (i) food,  beverages,  tobacco
(SITC  0,1);  (ii) basic  materials  (SITC  2,4);  (iii) fuels  (SITC  3);  and
(iv) manufactures  and  other  (SITC  5-9). The  LINK  trade  matrix  consists  of
these  four  trade  categories  for  each  of the  individual  country  or regional
groupings.  Solving  the  LINK  system  involves  iteration  of the  model  until
total  world  exports  (FOB)  is  equated  to  total  world  imports  (FOB),  both  in
constant  and  current  value  terms.
The  algorithm  for  solving  the  LINK  system  is  as follows.  First,
each  individual  country  or regional  model  is  solved,  taking  as  exogenous
variables  exports  and  import  prices. The  endogenous  solutions  of imports
and  export  prices  are  then  fed  into  the  LINK  trade  matrix,  which  takes
these  solutions  and  generates  as  output  exports  and  import  prices. These
latter  solutions  of  exports  and  import  prices  in  general  differ  from  those
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used initially  in  solving  the individual  models.  The process is repeated
again  and  again  until  the  final  solutions  for  exports  and  import  prices  do
not  change  from  the  last  simulation.
The  LINK  trade  matrix  consists  of  a trade  shares  matrix,  which  may
be  assumed  to  be a set  of  technical  parameters.  As  an illustration  of this
trade  shares  matrix,  where  countries  are  concerned,  the  diagonal  elements
of  the  matrix  are  zero,  since  a  country  does  not  trade  with  itself
internationally,  and  where  regions  are  concerned,  intercountry  trade  within
the  regions  is  entered  on  the  diagonal.  The  problem  arises  that  the  trade
shares  matrix  is  not  constant,  since  trade  shares  change  over  time,  and
mu-h  of the  current  LINK  research  is  devoted  to  attempts  to  project  the
elements  of the  trade  shares  matrix  for  their  dynamic  movements.
III. ASSUMPTIONS  FOR  KEY  EXOGENOUS  VARIABLES
A.  Exchange  Rates
According  to  the  IECAP  January  1988  forecast,  the  U.S.  dollar
exchange  rate  is  expected  to  depreciate  further  in  the  1988-89  period
because  action  on the  part  of the  U.S.  Administration  will  continue  to  be
inadequate  to  correct  the  U.S.  twin  deficits. In  the  face  of  continued
financing  needs  for  this  massive  overhang  of  U.S.  debt,  the  financial
markets  will  step  in  to  lower  the  dollar  exchange  rate. The  already  large
amount  of  U.S.  securities  outstanding  and  the  expectation  of  continued
financing  needs  for  this  debt  both  render  the  further  purchase  of  dollar
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securities  unattractive  to foreign  investors. On the other  hand, the
supply  of such securities  is  ever-increasin'g  in order to finance  the  debt
overhang.  The  market outcome  of this  lowered  demand  and increasing  supply
would  be a further  depreciation  of the dollar.
A new trough  of the  dollar is  expected  to  be reached  in 1989,  at
which time the  new U.S.  Administration,  spurred  by an atmosphere  of
mounting  crisis,  is expected  to take  action  to correct  the twin fiscal  and
trade  deficits. Accompanying  this further  fall in the dollar (to  a new
trough)  would  be a rise  in nominal  interest  rates in the  U.S.,  which  would
serve  to counter  what might  be even further  depreciation  of the  dollar so
as to continue  attracting  financing  capital  from  overseas.  This rise in
the  nominal interest  rate  would also  be the consequence  of higher  domestic
iaflation  as the "pass-through"  of the  dollar  devaluation  to nominal  wages
is  gradually  completed. At the  same time,  there  would be further  declines
in the  prices of stocks  and  bonds,  paring  down  private  real  wealth and
therefore  domestic  demand in  the  United States. The continued  devaluation
of the dollar  would eventually  be reversed  both through  government  action
and the  market.  The new U.S.  Administration  is  expected  to significantly
reduce  Federal  borrowing  requirements. This  reduction  in the fiscal
deficit,  together  with a decline in  private  real  wealth  would shrink
domestic  demand  considerably,  serving  to  help correct  the  current  account
deficit.
By 1991, the  corrective  action  taken  on the twin  deficits  would
have  had its effect.  The deficit  on U.S. merchandise  trade  would  have been
reversed  and  be on its  way toward  a surplus. Moreover,  the earlier  decline
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in  domestLc  demand  would not  be prolonged  as monetary  policy would  be
relaxed  (due  to a somewhat  higher tolerance  for inflation),  real interest
rates  would be lower (due  both to  weaker domestic  demand  as well as
expectations  of reduced "crowding  out" in the future),  and export-led  and
import-competing  demand  would be higher (due  to the further  weakening  of
the  dollar  which took  place earlier). As a result,  inflation  would once
again  emerge  as the  major  policy  concern.  Both  fiscal  and monetary  policy
would then  err on the side  of restraint,  given  the  rpcent  painful
contractionary  experience  and the fear  that  U.S.  households  would attempt
to too  quickly  recoup  the  massive income  losses  incurred  in the 1985-1990
period.  In the meantime,  because of continued  real  economic  slack in
Europe,  financial  surpluses  generated  there  would again  be exported to the
United States.  The dollar  would appreciate  again  as capital  flows to the
U.S. exceed  its deficit  on  the  current  account.
Hence,  what we would see for the  path of the  dollar exchange  rate
would  be a long cycle (of  approximately  10  years).  This pattern is
predicated  on the assumption  that  the current  regime  for fiscal  and
monetary  policy  would  not be modified.  This regime  is one in which  U.S.
fiscal  and  monetary  policies  follow  the  usual  path of !eing  belated  and
independent,  instead  of  being anticipatory  and coordinated. Thus, there
would probably  be an "overshooting"  of the  dollar,  a result  of the  U.S.
being  overzealous  in its anti-inflation  stance  and following  an
overly-restrictive  monetary  policy and  hence forcing  up the dollar.  The
dollar  is therefore  expected  to  continue  on an appreciating  trend  into the
mid-1990's,  with the  U.S. moving into  a trade  surplus.
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The  WEFA  forecasters  also  incorporate  variable  exchange  rates  in
their  forecasting  model. The  assumption  is  that  monetary  authorities
worldwide  will  agree  to  let  the  U.S.  dollar  fall  in  foreign  exchange
markets  to  avoid  causing  any  further  major  disruptions  to the  international
monetary  system. It  is  expected  by the  WEFA  group  that  much  of  the
readjustment  in  the  U.S.  will  come  through  an  effort  to  bring  up the  level
of  private  savings  while  at the  same  time  making  U.S.  assets  more
attractive  to  foreign  investors  by letting  the  U.S.  dollar  depreciate.
For  the  1988-1992  period,  both  the  Wharton  and  the  IECAP  exchange
rate  forecasts  show  a further  depreciation  of the  dollar,  reaching  a trough
in  1989  against  the  other  major  currencies,  followed  by a rebound.  This
reflects  a similar  assumption  in  both  models  that  initially  the  market  will
step  in  to  correct  the  imbalance  through  a  lowering  of  the  dollar  exchange
rate  in  the  face  of  as  yet  inadequate  government  action  to  correct  the  twin
deficits  and  the  resulting  massive  overhang  of  the  U.S.  debt. It  should  be
noted  that  the  IECAP  forecasts  show  a greater  depreciation  of  the  dollar
than  the  Wharton  forecasts.
Both  models  show  an  upturn  of the  dollar  after  1989,  probably
because  both  models  assume  that  corrective  action  on the  twin  deficits,
through  the  market  as  well  as  policy  action,  will  be  working  out  its  effect
in  the  economy.  However,  while  both  models  show  an  appreciation  of the
dollar  after  1989  in  the  period  up to  1992,  the  IECAP  forecast  actually
shows  an "overshooting"  of the  dollar  to  a  level  higher  than  that  in  1987
(due  to  a lag  in  adjustment  in  the  goods  markets),  while  the  Wharton  model
shows  either  a return  to  1987  levels  or to  levels  not  quite  as  high  as the
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1987  ones. No  'overshooting"  is  forecasted  for  the  Wharton  model,
probably  because  it  dcee  not  assume  an  ove;ly  restrictive  monetary  policy
to  counter  inflationary  fears,  or  maybe  because  it  assumes  that  monetary
policy  will  be reigned-in  later.
The  WEFA  forecasters  also  bring  into  the  picture  other  exogenous
variables  which  are  supposed  to  stabilize  global  growth  at levels  not  too
far  below  present  ones. For  example,  multilateral  orpanizations  like  the
IMF  are  assumed  to  make  available  to  the  LDC's  at least  some  of the  funds
necessary  to  achieve  domestic  growth  while  maintaining  the  servicing  of
their  debt.
At  WEFA,  it  is  believed  there  are  some  very  important
countervailing  factors  to the  mid-October  stock  market  crash  that  would
make  a  major  downward  revision  of their  October,  pre-crash  forecast
unwarranted.  For  instance,  lower  inflationary  expectations  and  lower
interest  rates. This  might  be  assumed  to  have  the  effect  of lightening-up
the  debt-repayment,  debt-servicing  burden  for  the  LDC's. In  fact,  the
post-market  crash  global  environment  envisioned  by the  WEFA  forecasters  is
a less  hospitable  one  for  the  LDC's. Counteracting  the  advantage  for  LDC's
of lower  interest  rates  worldwide,  the  LDC's  will  see  their  export  earnings
dwindle  due  to  sluggish  growth  in  demand  for  imports  in  the  developed
market  economies,  as  well  as  lower  commodity  prices. In  addition,  in  the
WEFA  forecasters'  opinion,  constant  reduction  of the  U.S.  deficit  on  the
current  account  over  the  next  five-to-six  years  will  come  more  as  a  result
of  diminishing  imports  into  the  U.S.  than  of  buoyant  export  growth.
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Real  exchange  rates  are  held  broadly  constant  from  the  Economic
Outlook  425  levels  in  the  OECD  forecast.  The  OECD  expects  that  real
interest  rate  differentials  will  be  sufficient  to  sustain  a  pattern  of
constant  real  exchange  rates. Given  this  assumption,  the  OECD  forecast  can
only  reduce  the  current  account  imbalances  in  the  region  if  U.S.  domestic
demand  moves  differently  than  the  rest  of the  OECD. Assuming  no
significant  supply  side  effects,  U.S.  domestic  demand  will  have  to  be  below
that  of  the  rest  of the  OECD  for  the  U.S.  current  account  balance  to
improve.  The  nominal  exchange  rates,  estimated  as  a result  of  these
assumptions,  show  the  U.S.  dollar  falling  from  133  yen  in  1989  to 121  yen
in  1993  and  from  1.68  DM in  1989  to  1.51  DM in  the  later  year.
The  OECD  assumes  a  progressive  tightening  of fiscal  policy  in  the
industrialized  nations. For  the  area  as  a  whole,  the  net  borrowing  of
government  is  expected  to  fall  by nearly  one  percent  of  GDP  by 1993,  with
Italy  and  Germany  notable  exceptions  to  this  movement. In  Germany,  public
borrowing  will  increase,  especially  as a  result  of  a tax  cut  in  1990.
Monetary  policy,  on  the  other  hand,  is  expected  to  be relatively
neutral  over  the  projection  period,  with  nominal  short-term  interest  rates
relatively  stable. In  the  U.S.,  monetary  growth  should  be  between  six  and
seven  percent.  Money  growth  will  be  weaker  elsewhere,  especially  in  Japan
and  Germany.
5/  OECD  Economic  Outlook  42. OECD,  Paris. December  1987.
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TABLE_1:  Medium-Term  Forecasts  of Exchange  Rate DeveloRments  Among the
Bilateral  Rates  with  Japan and Germany
(Expressed  in  Terms  of YEN/$ and  DM/$ Respectively)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
YEN/$
IECAP  123  121  130  150  186
WEFA  131  129  130  137  140
Interlink  134  134  131  128  125
*  Project  LINK  124  121  120  120  N/A
DM/$
IECAP  1.42  1.34  1.54  1.90  2.47
'WEFA  1.63  1.56  1.57  1.63  1.63
Interlink  1.66  1.66  1.63  1.59  1.54
Project  LINK  1.60  1.55  1.52  1.52  N/A
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The  OECD  expects  productivity  growth  to  remain  at  1.3  percent
throughout  the  period;  sGmewhat  higher  in  Europe  and  somewhat  lower  in  the
United  States. For  the  area  as a  whole,  the  growth  in  productivity  is
slightly  faster  than  the  growth  in  real  wages. Therefore,  the  profit  share
will  rise  somewhat  but  probably  not  by enough  to  stabilize  the  rate  of
return  on the  capital  stock. Still,  with  falling  long-term  real  interest
rates,  investment  is  expected  to  pick  up and  be the  fastest  growing
component  of  GDP.
In  level  terms,  the  Project  LINK  exchange  rate  forecast  is  much
closer  to  that  of the  Wharton  forecast  than  the  IECAP  forecast  although  in
terms  of  the  trend,  it  is  quite  different  from  both  of them. As  mentioned
earlier,  b%oth  the  Wharton  and  the  IECAP  foreign  exchange  rate  forecast  show
the  dollar  depreciating  further  against  the  major  currencies,  hitting  a
trough  in  1989,  then  appreciating  again. The  Project  LINK  forecast,  on the
other  hand,  does  not  show  a rebound  of the  dollar,  but  in  fact,  continued
depreciation,  though  not  a  very  steep  one. Tne  1989  dollar  exchange  rates
forecasted  against  all  the  major  currencies  except  the  yen  are  quite
similar  between  the  Wharton  and  Project  LINK  models,  but  they  start  to
diverge  after  1989,  with  the  Project  LINK  dollar  continuing  to  depreciate
while  the  Wharton  dollar  starts  to  appreciate.  On the  other  hand,  the
IECAP  dollar  exchange  rate  is  forecasted  to  depreciate  to  a  much  lower
level  in  1989  than  either  of  the  above  two  forecasts,  but  also  appreciate
to  a  much  higher  level  by 1991. The  difference  between  these  forecasts  may
be due  to  the  fact  that  the  IECAP  forecast  takes  into  consideration
possible  reaction  of  the  financial  markets  to  the  current  account  imbalance
while  the  LINK  forecast  disregards  the  financial  side  and  instead  only
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reacts  to the  real  side. As such,  IECAF  forecasts  that  the  financial
markets,  impatient  in  the  face  of  the  remaining  massive  imbalances  in  the
U.S.  economy,  stop  in  and  accelerate  the  correction  of those  imbalances
through  a further  lowering  of the  dollar  exchange  rate.  The LINK  model,  on
the  other  hand,  forecasts  exchange  rates  endogenously  as functions  of
interest  rate  differentials,  inflation  differentials,  and  CDP  growth  rate
differentials  between  the  countries.  Underlying  its  forecasts  are  the
assumptions  that  there  will  be a  gradual  correction  of  the  current
imbalances  through  a  gradual  depreciation  of  the  dollar,  that  there  will
not  be any  volatility  in  the  expectations  of  private  investors,  and  that
the  monetary  authorities  in  the  major  industrial  countries  will  closely
coordinate  their  policies.
B.  CommoditX  Prices
The  IECCM  (International  Commodity  Markets  Division  of the  World
Bank)  forecasts  for  commodity  prices,  which  are  estimated  independent  of
the  rest  of  the  forecast,  contain  a great  deal  of  year-to-year  variation.
This  variation  consists  mostly  of  downturns  in  prices  in  the  near  to  medium
term  for  some  commodities,  followed  by upturns  later. This  cyclical
pattern  reflects  one  or  both  of  the  following:  the  IECAP  forecasts  of
slower  economic  growth  in  the  near  to  medium  term  followed  by  recovery
after  1990,  and/or  bad  weather  in  the  near  term  leading  to  higher  prices,
overproduction  and  hence  decline  in  prices  even  later.  APPENDIX  1  gives  a
more  detailed  discussion  of the  price  forecasts  for  each  commodity  group
and  the  rationale  behind  them.
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The WEFA assumptions  for commodity  prices  differ  a great  deal from
the IECCM  assumptions. Given the large  number  of diverse  commodity  groups
for  which  projections  are  made, it is  difficult  to  conceive  of a general
unified  theme  for the  price forecasts  of all the  commodity  groups.  One
notable  observation,  however, is that  the IECCM  forecasts  contain a lot
more  variation  than  the  WEFA forecasts. 6 That is, the IECCM  forecasts
contain  more of a cyclical  pattern,  which is also  of a greater  magnitude,
than the  Wharton  forecasts.
While  OECD's commodity  price assumptions  differ  markedly from the
projections  made  by the  World Bank's  IECCM  Division  on a year-to-year
basis,  over the course  of the projections  period  the  paths are quite
similar.
Project  LINK's forecasted  trend  for commodity  prices in the
1988-89  period is  generally  flat  or moderate  because  of the expected
recessionary  economic  environment  and the  projected  limited  further
depreciation  of  the dollar  for that  period.  However,  this  gv 'neral  trend is
in  many instances  overshadowed  by individual  market  con,' Ions  such  as
drought  in the  case of rice  and sugar,  disorganized  market  conditions  in
the  case of cocoa,  and temporary  inventory  shortage.-  in the  case of copper.
Project  LINK  expects  prices  of  metals and  other industrial  raw
materials  to rise  moderately  in 1988  and start  falling  in 1989.  This is
due to the  expected  slow-down  in  growth  in the  U.S. in 1988-89  and a
i/  See  APPENDIX  1.
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moderate  (and  stable)  rate  of inflation.  By the  end  of  the  forecast
horizon  (1991),  these  prices  are  expected  to  recover  part  of their  losses.
On  the  other  hand,  prices  of  agricultural  commodities,  in  particular  sugar
and  grain,  are  expected  to  rise  in 1988-89  due  to the  drought  in  India  and
in  neighboring  countries,  and  to fall  afterwards,  as  production  is  expected
to  return  to  normal  levels.
Appendix  1 contains  further  information  concerning  the  price
forecasts  included  in  each  model  for  a  wide  range  of  commodities.
IV.  COMPARISON  OF WORLD  MODEL  FORECASTS
For  the  most  part,  a comparison  of the  forecasts  of Interlink,
Project  LINK,  WEFA,  and  IECAP  produce  a  very  consistent  and  predictable
pattern. With  respect  to almost  every  single  variable  under  examination,
and  for  pretty  much  all  of the  countries  or groupings  examined  in this
paper,  by far  the  most  conservative  estimates  are  those  produced  by IECAP,
followed  rather  closely  by the  LINK  and  OECD  projections,  with  the  WEFA
forecasts  displaying  a moderate  degree  of optimism.
On average,  IECAP's  forecasts  for  the  major  OECD  countries  and  for
the  area  as  a whole  are  quite  similar  to the  forecasts  produced  by the  OECD
itself. It  would  appear  that  the  IECAP  forecasts  tend  to err  on the  side
of caution,  to  the  degree  that  they  err  at  all.
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Low  growth  in  the  U.S. (ranging  from  IECAP's  forecast  of  1.2
percent  in  1989  to  WEFA's  3.5  percent  in  19pl)  over  the  projection  period
is  due  to  a  combination  of  the  negative  impact  of  last  October's  stock
market  crash  on the  domestic  economy  through  the  wealth  effect,  continued
low  levels  of  personal  savings,  and  less  stimulative  (if  not  outright
contractionary)  macroeconomic  policies.  The  latter  policies  are  due  to  the
necessity  of  reducing  the  twin  U.S.  deficits  to  more  manageable
proportions.  While  it  has  long  been  clear  to  economists  that  the  twin
deficits  are  creating  a  major  economic  problem,  the  stock  market  crash  of
1987  brought  this  home  to  policymakers.  Interest  rates  in  the  U.S.  have
been  driven  down  somewhat  to  counteract  the  contractionary  impact  of the
stock  market  crash  on the  economy,  but  not  by as  much  as otherwise  might
have  been  done,  due  to  a  desire  to  encourage  higher  rates  of  personal
savings.
The  immediate  prospects  for  growth  in  Germany  and  Italy  are
bleaker  than  those  for  the  U.S.  in  the  IECAP  outlook.  Germany  is  expected
to  continue  on a  path  of  very  low  growth  due  to:  (1) the  lack  of
sustainability  of  export-led  growth  over  the  long-term  and  (2) the  lack  of
political  will  for  generating  a  higher  level  of  domestic  growth  with  the
resulting  consequences  for  inflation.
Figure  5 shows  that  the  relative  rates  of  growth  between  Japan,
the  U.S.,  and  Germany  will  remain  nearly  constant,  according  to  IECAP's
forecast,  over  the  next  three  years. That  is,  although  there  are  large
differences  in  the  rates  of growth,  movements  in  the  growth  rate  will  be
similar.
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For Japan, IECAP  is not  as pessimistic  about future  real  GNP
growth,  and in fact,  seems to  be more trusting  of Japan's  widely  proclaimed
intent  to fiscally  stimulate  their  economy,  allow the  yen to appreciate
against  the  U.S. dollar,  and  have their  surplus  on the current  account
marginally  shrink,  than the  WEFA forecasters. However,  Interlink  is  even
more optimistic  than  IECAP in  all these  respects.  From 1990  onwards,
Project  LINK displays  the greatest  degree  of optimism.
Of all the  projections  included  in this  study,  IECAP's  expects  the
steepest  pickup in  U.S. inflation,  followed  by Project  LINK,  WEFA, and
Interlink. This is consistent  with IECAP's  assumption  of a further
depreciating  U.S. dollar  which  leads  to a fuelling  of domestic  inflation
via higher import  prices.  With respect  to the  current  account  balance,  the
U.S. does  not show an improvement  until 1989,  as the  January 1988 IECAP
forecast  allows  for extended  J-curve  effects.
WEFA expects  higher inflation  in  Japan,  coupled  with lower  GNP
growth,  over the course  of the  next five  years than  either the  OECD, IECAP,
or Project  LINK.  This is  due to an assumption  that the  more expansionary
fiscal  policy in  Japan in  the short-to-medium  term  will  have a small
multiplier  effect on domestic  GNP with most  of the  extra demand  spilling
over into  higher imports. This is evidenced  by the fact that  WEFA records
by far the  greatest  reduction  in the  Japanese  current  account  surplus  by
1991  among  the three forecasting  agencies.  Project  LINK's  estimates  of
Japanese  inflation  are  most notable  for  displaying  the highest  rate  of
inflation  in 1987 of all of the  models;  and the lowest  inflation  rate in
1991.
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TABLE 2:  Inflation  Rate Cojariggn
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United States
IECAP  5.0  5.5  6.0  5.0  5.0
Interlink  3.6  3.7  3.9  4.0  4.2
Project  LINK  4.2  4.7  4.6  4.9  N/A
*  WEFA  4.7  4.6  4.5  3.3  3.4
Germany
IECAP  1.8  1.8  1.6  2.7  2.7
Interlink  1.7  1.7  1.6  1.4  1.3
Project  LINK  2.2  1.6  1.7  3.9  N/A
*  WEFA  2.3  2.0  2.0  2.8  3.5
Japan
IECAP  1.0  1.8  2.0  2.5  2.5
Interlink  1.0  1.5  1.4  1.5  1.5
Project  LINK  1.5  2.0  1.4  0.8  N/A
'  EFA  3.6  3.4  3.4  3.3  3.0
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WEFA  predicts  higher  inflation  in  Germany  and  Italy,  as  well  as
higher  GNP/GDP  growth  over  the  course  of the  next  five  years  than  the  OECD
or IECAP.  The  reason  for  this  difference  is  that  WEFA  assumes  expansionary
fiscal  policy  in  West  Germany,  while  the  OECD,  and  presumably  IECAP,  expect
a  broadly  neutral  fiscal  policy  stance  in  Germany  over  the  next  few  years
and  a  contractionary  one  in  the  rest  of Europe  with  the  resulting
consequence  of  a rise  in  the  unemployment  rate. In  fact,  due  to tax  reform
measures,  private  consumption  is  seen  by the  WEFA  forecasters  as the  main
contributor  to  German  growth  in  the  imminent  future. On the  other  hand,
Project  LINK's  estimates  of the  medium-term  inflation  rate  for  Italy  are
higher  than  anyone  else's;  its  projection  of  German  inflation  (CPI)  is  also
the  highest.
Honetary  conditions  in  both  Japan  and  Germany  are  assumed  to  be
more  restrictive  by  WEFA  than  by the  OECD  as  witnessed  by  higher  short-term
interest  rates  forecasted  by  WEFA  in  both  countries  over  the  next  five
years. In  particular,  the  Bundesbank  is  perceived  to  have  been  mostly
concerned  with  exchange  rate  stabilization  since  the  Louvre  Accord  was
signed,  and  to  have  willingly  forfeited,  in  pursuit  of this  objective,  much
of its  room  for  maneuver  in  manipulating  the  interest  rate  with  a  view  to
affecting  the  level  of  domestic  activity.  On the  other  hand,  OECD
forecasters  assume  that  the  German  monetary  authorities  will  adopt  a  more
pragmatic  approach,  shedding  their  traditional  image  as "sticklers  for
monetary  orthodoxy  at  all  costs" while  not  renouncing  the  objective  of
keeping  monetary  growth  within  the  target  range  whenever  feasible.  This
assumption,  in  turn,  is  predicated  on  the  expectation  that  the  policy  will
not  place  an  unsustainable  burden  on  domestic  growth. For  instance,
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FIGURE 6
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short-term  interest  rates  were lowered  substantially  in the  aftermath  of
the stock  market crash in  mid-October  in  order to inject  liquidity  into the
economy.  However,  unlike in the  OECD forecasts,  the  WEFA forecasts  show
that  the positive,  long-term  over short-term  interest  rate spread  narrows
uver time in  Japan but not in  Germany.
As far  as exchange  rate developments  are concerned,  the  OECD,
LECAP,  Project  LINK,  and the  WEFA Group  all assume that Lhe  U.S. dollar
will  continue  depreciating  in their  medium-term  scenarios.  However, in thu
W.FA forecasts,  the  U.S. dollar  stops  depreciatiag  and  begins undergoing  a
slight  appreciatiotn  in 1990  vis-a-vis  the  DM, thie  lira  and the yen.
Project  LINK  comes in  second  atLer IELAP  in anticipating  the  most severe
dollar  depreciation. LINK does  niot  anticipate  a  turnaround  in the  dollar
by  1991  as  IECAP does, however.
In the  OECD turecast.  the  depreciation  ot the U.S.  duolldr  against
the  DM dppears to  be less  marked than  against the Japaniese  Yun.  which is
w1ore  than likely  a reflection  of the  emerging  teeling in  Europe that  tiue  W1I
is  undiervalued  wttlhin  the  EMS system  This  means tlLat.  to a  l..rge  uxtenLt.
thu  DM is sheltered  by the EMS trom  the  worst ettects  *t a  dupruciatinig
ll.S.  dollar.
/  Ili,  uIEGD runis  a  Sizntl  atiuOi,  given1  inl  tthe  technit  adl ppciaadix  Io
Ecoiiomic  Outlook  42,  expliLitly  postulatinig a UJ  S  dolldr  deprc.:iatiui.
Over  the  course  of  the  next  five-to-six  years.
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With respect  to the  U.S. current  account  balance, the OECD assumes
a falling  deficit  until 1989.  In 1990  the  deficit is expected  to increase
and  will continue  to do so until 1993.  IECAP,  Project  LINK and  WEFA all
show  a constantly  falling  U.S. deficit  on the current  account  with no
turning  point in sight. 8
The OECD shows  the  Japanese  current  account  surplus  diminishing
through  1989 after  which the surplus  rises  well into  1993.  In the  WEFA
forecast,  the  Japanese  surplus  on the current  account  declines through
1992.  Project  LINK expects  the  Japanese surplus  to decline through  1990,
and then increase  slightly.  For  Germany, the  OECD  predicts a falling
current  account surplus  until 1990  with an increase  beginning in 1991.  The
WEFA forecast  shows the  German current  account  surplus  falling  constantly,
with the  only exception  being recorded  in 1989,  which shows a rise in the
surplus  over the  previous  year.  Project  LINK  expects  '  small increase  in
Germany's  current  account  surplus  in 1989, followed  by a fall to  U.S. $36
billion  by 1991.  For Italy,  the  OECD  postulates  a more or less constantly
growing  deficit (with  the  only  exception  occurring  in 1990).  This is
consistent  with its anticipation  of problems  arising from  the fact  that the
overall  European  current  account  surplus  reduction,  which constitutes  the
necessary  counterpart  to a falling  US deficit  will not be spread  evenly
among the  European  countries. Those  countries  which could  afford the
surplus  reduction,  such  as West  Germany, the  Netherlands,  and the
Scandinavian  countries,  will  bear by far the lighter  share  of the  burden
I/  IECAP  projections  for the  U.S. current  account  balance currently
extend  only through  1989.
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throughout  the  adjustment  period. 9 WEFA  projects  a  constantly  improving
current  account  balance  for  Italy,  which  in  fact,  moves  into  surplus  in
1992. Project  LINK's  expected  dollar  depreciation  vis-a-vis  the  Lira  over
the  next  five  years  is  the  most  severe  of all  of  the  forecasts,  and  results
in  the  smallest  reduction  in  the  Italian  current  account  deficit.
The  OECD  estimates  of  the  U.S.  current  account  balance  over  the
course  of the  next  few  years  make  sense  in  the  context  of a forecasting
model  which  treats  exchange  rates  as  an  exogenous  variable  (and  holds  them
constant  over  the  entire  forecastLng  period),  and  where  a  declining  deficit
for  three  years  in  a  row  is  accounted  for  by the  well-known  J-curve
effects. 10 Given  that  the  U.S.  dollar  has  depreciated  (and  even  under  the
assumption  of  a one-time,  one-shot  only,  U.S.  dollar  depreciation),  the
effects  of  such  depreciation  would  translate  into  a falling  deficit  for  the
U.S.  only  with  a considerable  time  lag. At first,  the  U.S.  current  account
deficit  might  even  increase,  although  U.S.  exports  in  volume  terms  would
likely  increase  fairly  quickly.  The  reversal  in  the  trend,  after  the  first
three  years  of the  forecasting  period,  is  easily  accounted  for  by the
progressive  wearing  off  of  this  effect.
i/  This  is  based  on  WEFA's  belief  that  the  deutsche  mark  is  undervalued
in  the  EMS,  along  with  those  European  currencies  which  move  in  line
with  the  deutsche  mark.
1Q/ Using  the  OECD  medium-term  baseline.
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TABLE 3:  Medium-Term  Alternative  Projections  of Developments
on the Current  Account  Balance  of the  G-3 Countries
(Billion  US$ Levels)
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United States
OECD  -156.0  -134.2  -105.4  -108.3  -113.2  -116.4
IECAP  -161.3  -138.5  -128.4  - 91.3  - 74.0  - 50.0
*  WEFA  -156.1  -142.4  -146.4  -137.6  -137.0  -129.6
Japan
OECD  86.4  80.9  79.1  83.4  88.0  92.6
IECAP  86.7  77.1  74.6  48.8  39.7  26.8
W  WEFA  84.9  79.4  74.8  69.5  56.3  49.4
Germany
OECD  44.0  40.5  32.2  31.0  32.1  33.8
IECAP  44.2  42.0  41.5  25.0  20.3  13.7
WEFA  39.5  39.0  40.0  32.1  22.4  23.3
NOTE:  As IECAP's  estimates  for 1987,  1988  and 1989,  we have used the
latest  WEO (March  2) figures.
KASS-11:KINC:0006/Tablel-2:rk:March  23,  1988  14-OCT-88  15:38:00- 33 -
Contrasting  the  WEYA  view  of a  constantly  falling  U.S.  deficit  on
the  current  account  over  the  course  of  the  entire  projection  period,  the
OECD  assumes  that  the  U.S.  dollar  depreciation  to  date  has  not  been  of  a
magnitude  sufficient  to  increase  the  price-competitiveness  of  American
goods  in  the  home  market  vis-a-vis  those  of foreign  suppliers.  Therefore,
if  some  adjustment  in  the  direction  of lower  overall  import  bills  for  the
U.S.  occurs,  it  will  come  rather  as the  result  of a  shift  away  from
high-cost  suppliers  and  toward  lower-cost  ones,  in the  OECD  forecasters'
perceptions.
How  does  one  explain  what  may,  by  some,  be considered  as  an
overcautious  approach  to forecasting  on the  part  of IECAP? On the  one
hand,  our  latest  forecasts  were  based  on the  assumption  of a  large  further
U.S.  dollar  depreciation  over  the  next  few  years,  but  so  were  the  most
recent,  post-market  crash  WEFA  forecasts.  The  OECD  projections  were
explicitly  predicated  on the  assumption  of  unchanged  exchange  rate  levels
(as  of  November  10,  1987). IECAP's  use  of  variable  exchange  rates  over  the
entire  projection  period  reflects:  (1) a  high  degree  of  pessimism  about
the  prospects  of  an imminent  reemergence  of a  sound  international
monetary/financial  system;  and  (2) the  expectation  of continued  low  levels
of  confidence  on the  part  of investors  resulting  in  relatively  limited
capital  movements  with  a  consequent  loss  of  efficiency  in  terms  of foregone
opportunities  for  gain  through  foreign  investment.
In  addition,  anticipated  smaller  injections  of  liquidity  (lower
prospects  for  liquidity  growth)  in  the  international  economy,  due  to  a
sizeable  scaling  down  in  the  foreseeable  future  of  the  U.S.  current  account
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deficit  (the  counterpart  of  which  is  diminished  confidence  in the  U.S.
dollar  as  a reliable  reserve  currency),  wou,ld  already  be sufficient  to
account  for  rather  pessimistic  forecasts  of future  real  GNP  growth  in  the
OECD  area  as  a  whole.
IECAP's  much  gloomier  views  about  the  future  growth  prospects  of
the  global  economy  may  also  be due  to its  skepticism  over  the  future
availability  of funds  destined  for  the  LDC's  from  the  multilateral
organizations.
In  contrast,  Project  LINK's  forecasters'  confident  anticipation
that  GNP  growth  in the  entire  OECD  area  will  pickup  in  1991,  is  quite
consistent  with  its  projections  of aimilar  developments  ln the  individual
countries.  This  confidence  is  due,  perhaps,  to  the  LINK  forecasters'
belief  that  resumed  faster  growth  in  the  U.S.,  made  possible  by a lifting
of  the  external  constraint,  is  the  main  locomotive  which  can  pull  the  rest
of  the  world  from  its  low  growth  path. It is  also  indicative  of the  fact
that,  in  general,  LINK  has  singled  out  1991  as  the  year  most  likely  to
constitute  a turning  point,  if  not  a  watershed  in  these  forecasts.
Indeed,  it  is  difficult  to  account  for  Project  LINK's  gloom  with
regard  to  prospects  of  buoyant  U.S.  GDP  growth,  given  its  seemingly  firm
belief  in  continued  severe  dollar  depreciation,  which,  in  turn,  contributes
to  a  fast  disappearing  surplus  on the  current  account  of  Japan,  and  a
marked  worsening  of the  Italian  deficit  over  the  next  few  years. If  the
export  performance  of these  two  countries  is  expected  to  be  dealt  by far
the  heaviest  blow  by their  currencies'  constant  appreciation  vis-a-vis  the
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dollar,  American  exports  will then  most likely  profit  by this  development,
deriving  a powerful  boost,  which will  help contribute  to resumed  faster
growth  in the  United  States. 11 Alternatively,  it is the  capital  account of
these  countries  that  will suffer  most from the  continued  appreciation  of
their  currencies,  if interest  rates  do not rise  by enough to  yield a
covered  interest  differential  making it  advantageous  for investors  to
invest  in these  economies.  Project  LINK appears  to subscribe  to the latter
view, at least  in the case  of Japan.
As it turns  out, Project  LINK's  forecasters  do, indeed,  expect the
growth  rate  of U.S. exports  to exceed  tuat  of its imports,  during  the next
five  years,  and thus to contribute  positively  to overall  GNP growth in the
United States. Where their  optimism  fails  them  is in their  anticipation  of
a  very modest  growth  rate of private,  but aiso,  ptUDlic,  consumption  in tne
United  Statos.  In turn,  U.S. total  domestic  consumption  is  perceived  to
drag  until at least  1991.  This will  pull down an otherwise  considerably
higher  overall  GNP growth  rate,  by detracting  from  the invigorating
stimulus  to the  economy  due to constantly  growing  exports.
/  Although  U.S. exports  to Italy  and Japan  may not grow substantially,
the  U.S. should  become more competitive  in  other  markets.
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V.  COMPARISION  OF  ALTERNATIVE  BASELINES
A.  WEF
The  objective  of  this  exercise  is  to,  firstly,  compare  the  Wharton
and  the  World  Bank  baseline  forecasts,  with  the  latter  derived  from  running
the  Wharton  model  using  the  World  Bank's  exogenous  assumptions.  In  other
words,  Bank  exchange  rate  and  commodity  price  projections  are  imposed  as
exogenous  variables  in  the  Wharton  model. Any  differences  between  the  Bank
baseline  forecast  and  the  Wharton  forecast  could  then  be attributed  to
differences  in  the  structures  of  the  models.
Comparing  the  Bank  forecast  with  the  Bank  baseline  forecast  using
tne  lwnarton  mouel  (WEFPABAC),  we can  see  tnat  in  the  short  run  (1.988  and
1989),  GDP  growth  rates  are  quite  a  bit  lower  for  the  Bank  forecast,
whereas  from  1990  to  1992,  they  are  higher  and  in  fact  quite  a  bit  higher
in  some  iiistances  for  the  Bank  forecast  (see  Table  4). One  plausible
explanation  for  this  pattern  of  GDP  growth  is  that  a greater  wealth  effect
on  growth  is  assumed  in  the  Bank  forecast.  As  a consequence,  when  the
dollar  depreciates  further  in  1988  and  1989,  stock  and  bonid  prices  will  be
expected  to  fall  further,  which  will  decrease  the  value  of  the  private
stock  of  wealth. Consumption  and  investment  are  in  turn  expected  to
decline,  both  of  which  will  contribute  to  a steep  decline  in  GDP  growth.
This  market  action  also  contributes  greatly  towards  hastening  the
correction  of the  twin  deficits.  Therefore,  the  Bank  projections  show  a
greater  decline  in  GDP  growth  in  the  short-run,  but  also  an  earlier
correction  of the  deficit  problem.  As a result,  real  interest  rates  after
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TABLE  4:  WEFABANK  Baselinel
198E  1989  1990  1991  1992
United States
Real GDP  3.6  2.2  1.4  1.6  0.8
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  4.3  4.9  4.6  3.5  3.6
Unemployment  Rate  5.8  5.8  6.4  6.5  6.9
Current  Account Balance  -140.9  -132.1  -121.1  -126.0  -135.4
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  7.1  8.7  7.7  6.6  6.9
*  Effective  Exchange  Rate  - 15.7  - 3.2  9.8  16.2  21.2
Japan
Real  GDP  2.7  3.2  2.8  2.7  2.6
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  1.0  2.8  2.6  3.1  5.0
Unemployment  Rate  3.4  3.5  3.5  3.3  3.2
Current  Account  Balance  86.5  87.0  79.5  55.9  35.7
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  3.4  3.7  4.1  4.8  5.1
Effective  Exchange  Rate  4.9  - 0.6  - 0.5  - 4.7  - 9.5
Germany
Real GDP  1.2  1.5  3.5  4.0  4.7
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  2.2  2.1  2.5  3.2  4.4
Unemployment  Rate  9.0  8.8  8.4  7.8  7.3
Current  Account  Balance  48.1  48.2  31.5  16.4  9.9
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  4.2  5.4  4.6  5.2  5.8
Effective  Exchange  Rate  7.2  2.1  - 4.3  - 5.8  - 7.1
/  Results from  the simulation  of the  Wharton  World  Model using  The World
Bank's  exchange  rate and commodity  price projections.
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1990  under  the  Bank  forecast  are  quite  a  bit  lower  than  those  under
WEFABANK  due  to  the  now  much  lower  "crowding  out"  effect. Hence,
investment  and  GDP  growth  are  also  higher  under  the  Bank  forecast  than
under  WEFABANK  for  the  period  after  1990. In  sum,  the  differences  in  the
two  forecasts  may  therefore  be  partly  attributed  to  the  differing
assumptions  about  the  short-run  negative  wealth  effect  on  economic  growth
which  in  turn  affects  the  speed  with  which  the  deficits  are  corrected  and
hence  long-run  interest  rates  and  GDP  growth  rates.
Turning  to the  comparison  of the  Wharton  forecast  with  the
WErABANK  forecast,  the  major  differences  in  assumptions  are  the  exchange
rate  and  commodity  price  paths. The  World  Bank  and  Wharton  exchange  rate
forecasts  show  the  same  basic  trend  of  a  continued  depreciation  of the
do''a  wi-.h -. he dol'a.C hiLtti.g  a  LLUuSg  In  Lvov  ano reoounaing  chereafter.
The  difference  is  that  the  trough  under  the  Bank  forecast  is lower,  and  the
rebound  under  the  Bank  forecast  is  also  much  higher,  showing  actually  an
"overshooting".  Given  this  difference,  the  results  obtained  from  running
the  Bank  baseline  scenario  with  the  Wharton  model  are  mostly  as  expected.
Let  us  look  first  at  the  comparison  of the  forecasts  for  the  United  States.
Under  the  Bank  scenario,  the  only  year  for  which  the  forecast
shows  higher  GDP  growth  than  the  Wharton  scenario  is  1988. This  follows
logically  from  the  larger  depreciation  of  the  dollar  in  1988  anticipated
under  the  Bank  scenario.  This  larger  depreciation  of the  dollar  occurs
concurrently  with  lower  short-  and  long-term  nominal  interest  rates  as  well
as  lower  real  long-term  rates  in  that  year. In  terms  of  effective  exchange
rate,  the  decline  is  much  higher  than  under  the  Wharton  scenario,  -15.7
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percent  for  the  Bank  compared  with  only  -6.2  percent  for  Wharton.  With  a
lower  dollar  exchange  rate,  exports  enjoy  higher,  and  imports  lower  growth,
as  expected,  and  the  current  account  deficit  improves  a little. The  lower
interest  rates  also  encourage  investment,  which  shows  a much  higher  growth
rate  under  the  Bank  scenario  (7.1  percent),  compared  to  the  Wharton  growth
rate  of  4.4  percent. Private  consumption  is  also  higher  in  the  Bank
scenario  due  to  the  higher  income,  which  is  in  turn  generated  from  both
higher  investment  and  an improved  trade  balance. All  these  factors
together,  that  is,  the  higher  growth  of  consumption,  investment  and
exports,  and  the  lower  growth  of imports,  therefore  contribute  to  the
higher  GDP  growth  rate  for  1988. The  other  variables  also  show  the
expected  outcome,  with  the  personal  consumption  deflator  growing  at  a
slightly  higher  rate  (due  to  the  lower  exchange  rate),  and  the  unemployment
rate  declining  and  industrial  production  growth  rate  increasing  due  to  the
stimulus  from  higher  GDP  growth. Industrial  production,  aside  from  being
directly  affected  by  GDP  growth,  is  also  positively  related  to  investment,
which  is  itself  growing  and  which  also  contributes  to  GDP  growth. Net
government  borrowing  is  lower,  which  could  be a result  of  both  higher  tax
revenues  due  to  the  higher  GDP  growth,  as  well  as  lower  interest  rates
which  lower  interest  payments  on  the  outstanding  government  debt.
Going  on  to 1989,  the  year  in  which  the  dollar  exchange  rate  hits
the  low  point,  there  is  the  surprising  outcome  of  a slightly  lower  GDP
growth  rate  compared  with  the  Wharton  model  (in  which  the  dollar  exchange
rate  does  not  hit  quite  as low  a trough).  This  is  probably  due  to  higher
inflation  (a  result  of a lower  exchange  rates)  which  lowers  consumption
growth,  which  in  turn  lowers  GDP  growth. Exports  grow  faster  and  imports
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slower  compared  to  the  Wharton  base  case,  in  expected  response  to,  again,
the  lower  dollar  exchange  rate. The  current  account  improves  as  a
consequence,  compared  with  the  Wharton  projection  of a  current  account
deterioration  in  1989. An improvement  in  the  current  account  is  associated
with  a  decrease  in  capital  inflows,  which  leads  to  the  increase  in  interest
rates  (both  nominal  and  real)  necessary  to  attract  financing  for  the
outstanding  U.S.  debt. This  increase  in  interest  rates  over  the  Wharton
baseline  is in  turn  responsible  for  the  lower  growth  in  investment.  With
lower  GDP  and  lower  investment,  industrial.  production  is  also  lower. The
unemployment  rate  is  lowar  than  that  of  Whiarton's  despite  the  slightly
lower  GDP  growth  compared  to  Wharton's  because  of the  lagged  effect  of
higher  employment  in  the  previous  year.
From  1990  to  i992,  as  the  bank's  doliar  exchange  rates  appreciate
by a  much  larger  magnitude  than  those  of  Wharton,  the  results  of the
simulation,  as  expected,  are  that  GDP  growth  would  be lower  than  the
Wharton  projections.  Interest  rates  are  higher  (the  real  interest  rates
are  higher  through  that  entire  period,  but  the  nominal  short-term  rate
starts  coming  down  in  1992),  which  lead  to  lower  investment  (in  fact,
investment  growth  is  negative  in  1992). Concurrent  with  the  lower  growth
in  GDP  is  lower  consumption  growth,  which,  with  the  multiplier  effect,
lowers  GDP  growth  even  further  in  comparison  with  the  Wharton  numbers.
Industrial  production,  a function  of  both  investment  and  GDP,  slows  down
considerably  in  the  entire  period,  growing  at a  lower  rate  compared  to  the
Wharton  scenario.  The  higher  dollar  appreciation  in  this  period  in
comparison  to the  Wharton  scenario  also  leads  to  the  expected  lower  growth
in  exports  and  higher  grovth  in  imports.  This  results  in  a deterioration
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in  the  current  account.  with  the  exception  of  1990.  when  the  current
account  improves  despite  worsened  export  vo,lume  growth  and  higher  import
volume  growth;  a  result  of the  J-curve  effect. In  contrast,  the  Wharton
current  account  balance  actually  improves  from  1990  to 1992. This  is  in
part  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Wharton  dollar  appreciation  is  of  a  much
smaller  magnitude.  as  well  as  duration,  compared  with  the  Bank  dollar
forecasts.  In  fact,  for  some  of the  major  currencies,  the  dollar  begins  to
depreciate  in  1992  in  the  Wharton  forecast.
In  the  medium-term  (1990-91),  the  WEFABANK  inflation  rates  are  the
same  as those  of the  Wharton  forecast,  despite  lower  economic  activity  and
higher  dollar  exchange  rates  compared  with  the  Wharton  scenario.  This  is
because  of  the  lagged  effect  of  higher  inflation  in  the  previous  two  years.
From  1992  to  1994,  the  inflation  rates  are  lower  than  those  of  Wharton  in
line  with  the  lower  level  of  economic  activity  and  higher  value  of the
dollar  exchange  rate  forecasted,  and  also  because  the  lagged  effects  of
inflation  from  the  earlier  years  have  dissipated.  In  1992,  the  nominal
long-  and  short-term  interest  rates  begin  to  grow  at a  slower  rate  than
those  in  the  Wharton  scenario,  probably  because  of the  sustained  lower
levels  of  economic  activity  and  inflation  compared  with  the  Wharton
scenario.
Compared  to  the  Wharton  scenario,  the  lower  dollar  has  also
lowered  the  growth  in imports  though  exports  still  grow  at  a lower  rate
compared  to  the  Wharton  scenario.  This  is  probably  due  to  the  J-curve
effect. As  a result,  there  is  a slight  worsening  of  the  current  account
balance  despite  the  depreciation  of the  dollar.
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So  far  we have  discussed  in  detail  the  results  for  the  U.S.
economy  of the  simulation  of the  Wharton  model  Using  Bank  baseline
assumptions.  Turning  nov  briefly  to  the  other  major  OECD  economies,  one
would  expect  that  the  results  for  these  economies  of  using  Bank  assumptions
in  the  Wharton  model  should  be  more  or less  the  mirror  opposites  of those
for  the  U.S.  economy.  With  the  dollar  depreciating  to  a  new  trough  in
1989,  the  other  currencies  appreciate  to  a  new  height. This  should  result
in  a shrinkage  of their  GDP  growth  in  the  late  1980's.  And  when  the  dollar
starts  appreciating  after  1989,  one  would  expect  these  economies  to  grow
faster. The  German  and  the  Italian  economy  seem  to  fall.  into  this  pattern,
but  it  is  not  quite  true  for  the  Japanese  economy.
German  GDP  growth  does  slow  down  in  1988  and  1989  compared  to  the
Wharton  growth  rates  as the  deutsche  mark  appreciates  against  the  dollar  at
a higher  rate  under  the  Bank  scenario  than  under  the  Wharton  scenario.  And
when  the  deutsche  mark  starts  depreciating  against  the  dollar  after  1990,
and  at  a steeper  rate  of  decline  compared  with  the  Wharton  model,  the  GDP
growth  rates  overtake  those  of  Wharton. Similar  results  are  found  for  the
Italian  economy,  with  GDP  growing  at  a lower  rate  in  the  1988-90  period
compared  to  the  Wharton  scenario  as the  lira  appreciates  st  a  higher  rate
against  the  dollar  compared  to  the  Wharton  scenario.  From  1991  onwards,  as
the  Italian  lira  depreciates  against  the  dollar  at  a  higher  rate  than  under
the  Wharton  scenario,  GDP  growth  rates  surpass  those  of  Wharton. The  other
economic  variables  for  both  the  German  and  Italian  economies  follow
logically  the  pattern  of  GDP  growth.
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The  results  are  different,  however,  for  the  Japanese  economy.
First,  movements  in  the  yen  effective  exchange  rate  do  not  seem  to
synchronize  with  movements  in  the  dollar  exchange  rate,  at  least  not  all
the  time. For  instance,  the  dollar  is  expected  to  depreciate  to  a  low
trough  in  1989,  which  should  imply  an  appreciation  of the  yen  that  year.
However,  the  yen  effective  exchange  rate  is  actually  depreciating  in  that
year. On  the  other  hand,  after  1989,  the  yen  effective  exchange  rate  does
move  in  the  direction  expected,  that  is,  depreciate  given  the  appreciation
of the  dollar  in  that  period.
Movements  in  the  yen  exchange  rate  do  not  seem  to  generate  the
expected  effects  on  trade  either. A steeper  depreciation  of the  yen
throughout  the  1989-92  period  under  the  Bank  scenario  actually  leads  to
lower  export  growth  in  comparison  to  the  Wharton  scenario,  for  all  the
years  except  1989. This  could  be  due  to lower  GDP  growth  in  the  U.S.
during  that  period. On the  other  hand,  it  does  lead  to  the  expected  lower
growth  in  imports,  except  for  1989. Overall,  the  current  account  does  not
move  in  the  direction  expected.  It  registers  a  continued  decline  in  the
surplus  despite  continued  depreciation  of the  yen,  on top  of  registering  a
lower  surplus  than  under  the  Wharton  model  even  with  the  higher  yen
depreciation  under  the  Bank  scenario.
Japanese  nominal  interest  rates  seem  to  follow  in  general  the
movements  of the  exchange  rate,  that  is,  decrease  as  the  yen  depreciates.
and  vice-versa.  The  real  interest  rate  also  seems  to  move  in  the  direction
of the  exchange  rate,  except  for  1989,  when  it  is  higher  than  the  Wharton
number,  due  to  a lower  inflation  rate. This  lower  inflation  rate  does  not
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concur  with the  yen depreciation  of that  year, although  it could  be due to
the lagged  effect  of the  previous  year's low inflation  rate.  For the rest
of the  period,  however, the inflation  rates  move in the correct  direction,
that  is, they  become  higher given  the depreciating  yen.
The  worsening trade  balance  under the  Bank scenario  probably
contributes  to the lower  GDP growth  rate,  which in turn  worsens the
investment  growth rate.  In fact,  investment  growth  does  not follow  the
movement  of interest  rates; it is  actually  lower  or stays the same despite
the  lower real interest  rate in the  period 1990-92. GDP growth  probably
has a stronger  effect  on investment  than interest  rates  do.  Given the
lower  GDP growth,  consumption  growth  is also lower.
In all, it seems  that the  Japanese  economy  does  not react in  an
expected  fashion  to assumptions  under the  Bank scenario.  In particular,
depreciation  of the  yen does not lead  to improvement  in its  current  account
or  higher  GDP growth.  This could  be due to  a combination  of the following
factors.  First,  Japanese  exports  to the  U.S. could  make up such  a large
percentage  of U.S. imports  that  when the  U.S.  economy slows  down during
those  years of dollar  appreciation,  the  concurrent  slow-down  in  U.S.
exports  could  have a rather  large  constricting  effect  on Japanese  export
growth.  Second,  the  J-curve  effect for  Japan  could  have a much longer  time
horizon.
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B.  OECD
Using IECAP's  exchange  rate  projections  and IECCM's  commodity
price projections,  a World Bank-OECD  baseline (OECDBANK)  was developed.
Tne following  section  describes  the new  baseline.
In comparing  the IECAP  forecast  with the Bank  baseline  using the
OECD model (OECDBANK),  one quickly  sees that  while the IECAP  forecast  shows
a near-term  slow-down  in  economic  growth  in the  U.S., followed  by a modest
recovery  in the 1990s.  the simulation  results  are quite the  opposite.  In
fact, the  OECDBANK  results  are  quite startling. Real  GNP in the  U.S. grows
by 2.9 percent in  1988, slightly  higher than the  consensus  forecasts  of 2.5
percent  or so, and  way above the  IECAP  forecast  of 2.1  percent.  One reason
*fnr  th4s  mAw  ha  the amp-eead  11 nereant  avrwth  in  evnnrt  vontumae-  comnarad
to growth  of less than  one percent  in imports. This leads to a fall in  the
U.S. current  account  deficit to  U.S. $141  billion.  Domestic  demand  grows
slowly (1.1  percent),  indicating  that  wealth  effects from  the  October stock
market  crash do  have an impact.
What is  noteworthy  about this  forecast  is that  GNP growth  remains
moderately  strong  at 2.3  percent in 1989  and 1990,  while other forecasts
show these  as  being recessionary  years.  GNP seems  to be driven  by the
external  sector in 1989,  while in  1990, there  is  no effect from the
external  sector.  By 1990, the  current:  account  deficit  has fallen  to U.S.
$72  billion.
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TABLE 5:  OECDBANK  Baselinel
(Percent  Change)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United  States
GNP  2.9  2.3  1.7  0.7  - 0.2
GNP Deflator  3.2  4.6  5.2  4.5  2.8
Total Employment  1.9  1.6  1.4  0.9  0.1
CAB (US$  Billion)  -140.5  93.6  71.7  - 81.3  -110.0
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  5.65  5.70  5.53  5.63  5.47
*  Effective  Exchange  Rate  0.905  0.876  0.956  1.096  1.300
Germany
GNP  1.4  0.8  1.1  2.3  4.7
GNP Deflator 2 0.9  0.0  0.7  2.2  4.9
Total Employment  0.1  - 0.2  0.0  0.8  2.0
CAB (USS  Billion)  51.9  35.1  13.1  9.1  14.5
Short-Term  Interest  Rate 3 5.5  5.4  5.0  4.7  4.4
Effective  Exchange  Rate  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Japan
GNP  3.7  3.4  3.3  3.3  4.0
GNP Deflator  0.64  1.1  1.4  2.8  4.6
Total Employment  0.9  0.8  1.0  1.0  1.2
CAB (US$  Billion)  92.4  95.3  86.0  73.8  66.9
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  3.5  3.75  3.7  3.6  3.5
Effective  Exchange  Rate  1.76  1.75  1.74  1.65  1.49
l/  Results  from the simulation  of the  OECD model  using The  World Bank's exchange
rate and commodity  price  projections.
~/  Consumption  Deflator
i~/  Long-Term  Interest  Rate for Germany
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After  1990,  when  other  forecasts  indicate  that  the  U.S.  will  be
recovering,  OECDBANK  indicates  that  matters.will  got  much  worse. In fact,
from  1991-1993,  growth  is  near  zero. A great  deal  of  this  is  due  to  the
expected  appreciation  of  the  dollar  in  those  years. In  fact,  the  model
results  indicate  that  export  growth  will  come  to  a  halt,  while  imports  grow
substantially.  Thus,  one  can  see,  Interlink  is  very  sensitive  to  exchange
rate  movements.
For  Germany,  as  one  might  expect,  the  forecast  follows  a  similar,
but  opposite  pattern  as for  the  United  States. The  German  economy  grows
well  in  1988-89,  starts  to  slow  in  1990,  reaches  a  nadir  in  1991,  and
recovers  slightly  thereafter.  This  follows,  as  expected,  the  movement  of
the  deutsche  mark  vis-a-vis  the  dollar.
There  are  several  problems  with  the  simulation  results  for
Germany. Foremost  among  these  is  that  consumer  prices  reach  a rate  of
change  of  4.9  percent  in  1992  and  7.8  percent  in  1993. Obviously,  while
possibly  a  consistent  result,  policy  actions  would  be taken  long  in  advance
of  reaching  this  stage. Therefore,  this  must  be  considered  a strictly
"hands-off"  scenario.
In  Japan,  GNP  growth  remains  relatively  strong  throughout  the
forecast  period,  although  falling  from  a  high  of  4.3  percent  growth  in  1988
to  a low  of 2.4  percent  in  1992. The  declining  rate  of  growth  in  1988-90
is  largely  due  to  the  appreciating  yen,  but  the  turnaround  is  not  as  quick
for  Japan  as for  other  countries  when  the  dollar  rebounds.
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In comparison  with  OECD's own medium-term  baseline,  OECDBANK is
more  optimistic  for the  U.S. for 1989-90,  and  much more pessimistic  for the
later  years.  This result is  very much the same  as in the comparison  of
OECDBANK  with IECAP's  forecast.
In fact, it is reelly  not necessary  to present  a complete
comparison  of these two  baselines.  First,  the comparison  is  very much the
same  cs the comparison  between  OECDBANK  and IECAP's  forecast.  Second,  and
more importantly,  the overriding  factor in the  comparison  is that  OECDBANK
includes  a major  dollar  depreciation,  followed  by a strong  rebound,  while
the OECD  medium-term  baseline  follows  constant  real exchange  rates.  All
results  are intuitive  from  this  difference.
C. LINg
This baseline  scenario  is  derived  by imposing  World Bank exchange
rates  and commodity  price forecasts  on the LINK  baseline (we  will call this
LINKBANK). While LINK forecasts  a continued  depreciation  of the dollar
through  1992,  the  World Bank forecasts  a rebound  of the  dollar  after it
reaches  a trough in 1989.  The trough  reached  by the  dollar in the  World
Bank  case is also much lower  than the  dollar  exchange  rate for 1989
forecasted  by LINK.  Given these  different  exchange  rate  paths, the results
of the simulation  are somewhat  surprising. GNP growth  for LINKBANK  in 1988
and 1989 is only slightly  higher than that for  the LINK  baseline,  despite  a
lower  dollar forecasted  by the Bank for  those two  years.  In 1990,  when the
dollar  starts  appreciating  in  the Bank  case  while it  continues  to
depreciate  for LINK, the LINKBANK  GNP growth is lower,  as to  be expected.
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However,  this  lower  GNP growth  rebounds in 1991,  and is  only slightly  lower
than the  LINK case and in fact  overtakes  the LINK  case  by 1992.  These
latter  results  are surprising  given that  the Bank  dollar  exchange  rate
continues  to appreciate  while the LINK rate  contirues  zo depreciate.
The relatively  high  GNP growth  rates  for 1991 and 1992  could in
part  be explained  by the  continued improvement  in the trade  balance even
when the  dollar  begins its  upturn.  This  could  be due to the J-curve
effect.  This is  borne  out in  particular  by the  pattern  of nominal exports.
Nominal  exports  decrease  although  real exports  remain  more or less the
same.  This is due to the  decrease  in ttie  export  price index,  which in turn
may  be due to the  fact that  with the higher  dollar,  the  prices of imported
inputs  go down, cutting  the cost  of production  of the  exportable  goods and
hence lowering  the  export  price index.  Where imports  are concerned,  the
nominal  value of imports  goes  down even though  real imports  actually
increase. This implies  that the import  price index  must be declining
(which  it is  by quite  a bit), due to the  appreciating  dollar.  Since
nominal imports  decrease  more than  nominal  exports,  both the trade  account
and the  current  account  improve.
The federal  deficit  decreases inder  the  LINKEANK  scenario  in 1988,
which  may be attributable  to the slightly  higher  GNP growth  rate and  hence
slightly  higher tax  revenues  which lower  the federal  deficit.  This lower
deficit  continues  into 1989,  when interest  rates  also fall  slightly.  The
lower  interest  rates  are in  turn attributable  to the lower  deficit  and
hence less "crowding  out".  By 1990,  when GNP growth  has slowed,  interest
rates  and the deficit  continue  to fall,  but for  different  reasons  now.
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TABLE 6:  LINKBANK  Baselinel
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United States
Real GDP  2.5  1.4  1.2  3.1  3.2
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  4.6  5.0  4.5  5.4  5.3
Unemployment  Rate  5.8  5.9  7.1  6.5  6.6
Current  Account Balance  -129.2  -105.1  - 91.9  - 84.3  - 76.3
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  6.2  7.4  6.7  6.6  6.6
*  Effective  Exchange  Rate  - 13.8  - 2.9  7.1  12.4  12.6
Japan
Real  GDP  4.6  3.2  3.8  4.3  4.9
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  1.5  1.7  1.7  2.4  6.3
Unemployment  Rate  2.9  3.0  3.0  3.1  2.9
Current  Account Balance  81.1  79.7  81.5  87.8  117.2
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  4.8  5.8  7.0  7.4  7.6
Effective  Exchange  Rate  - 15.6  - 1.7  7.1  15.5  24.2
Germany
Real GDP  - 0.2  1.8  5.5  5.8  4.5
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  1.7  2.4  3.5  6.3  8.8
Unemployment  Rate  9.5  9.6  9.2  7.3  5.5
Current  Account  Balance  41.4  43.1  34.3  42.0  31.3
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  3.7  4.4  4.8  4.8  5.0
Effective  Exchange  Rate  - 21.1  - 5.3  15.1  23.2  15.0
_/  Results  from the simulation  of Project  LINK  using  The World Bank's
exchange  rate  and commodity  price  projections.
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Interest  rates  fall  because  of the  lower  investment  demand  due  to  lower  GNP
growth. This  is  borne  out  by the  slight  decrease  in  non-residential
investment  in  1990. As interest  rates  fall,  interest  payments  on the
outstanding  federal  debt  fall,  and  hence  the  federal  deficit  decreases.
This  pattern  of decreasing  GNP  growth,  investment  demand,  interest  rates,
and  federal  deficits  continues  into  1991  and  1992,  and  at greater
percentages,  in  particular  for  the  last  two  variables.  The  rates  of
decrease  in  GNP  growth  and  investment  demand  both  level  off  after  1991.
The  GNP  deflator  increases  somewhat  in  1988  and  1989,  as  GNP
growth  increases.  The  GNP  deflator  continues  to  be higher  in  1990  and
1991,  even  though  GNP  growth  is  lower. This  is  probably  because  of the
lagged  effects  of inflation.  In  1992,  the  GNP  deflator  drops  finally,
after  three  conseeutive  years  of slower  GNP  growth. On the  other  hand,  the
unemployment  rate  follows  GNP  growth,  and  is  lower  in  1988  and  1989  when
GNP  is  higher,  and  higher  in  1990-92  when  GNP  is  lower.
Turning  now  to  the  Japanese  economy,  the  GNP  growth  rate  is
actually  higher  all  through  the  forecast  period,  though  not  by  much  in  1988
and  1989. This  fits  in  with  the  yen  exchange  rate  forecasts,  whereby  both
LINK  and  the  World  Bank  forecast  a  yen  appreciation  of quite  similar
magnitudes  for  the  first  two  years,  followed  by a  divergence  afterwards
with  the  World  Bank  forecasting  a  severe  depreciation  and  LINK  forecasting
continued  gradual  appreciation.  The  percentage  increase  in  GNP  levels
under  the  LINKBANK  scenario  compared  to  the  LINK  baseline  gets
progressively  larger  from  1990-92,  which  goes  along  with  the  increasingly
larger  depreciation  of the  yen  under  the  LINKBANK  scenario.
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Most  of this  increase  in  GNP  is  attributable  to  the  improvement  in
the  trade  account  in  that  period,  which  goes  along  with  the  yen
depreciation  in  the  same  period. As in the  case  for  GNP,  the  improvement
in  the  trade  account  gets  progressively  larger  through  the  forecast  period.
With  the  higher  GNP,  consumption  is  also  higher,  although  by a smaller
percentage.  The  higher  GNP  also  leads  to  higher  private  investment.
Interest  rates  decline  somewhat  in  1989,  possibly  due  to  the  lagged  effect
of  the  slightly  higher  yen  appreciation  in  1988.  -- om 1990  to 1992,
interest  rstes  continue  to increase,  and  at  higher  percentages,  probably
the  result  of  progressively  larger  yen  depreciation  in  that  period. This
rise  in  interest  rates  is  also  the  proximate  cause  of the  increasingly
large  decline  in  housing  investment  in  the  1990-92  period. The  decline  in
housing  investment,  however,  is  outweighed  by increases  in  other  types  of
rrivate  investment  due to the increase  in  GNP zo that  total pri-ate
investment  is  higher.
Inflation  seems  to  follow  the  path  of  GNP,  but  with  a lag. After
three  consecutive  years  of lower  inflation  starting  in  1988,  inflation
starts  to  pick  up in  1991  and  continues  through  1992. Finally,  the
unemployment  rate  seems  to  move  in  line  with  GNP;  it  drops  all  through  the
period,  and  at  greater  percentages  as  the  increase  in  GNP  grows  larger.
As for  the  German  economy,  the  differences  in  exchange  rate
forecasts  between  the  World  Bank  and  LINK  are  quite  a  bit  more  severe,  and
the  outcome  of the  simulation  shows  the  more  marked  effects  of a  deutsche
mark  appreciation  in 1988-89  and  depreciation  in  1990-92.  German  GDP
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decreases  from the LINK  baseline  in the first  period, in  line with the
deutsche  mark appreciation,  and it increases  from the  LINK  baseline in the
second  period, in line  with the  deutsche  mark depreciation.
The World Bank forecasts  a  much stronger  appreciation  of the
deutsche  mark in 1988-89  then  LINK.  And whereas  LINK forecasts  a much
milder  but sustained  appreciation  of the  mark throughout  the forecast
period,  the  World Bank forecasts  a rather  sharp downturn  of the  mark after
it reaches  a peak in 1989.  By 1991,  the  mark is  at a  much lower  level
under the  Bank scenario  than  under the  LINK scenario.  Given these  exchange
rate forecasts,  the  LINKBANK  outcome  for the trade  account  for  Germany is
as expected.  The trade  balance  worsens in  1988 and 1989  compared  to the
LINK  baseline,  and it improves  over  the LINK  baseline in the  remaining
yrz.  The eurrent  account  follows  more nor  loa  tha  snma nath  With  this
result  for the trade  account,  GNP is  higher than the  LINK  baseline in the
first two  years and lower in  the remaining  period.  Private investment
follows  the same  pattern  as GNP, although  housing investment  follows  the
reverse  pattern.  This  reverse  pattern is  also found for  private
consumption. This pattern  for  both private  consumption  and housing
investment  may be due to higher interest  rates in  the 1990-92  period, a
result  of the  rather severe  deutsche  mark depreciation  in that  period.
The unemployment  rate  follows  more or less  the path  of GNP, being
higher than the  baseline in the  earlier  years  when GNP is lower,  and lower
than the  baseline  in the later  years  when  GNP is  higher.  Finally,
inflation  seems to follow  GNP with quite  a lag,  being lower  than  baseline
for the entire  forecast  period  except for  1988,  when it is slightly  higher.
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We now  turn  finally  to  the  Italian  economy.  While  LINK  forecasts
a lira  that  appreciates  somewhat  in  1988  and  1989  and  then  remains  stable
thereafter,  the  Bank  forecasts  a lira  that  appreciates  by a  much  larger
magnitude  in  1988  and  1989,  and  then  depreciates  by  quite  a  bit  thereafter.
Again,  given  these  exchange  rate  forecasts,  the  outcome  of the  simulation
is  as  expected.
With  the  large  appreciation  of  the  lira  in  1988  and  1989,  GNP  for
those  years  is  smaller.  In  fact,  GNP  in  absolute  terms  is  still  lower  than
the  LINK  baseline  in  1990,  although  the  growth  rate  of  GNP  has  rebounded
for  the  LINKBANK  scenario  in  that  year. This  is  because  the  depression  of
GNP  must  have  been  quite  severe  in  the  first  two  years. After  1990,  GNP
rebounded,  both  in  absolute  terms  and  growth  rates,  in  line  with  a rapidly
depreciatine  lira.
Again,  as in  the  case  for  Germany  above,  most  of  the  effect  on  GNP
is  derived  from  the  trade  account,  which  responds  in  a  manner  close  to  what
is  expected.  The  trade  account  deteriorates  in  comparison  with  the  LINK
baseline  all  through  the  period  1988-91,  even  though  the  lira  has  already
started  to  rebound  in  1990. The  outcome  for  the  last  year  is  due  to  the
J-curve  effect. The  trade  account  improves  relative  to  baseline  in  1992,
following  the  depreciation  of the  lira  which  has  already  started  one  year
earlier.  Movements  in the  current  account  balance  follow  quite  closely
those  in  the  trade  account,  with  the  improvement  actually  beginning  sooner,
in  1991.
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Private  consumption  is  lower  than  the  baseline  for  the  years  that
GNP  is  lower  than  baseline,  that  is,  1988-90.  Private  investment  falls  in
the  first  year,  and  is  follwed  by such  relatively  slow  growth  all  through
the  forecast  period  that  in  absolute  terms  it  never  catches  up  with  the
baseline  level  even  in  1992. This  is  due  to the  lower  GNP  in  the  earlier
years  and  probably  also  the  lagged  effects  of  lower  GNP  on investment.
Interest  rates  follow  a  path  that  is  expected  given  the  path  for  exchange
rates. Interest  rates  are  lower  than  the  baseline  in  1988-90  when  the  lira
is  appreciating,  and  they  are  higher  than  the  baseline  in  1991-92  when  the
lira  is  depreciating.  Investment  demand  does  not  therefore  seem  very
sensitive  to  interest  rates. Interestingly,  while  both  the  private
consumption  deflator  and  the  private  investment  deflator  follow  the  path  of
GNP,  both  being  lower  than  the  baseline  when  GNP  is  lower,  and  higher  than
dne bas el  ine  wuen GNP is  1igh1ih ,  tcI  GNrP  deJlatoLr  d-es  n-ot  follow  eit.her
and  is  higher  in  the  period  1988-90,  only  to  come  down  somewhat  in  1991-92.
Finally,  the  unemployment  rate  follows  GNP  closely,  being  higher  in  years
when  GNP  is  lower,  and  lower  in  years  when  GNP  is  higher.
VI.  IMPACT  MULTIPLIERS12
Although  the  main  focus  in  each  of the  simulations  has  been  on the
U.S.,  Germany,  Japan,  and  to  some  extent,  Italy,  in  each  case  the  "rest  of
the  world"  has  been  solved  endogenously.  This  allows  for  spill-over
I/  The  impact  multiplier  is  defined  as the  percentage  change  in  the
growth  rate  of the  variable  in  question,  divided  by the  percentage
change  in  the  policy  variable.
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effects  from  each  individual  country  to  its  trading  partners,  followed  by
feedback  to the  originating  economy.  The  alternative  simulations  run  with
each  model  include  a fiscal  shock  in  the  U.S.,  a fiscal  shock  in  Japan,  a
monetary  shock in the  U.S., and a combination  of all three.  This section
will  focus  on  the  impact  multipliers  inherent  in  each  model,  as evidenced
by the  results  of the  first  three  alternative  simulations.
The  main  emphasis  of  this  section  will  be on  the  specific  model
mechanisms  involved,  rather  than  on  the  feasibility  or  desirability  of
various  changes  in  macroeconomic  policy  or their  influence  on the  real
world. We  have  already  seen  that  Bank  baselines  using  outside  models  yield
predictable  results.  This  section  will  examine  the  degree  to  which  policy
changes  affect  these  outside  models. For  example,  we  know  that  a
contractin-r-y  fiscal  policy  will  have  certain  af'ects.  This  section  will
show  whether  those  effects  are  equal  across  models.
In  order  to  study  impact  multiplier  effects,  we  will  focus  on four
variables  for  three  countries.  They  are  real  GNP/GDP,  GNP/GDP  deflator,
investment,  and  the  long-  or  short-term  interest  rate,  depending  on the
model  involved,  for  the  U.S.,  Germany,  and  Japan. A table  will  show  the
impact  multipliers  for  each  scenario.
KMSS-11:KlIG:OOOCIZN&1987-93:rk:February  25.  1988  14-OCT-88 11s32:00- 57 -
A.  WEF
i. U.S.  Monetary  Ease
In  this  scenario,  the  U.S.  discount  rate  was  lowered  (a  one-time
sustained  shock)  by 200  basis  points  in  each  year  of  the  forecast,  starting
in  1988. Non-borrowed  reserves  were  not  increased  to  accommodate  this
shock. For  the  U.S.  economy,  the  WEFA  model  indicates  low  sensitivity  of
real  growth  to  changes  in  the  money  supply. Stimulation  of the  economy
through  a sustained  lowering  of the  discount  rate  mainly  increases  leakages
from  the  economy  in  the  form  of  higher  imports,  and  hence,  deterioration  of
the  current  account.  Real  GDP  growth  increases  only  a  little. There  are,
surprisingly,  very  little  inflationary  effects  from  monetary  stimulation.
*e  .0.1ow-.ng  i's a  ..  dota  d  J&  tiscussion  vf  the  eZ&  o  r  -- 'eC
individual  variables.
For  the  U.S.,  a  sustained  200  basis  point  decline  in  the  discount
rate  starting  in  1988  lowers  the  short-term  interest  rate  all  through  the
forecast  period,  starting  with  a 1.2  percent  decrease  in  1988,  with  the
magnitude  of the  decrease  growing  each  year  due  to  the  own  lagged  effect  of
the  short-term  rate. Since  the  long-term  interest  rate  is  directly  related
to the  short-term  rate  as  well  as to  itself  lagged  one  period,  the
long-term  rate  also  decreases,  and  at  growing  magnitudes  through  the  end  of
the  period.
The  decrease  in  long-term  interest  rates  in  turn  spurs  higher
growth  in  investment.  However,  although  the  decline  in interest  rates  is
progressively  larger  over  time,  the  trend  of investment  growth  has  the
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reverse  outcome.  Simulation  results  show  that  the  increase  in  investment
growth  is  the  smallest  in  1988,  largest  in  1989,  slightly  lower  in  1990,
lower  again  in  1991  and  higher  in  1992  (see  Table  7).
The  pattern  of  percentage  increase  in  GDP  growth  for  each
percentage  decline  in  the  discount  rate  follows  that  of the  change  in
investment  growth,  being  the  low,  -0.31  percent  in  1988,  dropping  to  -0.17
in  1989,  then  back  up to -0.47  in  1990,  -0.39  in  1991,  and  actually
increasing  to -0.41  in  1992.
The unemployment  rate  is  improved  somewhat  throughout  the  forecast
period,  and  in fact  more  so  in  the  later  years  than  in  the  earlier  years,
the,  result  of  lagged  employment  effects.
The  current  account  balance  deteriorates,  increasingly  so  in  the
period  1988-91,  with  the  deterioratlon  becoming  milder  in  the  last  two
years  of  the  forecast  period. It  therefore  appears  that  the  strongest
effect  on the  current  account  occurs  in  the  medium-term.
Monetary  ease  seems  to  have  only  very  little  effect  on  prices. In
fact,  the  only  significant  impact  is  in  the  last  two  years  of  the  forecast.
Table  7  shows  the  percentage  increase  in  the  personal  consumption  deflator
for  each  percentage  decrease  in  the  discount  rate.
In  sum,  two  distinct  trends  emerge  from  observations  of the
variables  discussed  above. First,  for  GDP,  the  effects  of  a  sustained
lowering  of the  discount  rate  seem  to  follow  a slight  cyclical  path  with
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TABLE  7: WEFA
Impact  Multipliers
Easy  Honeyl
Year  1  2  3  4  5  Mean
Long-Term  Interest  Rate
United  States  0.18  0.33  0.46  0.66  0.81  0.49
Germany  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.09  0.04  0.06
* Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.07  0.03
Investment
United States  - 0.64  - 6.88  - 2.80  -1.04  - 3.27  - 2.93
Germany  - 0.22  - 0.14  - 0.08  - 0.11  - 0.13  - 0.14
* Japan  0.00  -0.08  - 0.10  - 0.09  0.00  - 0.05
Private  Consumption  Deflator
United  States  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.09  - 0.09  0.04
Germany  0.00  - 0.18  0.00  0.00  - 0.07  - 0.05
Japan  0.00  0.14  0.00  0.00  - 0.07  0.01
Real  GNP/GDP
United  States  - 0.31  - 0.17  -0.47  - 0.39  - 0.41  -0.35
Germany  - 0.31  - 0.25  - 0.09  - 0.16  - 0.0'  - 0.18
Japan  - 0.14  - 0.12  - 0.24  - 0.23  - 0.1l  - 0.17
1/  Lowering  of the  U.S.  discount  rate  by 200  basis  points  for  each  year  of  the
forecast.
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the  turnaround  occurring  in  the  second  year  of the  shock. A large  effect
is  felt  in  the  first  year,  followed  by  a smaller  one  in the  second  year,
recovering  back  up in  the  third,  dropping  in  the  fourth  year,  and  finally,
recovering  again  in  the  final  year. Second,  for  unemployment,  the  current
account  balance,  and  inflation,  the  effActs  increase  over  the  forecast
horizon,  and  only  start  to  come  down  either  in  the  last  or  second  to  last
year  of the  forecast  period.
Under  conditions  of  exogenously  determined  exchange  rates,
monetary  ease  in  the  U.S.  has  a stimulative  effect  on the  German  economy.
In  order  to  maintain  fixed  exchange  rates,  a lowering  of  the  U.S.  discount
rate  which  in  turn  lowers  U.S.  interest  rates  has  to  be accompanied  by a
lowering  of interest  rates  in  Germany  also.
The  lowering  of  German  interest  rates  in  turn  increases  investment
growth,  by 0.22,  0.14,  ana  0.08  for  each  of the  years  1988-90  and  by an
average  of  0.12  for  each  of the  years  1991-92  for  each  percentage  decrease
in  the  U.S.  discount  rate. Higher  rates  of investment  growth  lead  to
increases  in  real  GDP  growth,  by 0.31,  0.25,  and  0.09  for  each  of the  years
1988-90,  0.16  in  1991,  and  0.07  in  1992  for  each  percentage  decrease  in  the
U.S.  discount  rate. It  seems,  therefore,  that  the  effects  on  GDP  growth
are  quite  similar  to  those  on investment  growth,  both  of  which  follow  a
trend  of  decreasing  magnitude  towards  the  end  of the  forecast  period. In
comparison  with  the  effects  of this  shock  on the  U.S.  economy,  however,  the
effects  on  the  German  economy  are  considerably  smaller.
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With  an lncrease  ln  the  GDP  growth  rate,  the  unemployment  rate
starts  to  decline  after  two  years,  wlth  the  decllne  greater  at  the  end  of
the  forecast  period.
The  personal  consumption  deflator  in  Germany,  on the  other  hand,
does  not  seem  to  be  much  affected  by this  U.S.  policy  shock. It  does
increase  somewhat,  by  0.18  for  each  percentage  decrease  in  the  U.S.
discount  rate  for  1989  and  by  0.07  in  1992. It  remains  unchanged  for  the
other  years.
FLnally,  the  variable  which  seems  to  be most  affected  by the  U.S.
policy  shock  is the  German  current  account,  which  improves  slightly  each
year. Unlike  the  case  for  some  of the  other  variables  such  as  GDP,
investment  and  unemployment,  all  of  which  improve  more  towards  the  end  of
the  forecast  period,  the  current  account  balance  benefits  the  most  towards
the  beginning  of the  period.
A monetary  ease  policy  in  the  U.S.  has  a  stimulative  effect  on the
Japanese  economy.  With  a lowering  of the  discount  rates  in the  U.S.,  and
in  order  to  maintain  exogenously  determined  exchange  rates,  Japanese
interest  rates  will  have  to  fall. However,  Japanese  interest  rates  do  not
start  decreasing  until  1990,  and  when  they  do,  they  decline  at  smaller
magnitudes  than  in  the  case  of  Germany. Starting  in  1990  and  until  1992,
the  Japanese  short-term  rates  decrease  by 0.07  percent  for  each  percentage
decrease  in  the  U.S.  discount  rate.
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This  decline  in  Japanese  interest  rates  in  turn  increases
investment  growth  in  Japan,  although  not  exactly  in  a  one-to-one  fashion.
The  increase  in investment  growth  starts  in  1989,  before  interest  rate
changes.  This  is  probably  because  investment  is  also  stimulated  by GDP
growth,  which  in  turn  is  stimulated  by  higher  exports  as the  U.S.  economy
engages  in  a  monetary  expansion  policy. This  conjecture  is  substantiated
by the  improvement  in  the  current  account  balance  all  through  the  forecast
period. The  improvements  in  the  current  account  balance  increase  over
time,  reaching  a  maximum  in  1991. The  magnitudes  of  the  improvements  are
higher  than  they  are  for  the  German  economy  for  the  entire  period,  probably
because  the  U.S.  serves  as  a  more  important  export  market  for  the  Japanese
than  it  does  for  the  Germans.
Both  the  increase  in  investment  growth  and  the  improvement  in  the
trade  account  contribute  to  increases  in  GDP  growth. These  rates  of  change
from  the  baseline  are  similar  to  those  for  Germany.  However,  unlike  the
case  for  Germany,  the  unemployment  rates  in  Japan  are  not  affected  at  all.
The  Japanese  personal  consumption  deflator  is  not  much  affected  by
this  U.S.  policy  shock,  as is  the  case  for  Germany.  For  half  of  the
forecast  period,  there  is  no change  at  all. For  1989  the  deflator  changes
by  +0.14  for  each  percentage  decrease  in  the  U.S.  discount  rate,  while  in
1992,  it  changes  by -0.07.
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ii. U.S.  Tax  Increase
The  tax  increase  scenario  is  used  to  test  the  effect  of a  one-time
sustained  shock  in fiscal  policy  in  the  United  States. The  tax  increase
begins  in  1990,  with  a 10  percent  increase  in  the  average  combined  personal
and  corporate  tax  rates. For  most  of the  variables,  a tax  increase
simulation  produces  significant  effects  only  in  the  first  year  of  the
shock,  with  the  magnitude  of  the  effects  diminishing  rapidly  thereafter
(see  Table  8). The  following  is  a  discussion  of  each  of the  key  variables.
The  simulation  results  show  that  a sustained  tax  increase  starting
in  1990  does  not  have  a large  sustained  effect  on  GDP  growth. In terms  of
the  percentage  change  in  GDP  growth  for  each  percentage  increase  in  the  tax
rate,  simulation  results  show  an initial  decline  of 5.71  percent  in  1990,
with  recovery  starting  in  1991  at  a  much  lower  rate  of  1.25  percent
increase,  and  no  change  in  1992. This  pattern  of  GDP  change  is  reflected
in  investment  growth,  less  so in  consumption  growth.
Investment  growth  shows  a  decline  in  the  first  year,  followed  by  a
recovery  that  takes  on  a slightly  fluctuating  path. These  fluctuations  are
of  a  much  smaller  amplitude  than  the  change  in  the  first  year,  a  pattern
also  exhibited  by the  changes  in  GDP  growth  rates. Consumption  also
suffers  a  bigger  decline  in  1990,  followed  by  a recovery  of  a  much  smaller
magnitude  which  eventually  dwindles  off.
Short-term  interest  rates  decline.slightly,  by 0.01  percent  for
each  perr.entage  increase  in  the  tax  rate  for  each  of the  years  1990  and
1991,  returning  back  to  baseline  thereafter.  Although  the  magnitude  of  the
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TABLE  8: WEFA
Impact  Multipliers
U.S.  Tax  Increasel
Year  1  2  3  Mean
Long-Term  Interest  Rate
United States  - 0.35  - 0.63  - 0.86  - 0.61
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
* Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Investment
United States  - 7.69  1.21  -10.00  - 5.49
Germany  - 0.48  - 0.18  - 0.20  -0.29
* Japan  - 0.29  - 0.29  - 0.34  - 0.31
Private  Consumption  Deflator
United States  0.22  - 0.57  - 0.28  - 0.21
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Real  GNP/GDP
United  States  - 5.71  1.25  0.00  -1.49
Germany  - 0.29  0.00  - 0.21  - 0.17
Japan  - 0.71  - 0.37  - 0.38  - 0.49
1/  A 10  percent  increase  in  the  avecage  combined  personal  and  corporate  tax  rates  l.i:
the  U.S.  for  each  year  of the  forecast.
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changes  in interest  rates is  much smaller  than  that for the growth  rates  of
GDP and its components,  the  pattern  of changes is  quite similar,  with the
greatest  effects  of the sustained  shock  occurring  in the earlier  years of
the  forecast  period,  and then  dwindling  down to zero thereafter.
The pattern  of changes  in the  unemployment  rates differ,  however,
trom  the  patterns of changes  in those  variables  discussed  above, in the
sense  that relatively  steady  effects  are felt  all through  the forecast
period,  without  much fluctuation. The unemployment  rate increases  by a
relatively  small  0.02 percent  for each  percentage  increase  in the tax  rate
for  each  of the  years 1990-92,  and  by 0.03  percent in 1993.
The personal  consumption  deflator  shows  fluctuating  effects  of
relatively  equal and small  magnitudes  all through  the forecast  period.
The current account  exhibits  the greatest  effect  of all in the
first  year,  with a large increase  of $8.2  billion.  For the rest  of the
period,  the increase  in the current  account  balance  declines  substantially,
and gets  progressively  smaller  towards  the  end of the forecast  period.
A U.S. tax shock  has very  minor effects  on the  German economy.
From the table  we can see that  for  most of the forecast  period, there  are
no changes  for  most of the  variables.  In the instances  where there  are
effects,  they  are of a magnitude  of only 0.02 to  0.05 percent  for each
percentage  increase  in the  U.S. tax  rate.  The only  exception  to this is
the current  account  balance,  which  shows first  a decrease  of $0.5  billion
in 1990,  another  decrease  of $0.2  billion in 1991,  then  followed  by a
reversal  of the  decrease  with an increase  of $0.1  billion in year 1992.- 66
In  general,  most  of the  effects  on  the  Japanese  economy  are  also
due  to  effects  on the  external  sector. In  comparison  with  the  German
economy,  these  effects  are  of  greater  magnitude  for  the  Japanese  case.
Again,  this  is  probably  due  to  the  fact  that  the  U.S.  serves  as  a  more
important  export  market  for  the  Japanese  than  it  does  for  the  Germans.
Starting  in  1990,  when  the  shock  first  takes  place,  the  Japanese  current
account  deteriorates,  and  with  a  greater  magnitude  than  in  the  German  case.
The  size  of this  deterioration  decreases  over  time  through  tl  *nd  of the
forecast  period,  although  it  never  reverses  and  goes  back  int  a  surplus  as
it  does  for  Germany.  As a result  of this  greater  impact  on the  current
account  than  in the  German  case,  the  Japanese  GDP  growth  rates  also
experience  changes  of a greater  magnitude  for  some  years.
Neither  the  personal  consumption  deflator  nor  the  unemployment
rate  are  affected  at all. The  short-term  interest  rates  change  a little
towards  the  end  of the  forecast  period,  by  0.01  percent  in  1992  for  each
percentage  increase  in  the  U.S.  tax  rate.
iii. Japanese  Fiscal  Expansion
This  simulation  involved  an increase  in  Japanese  public  sector
investment  beginning  in  1990  of a  magnitude  sufficient  to  maintain  the
proposed  high  levels  of 1989. On  the  whole,  a  Japanese  fiscal  expansion
simulation  shows  little  effect  on  the  U.S.  economy  (see  Table  9).  For
example,  the  only  year  in  which  U.S.  GDP  growth  is  affected  is  1992,  when
it  declines  0.1  percent  from  the  baseline.  The  only  other  variable  which
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TABLE 9:  WEFA
Impact  Multipliers
Japanese  Fiscal Expansionl
Year  1  2  3  Mean
Long-Term  Interest  Rate
United States  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
*  Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Investment
United States  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
*  Japan  1.12  0.69  0.00  0.60
Private  Consumption  Deflator
United States  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Japan  - 0.24  - 0.13  0.00  - 0.12
Real GNP/GDP
United States  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Japan  0.68  0.58  0.00  0.42
1/  Increasing  the  growth rates  of  Japanese  public sector  investment  over the  baselim.l
growth  rates  by 15.79 percent,  25.71  percent  and 0 percent,  respectively,  for rt,-
years of the forecast.
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is  affected  by the  shock,  and  only  for  one  year,  is  the  current  account
balance,  which  increases  by $0.1  billion  in  1991. All  the  other  variables
remain  unchanged  for  the  entire  forecast  period.
Likewise,  there  are  virtually  no  effects  at all  on the  German
economy  in  the  case  of  a  Japanese  fiscal  stimulus  scenario.
As to  be  expected,  the  Japanese  economy  experiences  effects  of the
greatest  magnitude  under  this  policy  shock,  more  so  than  under  the  other
policy  scenarios,  and  more  so  than  either  the  German  or the  U.S.  economy
under  the  same  shock. However,  the  magnitudes  of  the  changes  per  unit
change  in  fiscal  expenditures  are  relatively  minor.
GDP  growth  increases  throughout  the  forecast  period,  starting  in
1990  when  the  policy  is  first  implemented.  The  percentage  increases  in  GDP
growth  for  each  percentage  increase  in  fiscal  expenditures  are  0.68  percent
and  0.58  percent  for  1990  and  1991  (there  is  no increase  above  the  baseline
in  fiscal  expenditures  in  1992). A lot  of  this  increase  is  attributed  to,
obviously,  the  increase  in  investment  growth. Consumption  growth  also
increases  with  GDP  growth. In  all  three  cases,  that  is,  GDP,  investment
and  consumption,  the  effect  is  the  largest  in  the  earlier  years  of the
shock,  and  dwindle  off  towards  the  end.
The  changes  in  the  current  account  balance  are  generally  much
smaller  than  those  under  the  other  two  policy  scenarios.  This  result  seems
to indicate  that  Japanese  trade  is  less  sensitive  to  domestic  policy  shocks
than  it  is  to  U.S.  policy  shocks.  As  expected,  an  increase  in  government
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investment  which  increases  GDP  growth  also  increases  imports,  and  leads  to
a  deterioration  in  the  current  account  balance.  Deterioration  of  the
current  account  increases  in  the  earlier  years,  and  goes  back  down  in  the
last  year  of  the  simulation.
Finally,  the  effects  on  the  other  variables  are  relatively  minor,
when  they  are  present  at  all. The  personal  consumption  deflator  actually
decreases,  a curious  outcome,  although  only  by a  very  small  magnitude.  The
percentage  decline  in  this  deflator  for  each  percentage  increase  in  fiscal
expenditures  is  0.24  percent  in  1990  and  0.13  percent  in  1991. There  is  no
change  at  all  in  the  unemployment  rate  despite  the  higher  growth  in
investment  and  GDP. The  short-term  interest  rate  changes  very  little.
B.  M
i. U.S.  Monetary  Ease
The  impact  of  a  200  basis  point  exogenous  decline 13 in  the  U.S.
Treasury  Bill  rate  for  each  year  beginning  in  1988  is  felt  most  strongly  by
the  real  side  of  the  economy  in  1989,  but  by  the  financial  variables  not
until  1992. In  the  U.S.,  this  translates  directly  into  a 200  basis  point
decline  in  short-term  interest  rates. Long-term  rates,  however,  decline  by
much  less. In  fact,  the  long-term  interest  rate  falls  by only  18  percent
of the  change  in  the  short-term  rate  in  the  first  year,  increasing  to 58.3
percent  of  the  change  by 1991.
IV/  This  translates  into,  roughly,  a  36  percent  decline  in  the  three  month
Treasury  Bill  rate.
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The  fall  in  long-term  interest  rates  leads  to  a large  increase  in
real  investment  growth,  especially  in  the  second  year,  when  the  change  in
the  investment  growth  rate  for  each  percentage  point  change  in  the  Treasury
Bill  rate  equals  -1.15.  Investment  increases  in  1992  by the  largest  amount
(10.3)  for  each  percentage  change  in  interest  rates.
The  p:attern  of increase  in  GDP  growth  for  each  percentage  decline
in  the  short-term  interest  rate  follows  a similar  pattern.  The  change  in
GDP  growth  is  the  largest  in  the  second  year,  but  then  tails  off  towards
the  end  of  the  forecast  period. Inflation  follows  a  different  path,  with
the  magnitude  of the  impact  growing  each  year,  so that  by 1992,  inflation
is  nearly  doubled.
The  pattern  which  emerges  from  this  exercise  is  similar  to  that
from  the  WEFA  runs. Investment  and  GDP  growth  are  affected  in  a  cyclical
pattern  with  the  second  year  receiving  the  greatest  effect  for  GDP  and  the
last  year  having  the  largest  impact  on  investment.  The  direct  effect  on
financial  variables,  however,  such  as  the  long-term  interest  rate  and
inflation  build  in  magnitude  throughout  the  forecast  period.
With  exogenously  determined  exchange  rates,  the  monetary  expansion
in  the  U.S.  has  a  slightly  stimulative  effect  on the  German  economy  in  the
later  years. Although  one  would  expect  that  German  interest  rates  would
fall  in  order  to  maintain  the  predetermined  exchange  rates,  this  is  not  the
case. The  monetary  expansion  in  the  U.S.  has  no impact  on  German  interest
rates. In  fact,  the  only  feedback  to  the  German  economy  is  through  changes
in  exports  and  imports.
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The effect  of the interest  rate  shock  is felt  only slightly  more
in  Japan.  Again, interest  rates  in  Japan  show  no movement.  The  major
impact  is  due to increased  exports  from  Japan to the  United  States.  This
will  be discussed  later  in the  section  on alternative  simulations.
Impact  multipliers  are  shown for  this  scenario  in Table  10.
ii.  U.S. Tax Increase
The 10 percent  sustained  increase  in  personal  taxes  tests  the
impact  of a fiscal  policy  shock  on the  model.  The impact  is felt
immediately  on GDP,  where the  growth  rate  falls  by 82.4  percent  in 1988
yielding  an impact  multiplier  of 8.24.  The  effect  on GDP is less
pronounced  in  later  years.
The impact  on the  price  level  is the  opposite,  with a small  impact
in the  early  years  building  to  a 111  percent  decrease  (impact  multiplier  of
11.11)  in the  rate of inflation. Impact  multipliers  for the  U.S., Germany,
and  Japan  are shown in  Table  11.
In this  simulation,  it  is the  growth  rate  of employment  which
behaves  in a cyclical  manner.  The effect  of the tax increase  on employment
is strongest  in  the second  year,  and, in fact,  is double  the impact  felt in
both the first  and third  years.
Investment  is  particularly  hard  hit in this  simulation,  with
negative  rates  of growth  for  all three  years.  This is in large  part
responsible  for the  worsening  of domestic  demand,  which falls  by a greater
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TABLE  10:  OECD
Impact  Multipliers
Easy  Moneyl
Year  1  2  3  4  5  Mean
Long-Term  Interest  Rate
United  States  0.18  0.35  0.47  0.58  0.56  0.43
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
*  Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Investment
United  States  - 1.15  - 4.12  - 2.53  - 1.84  -10.27  -3.98
Germany  0.14  - 0.29  - 0.28  - 0.30  - 0.07  - 0.16
J  Japan  - 0.05  - 0.17  - 0.08  - 0.08  - 0.06  - 0.09
Private  Consumption  Deflator
United  States  - 0.07  - 0.28  - 0.59  - 0.94  - 2.28  - 0.83
Germany  0.31  0.00  0.00  - 0.13  - 0.11  0.01
* Japan  0.00  0.00  - 0.15  - 0.16  - 0.09  - 0.08
Real  GNP/GDP
United  States  - 0.19  - 0.74  - 0.49  - 0.40  0.00  - 0.36
Germany  0.00  0.00  - 0.25  - 0.12  - 0.06  - 0.09
Japan  - 0.08  - 0.08  - 0.17  - 0.09  - 0.07  -0.10
/  Lowering  the  U.S.  Treasury  Bill  rate  by 200  basis  points  for  each year  of  the
forecast.
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TABLE 11:  OECD
Impact  Multipliers
U.S. Tax Increasel
Year  1  2  3  Mean
Long-Term  Interest  Rate
United States  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
*  Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Investment
*=United  States  -13.91  -21.30  -72.50  -35.90
Germany  - 1.00  - 2.11  - 0.98  - 1.36
J  Japan  0.00  - 1.05  - 0.49  - 0.51
Private  Consumption  Deflator
United States  - 0.64  - 3.89  -11.11  - 5.21
Germany  0.00  - 0.46  - 0.41  - 0.29
Japan  0.56  0.29  - 0.17  0.23
Real  GNP/GDP
-United  States  - 8.24  -18.57  -25.00  -17.27
Germany  - 1.82  - 1.74  - 0.64  - 1.40
Japan  - 0.61  - 1.52  - 1.50  - 1.21
1/  A 10  percent increase  in the  U.S. personal  tax  rate for  each  year of the  forecast.
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degree  than  does  GDP. It is  not  clear  what  is  causing  this  drop  in
investment  although  it  is  probably  due  to  the  lower  levels  of  GDP  growth
which  may  affect  business  confidence.  As one  would  expect,  the  tax
increase  has  a  dramatic  effect  on  the  government  budget  deficit  in  the
first  year,  although  the  recessionary  effects  of  the  tax  increase  work  to
offset  this  improvement  in  later  years.
The  tax  increase  in  the  U.S.  has  little  effect  on  Germany,  causing
some  cyclical  movement  in  GDP. This  is  due,  most  probably,  to  lower
exports  to  the  U.S.  due  to  the  recession  there. The  slower  growth  in
Germany  leads  to  a  worsening  of  the  government  budgetary  position.
In  Japan,  the  effects  are  similar,  although  the  changes  in  GDP  are
not  cyclical  in  nature. Rather,  GDP  worsens  further  in  every  year,  and
whereas  Germany  experiences  lower  inflation  due  to  the  slow-down  in  growth,
Japan  actually  experiences  several  years  of  higher  inflation.
iii. Japanese  Fiscal  Stimulus
As one  would  expect,  the  most  significant  impact  of  a  Japanese
fiscal  shock  is  felt  in  the  Japanese  economy,  followed  by the  U.S.,  with
Germany  experiencing  very  little  effect. In  fact,  in  the  U.S.,  most  of  the
effects  are  due  to  changes  in  trade  and  are  reflected  primarily  in  a  fall
in  the  current  account  deficit.  GDP  improves  by 29  percent  in  1991,  but
this  is  largely  due  to  higher  exports,  since  domestic  demand  only  increases
by 5.9  percent.
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Of thLs  Lncrease  in  domestic  demand,  the  largest  impact  ls  due  to
an  unexplalned  lncrease  in  investment.  This  lncrease  may  be due  to
producers  of  exportable  goods  lncreaslng  their  productive  capacity.
For  each  percentage  point  increase  ln  Japanese  publlc  sector
investment,  U.S.  lnvestment  grows  by  0.28  percent  ln  the  first  year  and
0.34  percent  ln  the  second  year. Investment  doubles  over  the  baseline
figure  ln  the  thlrd  year,  but  thls  is  due  to  lagged  effects  since  the
fiscal  expanslon  ends  ln  1991.
The  Japanese  expanslon  ls  somewhat  lnflationary  for  the  U.S.,
causing  an 11.1  percent  lncrease  in  lnflatlon  in  the  flnal  year  of  the
forecast.
German  investment  also  increases  due  to  the  Japanese  expansion.
Total  investment  in  Germany  increases  by  0.41  percent  in  the  second  year
for  every  percentage  polnt  lncrease  in  Japanese  investment.  Thls  results
in  a sllght  expanslon  (4.3  percent)  in  German  GDP  in  the  second  and  third
year  of  the  shock. Inflatlon  lncreases  by 2  percent.
The  real  effect  of the  Japanese  expansion  is,  of  course,  on the
Japanese  economy.  The  immediate  impact  of  an  lncrease  in  government
expenditure  should  be to  raise,  ex  ante,  demand  through  the  standard
lncome-expenditure  relationships  and,  allowing  for  leakages,  should  put
upward  pressure  on  imports.  There  are  several  points  concerning  the  effect
of  the  shock  which  are  noteworthy.  First,  the  shock  ls  deflationary  ln  the
first  two  years. Inflation  's  22.2  percent  lower  in  the  flrst  year  and
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17.1  percent  lover  in  the  second  year. This  is  very  unusual,  since  one
would  expect  the  higher  level  of  government  spending  to  be inflationary.
In  fact,  looking  at  the  GDP  figures,  one  sees  that  the  economy  is  heating
up  very  quickly.  The  GDP  impact  multiplier  for  a  change  in  government
spending  is  2.5  in  the  first  year  and  4.8  in  the  second  year. This
translates  into  a tripling  of  the  GDP  growth  rate  by 1991.
Table  12  shows  the  impact  multipliers  for  the  V.S.,  Germany,  and
Japan  for  this  simulation.
Several  conclusions  may  be  reached  from  this  exercise.  First,  the
cross-country  linkages  are  not  very  strong  except  in  terms  of  trade. The
financial  variables  are  not  affected  substantially  by  changes  in  other
countries.  However,  output  is  generally  affected,  but  mostly  due  to
changes  in  exports  and  imports.  There  is  very  little  cross-country  effect
on  domestic  demand.
Second,  several  of  the  impact  multipliers  are  quite  large,
especially  for  one  or  two  years  of the  simulation.  The  GDP/Tax  Rate
multiplier  for  the  U.S.  averages  -17.3  for  the  entire  period. The
Investment/Tax  Rate  multiplier  for  the  U.S.  averages  35.9. Other  large
impact  multipliers  include  the  GDP/government  investment  multiplier  for
Japan.
Third,  investment  seems  to  react,  at  times  counterintuitively,  and
at  best,  by  magnitudes  which  seem  incredible.  This  may  be due  to  the
impact  of  real  household  disposable  income  on investment  in  housing,  which,
acting  at  times  in  concert  with  the  interest  rate  effect,  causes  major
swings  in  total  investment.- 77 -
TABLE  12:  OECD
Impact  Multipliers
Japanese  Fiscal  Expansionl
Year  1  2  Mean
Long-Term  Interest  Rate
United States  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00
*  Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00
Investment
United  States  0.28  0.34  0.31
Germany  0.00  0.41  0.21
*  Japan  8.09  11.89  9.99
Private  Consumption  Deflator
United  States  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00
* Japan  - 1.41  - 0.67  - 1.04
Real  GNP/GDP
United States  0.00  1.11  0.56
Germany  0.00  0.17  0.09
Japan  2.50  4.83  3.67
Increasing  the  growth  rates  of Japanese  public  sector  investment  over the  basel  ilt!
growth  rates  by 15.79  percent,  25.71  percent  and 0 percent,  respectively,  for  :L..;
years  of the  forecast.
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C.  LINK
i. U.S.  Monetary  Ease
In  order  to  reduce  interest  rates  substantially  in  the  Project
LINK  model,  which  uses  for  its  U.S.  model  the  Wharton  Quarterly  model,  it
was  necessary  to  lower  the  Federal  Funds  rate  by 250  basis  points,  rather
than  the  200  basis  points  used  in  simulating  the  Wharton  World  Model  or  the
OECD  Interlink  model. The  strongest  effect  is  felt  on the  economy  in  the
second  and  third  year  of  the  shock,  both  for  the  real  side  of the  economy
and  for  the  financial  variables.  The  sustained  shock  to che  Federal  Funds
rate  lowers  the  Treasury  Bill  rate  for  the  U.S.  by  about  200  basis  points
in  each  year  of the  simulation.  Long-term  rates  fall  by quite  a  bit  less.
The  fall  in  long-term  rates,  however,  leads  to  a  large  increase  in
the  growth  rate  of  investment,  especially  in  the  third  year  of  the
simulation  (see  Table  13),  when  the  change  in  the  investment  growth  rate
for  each  percentage  change  in  the  Federal  Funds  rate  equals  forty-four
percent.  By  1992,  the  effect  drops  off  to  near  zero.
The  pattern  of  change  in  the  GDP  growth  rate  is  quite  cyclical  in
nature.  The  GDP  growth  rate  increases  by the  largest  amount  in  the  second
year,  but  after  falling  to  a  factor  of  only  0.09  for  each  percentage  point
fall  in  the  Federal  Funds  rate  in  the  fourth  year  of the  simulation,  the
effect  doubles  in  the  following  year. The  decline  in  interest  rates  has
very  little  impact  on  the  rate  of  inflation,  with  whatever  marginal  effect
there  is  coming  in  the  second  year  of the  shock.
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TABLE 13:  Proiect  LINK
Impact  Multipliers
Easy  Moneyl
Year  1  2  3  4  5  Mean
Short-Term  Interest  Rate
United  States  0.92  0.89  0.88  0.85  0.88  0.88
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
*  Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Investment
United  States  - 0.32  - 5.87  -44.25  - 2.56  0.01  -10.60
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.07  0.16  0.07
* Japan  0.00  0.00  - 0.05  0.00  0.00  - 0.01
Private  Consumption  Deflator
United  States  0.00  - 0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  - 0.01
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.04  0.07  0.04
Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  - 0.15  0.00  - 0.03
Real  GNP/GDP
United  States  0.11  - 0.48  - 0.24  - 0.09  - 0.18  - 0.22
Germany  1.42  0.56  0.05  0.05  0.00  0.42
Japan  0.00  0.00  - 0.08  - 0.06  - 0.06  - 0.04
1/  Lowering  of the  U.S. federal  funds  rate  by 250  basis  points for  each  year  of the
forecast.
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With  exogenously  determined  exchange  rates,  the  monetary  expansion
in  the  U.S.  has  a  contractionary  effect  on  the  German  economy.  Host  of
this  effect  is  seen  in  the  first  two  years,  with  an  average  change  of 1.0
in  German  GDP  for  each  percentage  point  change  in  the  U.S.  Federal  Funds
rate. As in  the  Interlink  simulations,  the  monetary  expansion  does  not
have  the  expected  effect  of lowering  German  interest  rates. In fact,  there
is  no  change  in  German  interest  rates  at  all.
The  effect  of the  interest  rate  shock  is  felt  only  slightly  in
Japan. Interest  rates  show  no  movement.  The  GDP  growth  rate  increases
slightly  in  the  final  three  years  of  the  simulation.
ii. U.S.  Tax  Increase
The  ten  percent  increase  in  the  personal  tax  rate  in  the  U.S.
tests  the  impact  of  fiscal  policy  shocks  on the  model. The  effect  is
immediate  on investment  and  GDP  in  the  United  States. Investment  growth
declines  by 300  percent  in  the  first  year  and  15  percent  in  the  second
year,  yielding  impact  multipliers  of -30.0  and  -1.54  respectively.  The
impact  multiplier  for  GDP  is  less  dramatic,  at -2.5  in  the  first  year  and
- 0.65 in the  second  year.
The  price  level  does  not  change  due  to  the  tax  increase,  while
interest  rates  fall  slightly.
There  is  no cyclical  pattern  to  the  effects  of the  fiscal  shock.
The  impacts  are  felt  most  strongly  on  all  variables,  except  interest  rates,
in  the  first  year,  with  the  effect  halved  in  the  second  year,  and  falling
off  to  near  zero  in  the  third  year.- 81 -
The  tax  increase  causes  a  decline  in  the  rate  of  growth  of  GDP  and
investment  in  Germany,  although  the  magnitude  of  the  change  is  not  very
large.  The  impact  on  GDP  is  most  likely  due  to  the  economic  slow-down  in
the  U.S.,  which  causes  lower  export  growth  in  Germany.  The  decline  in  GDP
growth  rates  leads  to  lower  levels  of  expectation  for  economic  growth  in
Germany,  which  translates  into  lower  levels  of investment  growth.
In  Japan,  like  in  Germany,  there  is  no  effect  in  the  first  year  of
the  shock. Unlike  in  Germany,  where  the  impact  is  most  pronounced  in  the
third  year  (see  Table  14),  in  Japan,  the  impact  is  greatest  in  the  second
year.
iii. Japanese  Fiscal  Stimulus
As  one  would  expect,  the  largest  impact  of the  Japanese  expansion
is  felt  on  the  Japanese  economy.  In  fact,  there  is  no  significant  effect,
using  the  Project  LINK  model,  on  either  the  United  States  or  Germany.
Even  in  Japan,  the  impact  is  much  less  than  in  either  the  Wharton
World  Model  or the  Interlink  model. As  one  can  see  from  Table  15,  the
impact  multiplier  for  GDP  averages  about  0.17  in  the  first  two  years. The
effect  on investment  is  even  less,  with  an  average  impact  multiplier  of
0.12  in  the  first  two  years. There  is  no impact  on interest  rates,  while
inflation  increases  only  in  the  second  year.
MASS-l1XNUzOOO06IDMA19g7-93:rk:Fabruary 25. 1988 14-OCT-68 12:05:00- 82 -
TABLE 14:  Proiect  LINK
Impact  Multipliers
U.S. Tax Increasel
Year  1  2  3  Mean
Short-Term  Interest  Rate
United  States  - 0.11  - 0.22  - 0.24  - 0.19
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
*  Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Investment
United  States  -30.00  - 1.54  - 0.63  -10.72
Germany  - 0.17  - 0.14  - 0.27  - 0.19
* Japan  0.00  - 0.16  - 0.17  - 0.11
Private  Consumption  Deflator
United  States  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Real GNP/GDP
United States  - 2.50  - 0.65  0.00  - 1.05
Germany  0.00  - 0.17  - 0.22  - 0.13
Japan  0.00  - 0.23  - 0.20  - 0.14
i/  A 10  percent  increase  in the  U.S. personal  tax rate  for each  year  of the forecast.
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TABLE  15:  Project  LINK
Impact  Multipliers
Japanese  Fiscal  Stimulusl
Year  1  2  3  Mean
Short-Term  Interest  Rate
United States  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
*  Japan  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Investment
United States  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germany  - 0.11  0.00  0.00  - 0.04
Japan  0.11  0.12  0.00  0.08
Private  Consumption  Deflator
United States  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Japan  0.00  0.21  0.00  0.07
Real  GNP/GDP
United  States  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germany  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Japan  0.16  0.18  0.00  0.12
/  Increasing  the  growth  rates  of Japanese  public  sector investment  over the  baseline
growth  rates  by 15.79  percent,  25.71  percent  and 0 percent,  respectively,  for the
years  of the  forecast.
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D.  Summarv
Table  16  shows  a comparison  of  the  average  impact  multipliers  for
the  three  models  for  each  of the  three  scenarios.  It  is  difficult  to  draw
any  significant  conclusions  from  these  multipliers;  however,  that  in  ,.tself
is  significant.  One  cannot  even  make  a  broad  statement  as  to  which  models
have  similar  impact  multipliers,  for  this  changes  according  to  which
country  one  is  discussing,  which  variable,  and  for  which  scenario.
This  leads  us to  one  significant  result. As  a first  step,  we  have
run  each  of the  models  using  our  assumptions  for  exchange  rates  and
commodity  prices. This  closed  the  gap  between  our  forecast  and  the
forecasts  of the  other  groups. Then  we  ran  this  multiplier  test  to  try  to
determine  why  other  differences  still  occur  in  the  forecasts.  The  answer
to  this  is  that  the  impact  of  fiscal  and  monetary  shock  variables  differs  a
great  deal  from  model  to  model. While  impact  multipliers  are  not  explicit
in  the  IECAP  forecast,  one  would  expect  that  the  implicit  multipliers  would
vary  from  these  other  models  also.
Therefore,  one  must  conclude  that  while  the  differences  between
the  baseline  forecasts  using  the  outside  models  and  IECAP's  own  baseline
forecast  are  due  to  the  way  each  modetl  handles  the  change  in  exchange  rates
and  commodity  prices,  the  group  whose  baseline  is  closest  to  IECAP's  is
likely  to  be the  one  with  similar  impact  multipliers. 14
iV  As  a topic  for  future  research,  it  would  be  enlightening  to  run  each
model  shocking  just  the  exchange  rates  to  see  what  the  impact  is.
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TABLE 16:  Aver&&*  rmoact  Multipliers
Easy Money Scenario  U.S. Tax Incroeas  Jaoanese Exrnnsion
WEWA  OECD  LINK  WEFA  OECD  LINK  WSPA  OECD  LINK
Interest  RatoS
United States  0.49  0.43  0.88  -0.61  0.00  - 0.19  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germmny  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  00
Japan  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Investment
United  Statoe  2.93  - 3.98  -10.60  - 5.49  -35.90  -10.72  0.00  0.31  0.00
C  rmany  - 0.14  - 0.16  0.07  - 0.29  - 1.36  - 0.19  0.00  0.21  - O.  C
Japan  - 0.15  - 0.09  - 0.01  - 0.31  - 0.51  - 0.11  0.60  9.99  0 08
Private  Consumption  Deflator
United  States  - 0.04  - 0.83  - 0.01  - 0.21  - 5.21  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Germany  - 0.05  0.01  0.04  0.00  - 0.29  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Japan  0.01  - 0.08  - 0.03  0.00  0.23  0.00  - 0.12  - 1.04  0.07
Real  GNPIGDP
United  State.  - 0.35  - 0.36  - 0.22  - 1.49  -17.27  - 1.05  0.00  0.56  0.00
Gegnany  - 0.18  - 0.09  0.42  - 0.17  - 1.40  - 0.13  0.00  0.09  0.00
Japan  - 0.17  - 0.10  - 0.04  - 0.49  - 1.21  - 0.14  0.42  3.67  0.12
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VII. ALTERNATIVE  SCENARIOS
A.  NEM
Alternative  Bank  scenarios  were  derived  from  the  Wharton  model
based  on  Bank  baseline  assumptions  (that  is,  the  aforementioned  exchange
rate  and  commodity  price  forecasts).  These  alternative  scenarios  include:
(i) monetary  ease,  through  the  lowering  of the  U.S.  discount  rate  by two
percentage  points  per  year  beginning  in  1988;  (ii) U.S.  fiscal  deficit
correction  through  an  increase  in  the  average  tax  rate  by 10  percent
beginning  in  1990;  (iii) Japanese  fiscal  stimulus,  through  an increase  in
public  investment  starting  in  1990;  and  finally  (iv) the  combination  of
the  above  three  scenarios.
Due  to  the  idiosyncrasies  of  the  model,  certain  constraints  were
encountered  during  the  implementation  of  some  of  these  scenarios.  First,
as far  as  monetary  ease  is  concerned,  the  original  intention  was  to  impose
both  a  lower  discount  rate  and  a  higher  level  of  unborrowed  reserves.  This
was  relinquished  in  favor  of  just  the  first  change  because  the  Wharton
model  lacks  a distinction  between  borrowed  and  unborrowed  reserves  for  its
domestic  reserves  category.  Second,  our  intention  was  to  raise  taxes  only
on  personal  income  and  not  on  corporate  income  as  well. This  was
relinquished  because  the  Wharton  model  only  allows  for  changes  in  an
average  tax  rate  which  applies  to  both  the  personal  and  corporate  sectors.
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i. U.S.  Monetary  Ease
The  U.S.  monetary  ease  scenario  is  one  in  which  the  discount  rate
is  lowered  by two  percentage  points  beginning  in  1988. All  other  exogenous
variables  are  held  to  be the  same  as  before. The  objective  of  such  a
policy  would  be to  avert  a recession  in  the  U.S.  economy  as the  economy
adjusts  to  correct  the  twin  deficits.  The  monetary  ease  scenario  is  run
with  the  Bank  baseline  assumptions,  and  the  results  are  compared  with  the
results  of  the  Bank  baseline  scenario.
With  a lowering  of the  discount  rate,  interest  rates  fall  (nominal
and  real,  short-  and  long-term).  As  expected,  investment  growth  is  higher
in  comparison  with  the  baseline,  for  all  the  years  except  1994. For  most
of  the  years  in  the  forecast  period,  GDP  growth  increases,  but  not  by  much
over  the  baseline.  GDP  growth  is  actually  slightly  lower  in  1992. It
appears  that  much  of  the  monetary  ease  has  gone  to  stimulating  the  external
sector.  Although  both  export  and  import  volume  growth  are  higher  than  the
baseline,  the  current  account  deficit  worsens. It  would  appear  that  the
increase  in  investment  which  results  from  monetary  ease  is  not  sufficient
to  raise  GDP  growth  by any  significant  amount  as  the  trade  balance  probably
worsens  at  the  same  time. Private  consumption  growth  either  remains  at  the
same  rate  or increases  only  slightly,  given  the  very  small  changes  in  GDP
growth.  Contrary  to  what  one  might  expect,  inflation  does  not  increase
significantly  at  all. In  fact,  the  personal  consumption  deflator  either
remains  at  the  same  level,  or increases  only  very  slightly  (see  Table  17).
This  fits  into  the  picture  above  since  GDP  growth  does  not  pick  up
significantly  in  order  to  create  an  excessive  demand  situation  which  might
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TABLE 17:  WEFA
Monetary  Ease  Simulationl
(Difference  from  Baseline)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United  States
Real  GDP  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.2  - 0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1
Unemployment  Rate  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.2  - 0.4  - 0.4
Current  Account  Balance  - 2.2  - 2.4  - 3.4  - 4.2  - 2.5
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  - 1.2  - 1.7  - 2.0  - 2.1  - 2.2
* Effective  Exchange  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Japan
Real  GDP  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  - 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Current  Account  Balance  0.8  1.0  1.4  1.5  1.0
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.1
Effective  Exchange  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Germany
Real  GDP  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.1
Current  Account  Balance  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.1
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  - 0.3  - 0.3  - 0.2  - 0.1  - 0.2
Effective  Exchange  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1/  Lowering  of  the  U.S.  discount  rate  by 200  basis  points  for  each  year  of
the  forecast,  starting  in  1988.
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be inflationary.  The  unemployment  rate  declines,  and  the  growth  in
industrial  production  increases,  in  line  with  the  slightly  higher  GDP
growth.  Net  government  borrowing  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  decreases
slightly,  which  could  be  a  result  of  both  higher  tax  revenues  due  to  higher
GDP  growth,  as  well  as  lower  interest  payments  due  to  the  lower  interest
rates.
We turn  now  to  the  effect  on  the  German  economy  of a  U.S.  monetary
ease  policy. Given  that  exchange  rates  remain  unchanged  (exogenous),  lower
interest  rates  in  the  U.S.  imply  lower  interest  rates  in  Germany,  for
otherwise  there  would  be capital  flow  from  the  U.S.  to  Germany  which  would
cause  the  deutsche  mark  to  appreciate.  (This  would  be  a scenario  in  which
the  German  government,  in  order  to  maintain  the  same  level  of  exchange
rates  as  before,  would  also  engage  in  a  monetary  ease  policy  in  the  face  of
such  a  policy  in  the  U.S.) The  decline  in  interest  rates  in  Germany,
however,  is  small  compared  to  that  in  the  United  States. Lower  German
interest  rates  lead  to  higher  growth  in  investment,  but  again  of  a
magnitude  much  smaller  than  that  in  the  United  States. As  a result,  German
GDP  growth  is  also  higher. Given  the  higher  GDP  growth,  import  volume
growth  increases.  However,  export  volume  growth  also  increases,  which
could  in  part  be due  to  higher  GDP  growth  in  the  U.S.  and  hence  higher
import  demand  by the  United  States.  Unlike  the  case  for  the  U.S.,  in  which
the  current  account  balance  deteriorates,  the  German  current  account
improves.  This  may  be due  to  differences  in  import  demand  elasticities
between  the  two  countries.  The  effect  on  German  inflation  is  very  small,
with  the  personal  consumption  deflator  either  remaining  at the  same  lev'el
as  previously,  or increasing  by at  most  0.1  percentage  points.  And  with
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the  slightly  higher growth  in  GDP, the  unemployment  rate  declines  slightly
and industrial  production  growth  increases  slightly. Net government
borrowing  decreases  slightly  in the later  years,  due to  higher tax  revenues
resulting  from  higher  GDP growth,  and lower  interest  payments  resulting
from  the lower  interest  rates.
Turning  now to the  Japanese  economy,  we see that the  results  are
somewhat  similar  to those  for the  German  economy. With lower  interest
rates in  the  U.S. and  no changes  in the  exchange  rate,  Japanese  interest
rates  decline  by an even smaller  magnitude  than in  Germany,  and in  fact
remain  unchanged  for  some  years.  This could  be due to the  fact that  the
Japanese  economy  is relatively  insular  to capital  flows.  The slightly
lower  interest  rates lead  to slightly  higher  growth  in investment  for some
of the  years,  which in turn  leads  to slightly  higher  growth  in GDP for
nearly  all the  years.  Again,  as in  the case  for  Germany,  both export  and
import  volume  growth  increases,  due respectively  to  higher import  demand
overseas  and  higher  GDP growth  domestically. The current  account  balance
improves  somewhat.
ii.  U.S. Tax Increase
This is  a scenario  designed  to  have the  U.S. budget  in  balance  by
1994.  As expected  with a tax increase,  net government  borrowing  as a
percentage  of  GDP decreases,  starting  with a large  decrease  in 1990  and
followed  by gradual  decreases  through  the  end  of the forecast  period.
Since  the tax increase  originates  in 1990,  and since  it is the  average  tax
rate (composed  of both  personal  and corporate  taxes)  which is increased,
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both  consumption  and  investment  fall  that  year. As  a iesult,  GDP  growth
falls  substantially  in  1990,  leading  to  a large  decline  in import  volume
growth  and  the  consequence  that  the  current  account  balance  improves.
Export  volume  growth  also  declines  a little  in  1990,  probably  because  of
lower  productive  capacity,  though  not  to  the  extent  that  import  volume
growth  has  fallen. The  growth  rates  for  most  of  the  variables  rebound  in
1991,  although  of  course,  in  level  terms  they  are  lower. The  exception  is
long-term  interest  rates,  both  real  and  nominal,  which  are  lower  throughout
the  entire  forecast  period,  a  consequence  of  the  lower  borrowing
requirements  of  the  government  and  therefore  the  easing  of "crowding  out".
This  would  probably  explain  the  rebounding  of  the  investment  growth  rate
and  of the  GDP  growth  rate,  and,  consequently,  the  consumption  growth  rate.
The  import  growth  rate  also  rebounds  after  the  initial  large  decrease,  with
the  export  growth  rate  remaining  more  or less  the  same  as  before. As  a
result,  the  current  account  balance  worsens  again  after  the  initial  large
improvement,  though  in  level  terms  it  still  shows  an improvement  by the  end
of  the  forecast  period.
The  effect  of  a tax  increase  in  the  U.S.  on  the  Japanese  economy
is  such  that  the  GDP  growth  rate  declines  somewhat  in  1990  through  1992
(see  Table  18). The  major  contributing  factor  to  this  decline  is  lower
growth  of total  exports  in  the  years  1990-92,  with  the  decrease  being
especially  severe  in  1990. This  is,  of  course,  a result  of the  contraction
of import  demand  by the  U.S.  under  the  higher  tax  regime. With  a lower  GDP
growth  rate,  Japanese  import  growth  also  slows  down,  though  not  to  the
exter.t  of  t:e  de.line  in  its  export  growth  rates. As  a result,  the  current
account  balance  deteriorates  in  the  1990-92  period,  though  not  by  much.
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TABLE  18: WEFA
U.S  Tax  Increasel
(Difference  from  Baseline)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United  States
Real GDP  0.0  0.0  - 0.8  0.2  0.0
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.1  - 0.2  - 0.1
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.2
Current  Account  Balance  0.0  0.0  8.2  2.0  1.4
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  0.0
*  Effective  Exchange  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Japan
Real GDP  0.0  0.0  - 0.2  - 0.1  - 0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Current  Account  Balance  0.0  0.0  - 2.3  - 0.9  0.5
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
Effective  Exchange  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Germany
Rea'  GDP  0.0  0.0  - O.1  0.0  - 0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1
Current  Account  Balance  0.0  0.0  - 0.5  - 0.2  0.1
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0
Effective  Exchange  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
jf  A 10  percent  increase  in  the  average  combined  personal  and  corporate  tax
rates  for  the  U.S.  for  each  year  of  the  forecast,  starting  in  1990.
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The growth in  private  consumption  and investment  declines  slightly  for some
of the  years. ln llne  wlth the lower  growth  in  GDP.  Industrlal  production
growth  also  declines  sllghtly  for  some  years  as GDP and lnvestment  growth
slows  down.
The effects  on the  German economy  are quite  similar to those  on
the  Japanese  economy,  in that  German  export  growth  declines  in the  years
1990-92,  again the  result  of lower  U.S. import  demand.  Wlth lower  export
growth,  GDP growth  also slows  down,  though  only sllghtly  and only for 1990
and  1992.  Thls ls  probably  because  the lower  GDP growth  also  drags down
import  growth  such that the leakage  from the  economy  ls reduced,  wlth the
consequence  that  GDP growth ls  not much  affected.  For the same reasons,
the  current  account  balance is  only slightly  worsened.  And as ln the
Japanese  case, the growth  of L.oth  consumptlon  and investment  slows down  due
to the  slowing  down of  GDP growth.  Interest  rates  are  hardly affected  at
all.  In sum, for  both  Germany  and Japan,  an lncrease  ln taxes in the  U.S.
has only  very minor effects  on their  economies.
iii.  Japanese  Fiscal Stimulus
As anticipated,  this scenario  did  not lead to significant  changes
in the  U.S. economy (see  Table 19)  largely  because  U.S. goods  make up only
a very small fraction  of  Japan's imports. Therefore,  an increase  in
imports  by Japan through  fiscal  stimulation  of its  economy  would  have only
a slight  effect  on U.S. exports  and do little  to  alleviate  the  U.S. current
account  deficit.
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TABLE  19: WEFA
Japanese  Fiscal  Expansionl
(Difference  from  Baseline)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United  States
Real GDP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  0.0
Current  Account Balance  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.2  - 0.2
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
*  Effective  Exchange  Rate  0.0  0 0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Japan
Real  GDP  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Current  Account  Balance  0.0  0.0  - 0.8  - 1.4  - 1.3
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
Effective  Exchange  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Germany
Real  GDP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Current  Account  Balance  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Effective  Exchange  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1J  Increasing  the  growth  rates  of  Japanese  public  sector  investment  over
the  baseline  growth  rates  by 15.79  percent,  25.71  percent  and  0  percent,
respectively,  for  the  year  of the  forecast  starting  in  1990.
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This  Japanese  fiscal  stimulus  scenario  is  one  in  which  Japanese
public  investment  undorgoes  a sustained  increase  starting  in  1990.
However,  as explained  above,  the  effect  on the  U.S.  economy  is  minor. The
hoped  for  effect  is  to  stimulate  U.S.  exports  through  an increase  in
Japanese  import  demand. Results  of  the  simulation  show,  however,  that
export  growth  in  the  U.S.  hardly  changes  at  all,  and  when  it  does,  for  only
two  years  out  of  the  forecast  period,  and  by  only  0.1  percent.  Hence,  the
current  account  balance  of the  U.S.  is  hardly  affected.  None  of  the  other
major  economic  variables  for  the  U.S.  are  affected  either. The  effect  on
the  Japanese  economy,  on the  other  hand,  is  as  expected.  Growth  in  total
fixed  investment  increases  beginning  in  1989. As  a result,  the  growth  of
GDP  and  hence  private  consumption  also  increase.  The  growth  of  both  export
and  import  volumes  increases,  due  respectively  to  higher  production
capacity  and  import  demand. The  increase  in  the  growth  of import  volume
exceeds  that  of  export  volume  such  that  the  current  account  surplus
decreases  a  little. It  does  not  appear  that  there  is  crowding  out  in  the
economy  as interest  rates  hardly  change. In  fact,  nominal  long-term  rates
remain  the  same,  while  nominal  short-term  rates  increase  only  slightly  for
some  years. The  economy  does  not  seem  to  be suffering  from  excessive
inflationary  demand  either,  since  the  personal  consumption  deflator  barely
changes  and  in  fact  declines  very  slightly  for  some  years. With  the
increase  in  the  growth  of investment  and  GDP,  the  growth  of industrial
production  also  increases  slightly,  though  the  unemployment  rate  remains
unchanged.  Net  government  borrowing  as  a percentage  of  GDP  rises  somewhat,
as it  should,  to  finance  the  increase  in  public  investment.  In  sum,  a
fiscal  stimulus  in  Japan,  with  everything  else  held  constant,  on the  whole
generates  healthy  results  in  the  economy  with  hardly  any  adverse  effects
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such  as  inflation.  The  only  caveat  is  that  the  current  account  surplus
diminishes  somewhat,  though  with  a  very  healthy  surplus  to  begin  with,  this
should  not  be deleterious  at  all  to  the  economy.
As far  as the  German  economy  is  concerned,  the  effects  of  a
Japanese  fiscal  stimulus  seem  to  be similar  to  those  on the  U.S.  economy,
that  is,  minimal. Growth  in  real  GDP  barely  changes  at all,  which  also
holds  true  for  the  other  major  economic  variables.
iv. Combined  Scenario
This  is  a  scenario  in  which  all  of  the  above  three  changes  are
imposed  at  the  same  time  on the  World  Bank  baseline  scenario;  monetary  ease
together  with  fiscal  tightening  in  the  U.S.,  combined  with  fiscal
stimulation  in  Japan. This  is  by far  the  most  probable  of  all  the
scenarios  mentioned  above,  in  the  sense  that  should  the  U.S.  government
take  action  to  reduce  the  budget  deficit  or  even  aim  to  balance  it  by the
early  1990's,  a  monetary  ease  policy  should  be pursued  simultaneously  to
alleviate  the  recessionary  effects  of the  contractionary  fiscal  action. At
the  same  time,  the  U.S.  government  might  only  agree  on such  fiscal
tightening,  despite  the  necessity  for  it  whatever  others  may  do,  if it
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could  persuade  its  allies,  notably  Japan  in  this  case,  to  undertake
expansionary  fiscal  policies  so  as to  expand  export  markets  for  the  U.S.,
again  to  counteract  the  recessionary  effects  of  its  flscal  contractLon. 15
In  this  scenario,  monetary  ease  is  started  by the  Federal  Reserve
in  1988,  in  order  to  avert  a recession  given  the  huge  debt  overhang  and  the
inaction  on  the  part  of the  U.S.  government  to  tackle  the  problem,  which
would  result  in  further  falls  of  the  dollar  and  asset  prices,  rising
interest  rates  and  falling  consumption  and  investment.  In  the  face  of this
mounting  crisis  situation,  the  new  U.S.  administration  would  finally
introduce  measures  to  reduce  the  budget  deficit.  Given  the  time  lag
involved  for  such  legislation  to  pass  through  Congress,  it  would  probably
not  be  until  1990  that  actual  fiscal  tightening  would  be implemented.
The  first  two  years  of  the  forecast,  that  is  1988  and  1989,  give
the  same  results  as the  monetary  ease  scenario,  as  should  be expected  since
none  of the  other  policy  changes  have  taken  place  yet. In  1990,  when  all
three  policies  are  in  place,  the  results  of the  simulation  show  that  the
effects  of  U.S.  fiscal  tightening  overwhelm  the  effects  of  the  other
policies  (see  Table  20). We know  already  from  the  earlier  discussion  in
this  paper  that  Japanese  fiscal  expansion  does  not  have  much  effect  on the
U.S.  economy.  On  the  other  hand,  U.S.  domestic  fiscal  tightening  has  a
.jj/  This  is  true  even  if  U.S.  exports  to  Japan  do  not  increase.  As  the
Japanese  economy  heats  up,  U.S.  output  will  become  relatively  more
competitive  with  Japanese  exports,  both  in  other  countries  and
domestically.
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TABLE  20: WEFA
Combined  Scenario
(Difference  from  Baseline)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United  States
Real  GDP  0.3  1.0  - 0.6  0.4  0.0
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.1  - 0.2  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  - 0.1  - 0.1  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.2
Current  Account Balance  - 2.2  - 4.5  0.3  - 2.2  - 3.7
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  - 1.2  - 1.7  - 1.1  - 2.2  - 2.2
* Effective  Exchange  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Japan
Real  GDP  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.1  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Current  Account  Balance  0.8  1.4  0.1  0.3  0.9
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
*  Effective  Exchange  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Germany
Real  GDP  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  0.0  - 0.1
Current  Account  Balance  0.3  0.7  0.5  0.7  0.7
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  - 0.3  - 0.3  - 0.2  - 0.1  - 0.2
Effective  Exchange  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
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tremendous  downward  effect  on  GDP  growth  in  the  starting  year,  that  is,  in
1990. This  effect  in  fact  outweighs  the  higher  GDP  growth  generated  by the
monetary  ease  policy,  as  can  be seen  in the  lower  GDP  growth  for  that  year
under  the  combined  scenario.  The  combined  effects  of  U.S.  monetary  ease
and  fiscal  tightening  lead  to interest  rates  which  are  lower  than  those  in
any  of  the  individual  scenarios,  as is  expected.  Interest  rates  remain
lower  for  the  entire  forecast  period. The  growth  in  private  consumption  in
1990  is  quite  a  bit  lower  than  the  baseline  number. This  reflects  the
stronger  effect  of the  tax  increase  compared  to  that  of the  easy  money
policy,  a result  of  both  the  direct  effect  of  higher  taxes  on consu4aption,
and  the  secondary  multiplier  effect  of lower  GDP  growth  (due  both  to  lower
investment  and  consumption).  Investment  growth  for  1990,  on the  other
hand,  reflects  relatively  equal  weights  of  the  two  policies  in  affecting
investment:  the  tax  increase  which  reduces  investment  growth  quite
significantly,  and  monetary  ease  which  increases  investment  growth  by
lowering  interest  rates. Import  growth  in  1990  is  also  quite  a  bit  lower
than  the  baseline,  again  reflecting  the  stronger  effect  of the  tax  increase
compared  with  the  easy  money  scenario  on imports.  This  can  be attributed
to  the  -1irect  effect  of lower  GDP  growth  on imports.  Export  growth  remains
unchang  ^  from  the  baseline,  reflecting  equal  weights  of the  two  policies:
the  tax  increase  lowers  exports  and  monetary  ease  increases  exports.  As  a
result,  the-current  account  for  1990  is  hardly  changed.
For  the  rest  of  the  forecast  period,  that  is  1991-92,  GDP  growth
rebounds  from  the  low  point  of 1990. In  fact,  the  1991  GDP  growth  rate  is
higher  than  any  of the  individual  scenarios',  due  to  the  much  higher
investment  growth  of that  year. This  investment  growth  rate  results  from
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the  lower  interest  rates,  in  particular  the  lower  ig-term  real  interest
rate. Given  the  higher  GDP  growth  rate,  consumption  growth  is  also  the
highest  of  all  the  scenarios.  For  the  rest  of  the  period,  GDP  growth  rates
return  back  to the  baseline,  and  so  .'  consumption  growth  rates.
Investment  growth,  however,  is  improved  over  the  baseline,  and  in  fact  is
the  highest  of all  the  individual  scenarios.  This  follows  from  having
interest  rates  which  are  the  lowest  of  all  the  scenarios,  a  combined
outcome  of  monetary  ease  and  fiscal  contraction,  both  of  which  exert  a
downward  effect  on interest  rates. Both  the  export  and  import  growth  rates
are  higher  than  the  baseline  numbers,  reflecting  the  stronger  effects  of
the  easy  money  _zenario  over  the  fiscal  tightening  one,  as  well  as some
contribution  from  Japanese  fiscal  expansion.  In  all,  the  combined  scenario
gives  a  current  account  balance  which  is  worse  than  the  baseline's,  though
not  by a  great  amount,  and  which  is  also  an improvement  over  the  purely
monetary  ease  scenario.  The  personal  consumption  deflator  is  not  much
affected  for  the  entire  period,  as  should  be expected  since  it  remains  more
or less  unchanged  for  each  of  the  individual  scenarios  also. The
unemployment  rate  is  somewhat  improved,  and  so  is  the  growth  in  industrial
production,  the  former  more  the  result  of  monetary  eaae  and  the  latter  more
the  result  of  fiscal  tightening.  Finally,  net  government  borrowing  as  a
percentage  of  GDP  experiences  the  largest  improvement,  such  that  by 1991
the  budget  is  back  in  balance  and  is  in  fact  in  a slight  surplus,  a  state
of affairs  which  remains  through  the  end  of  the  forecast  period.
The  above  discussion  seems  to  indicate  that  given  the  choice  of
scenarios,  the  combined  one  offers  the  best  results  in  terms  of averting  a
major  sustained  recession  while  at the  same  time  balancing  the  budget
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within  a relatively  short  period  of time. Moreover,  while  the  combined
scenario  does  not  ameliorate  the  current  account  deficit,  it  only  leads  to
a  slight  worsening.  And  aside  from  the  one  year  of  low  growth,  that  is
1990,  when  the  tax  increase  is  first  introduced,  growth  rates  for  most  of
the  variables  rebound  back  to  those  of  the  baseline  scenario's,  such  that
there  is  not  auiy  sustained  recession  or inflation  either.
B.  QOEC
Alternative  scenarios  were  derived  from  the  OECD  Interlink  model
based  on  the  Bank's  baseline  assumptions.  These  scenarios  include:
(i) monetary  ease,  through  the  lowering  of the  U.S.  discount  rate  by two
hundred  basis  points  for  each  year  of  the  forecast,  beginning  in  1988;
(ii) U.S.  fiscal  deficit  correction  through  an increase  in  the  average
personal  tax  rate  by 10  percent  beginning  in  1990;  (iii) Japanese  fiscal
stimulus,  through  an increase  in  public  sector  investment  starting  in  1990;
and  (iv) an  attempt  at  simulating  a  coordinated  effort  between  the  U.S.
and  Japan  to  correct  the  major  external  imbalances  through  a combination  of
the  factors  involved  in  the  above  three  scenarios.
Several  differences  arose  in  planning  these  scenarios  for  the
Interlink  simulations  compared  to  the  Wharton  Model. First,  like  the
Wharton  simulations,  it  was  not  possible  to  accomodate  the  lower  interest
rates  through  an increase  in  non-borrowed  reserves.  However,  unlike  in  the
Wharton  simulation,  where  interest  rates  were  affected  through  the  discount
rate,  it  was  necessary  to impact  the  short-term  rate  directly  for  the
Interlink  simulation.  This  was  done  by lowering  the  three  month  U.S.
Treasury  Bill  rate  by two  hundred  basis  points.- 102  -
Second,  unlike  the  Wharton  model,  we  were  able  in  this  case  to
affect  only  personal  (household)  taxes. Business  tax  rates  were  held
constant  for  the  tax  lncreass  scenario.  Thi,  scenario  is  one  that  we feel
is  more  likely  for  the  U.S.  in  the  near  Zuture.
In  each  of  the  sections  descrlbing  the  results  of the  alternatlve
scenarios,  a  table  will  present  the  differences  from  the  baseline  for  the
same  variables.
i. U.S.  Monetary  Ease
The  U.S.  monetary  ease  scenario  is  one  in  which  the  U.S.  Treasury  Bill
rate  was  lowered  (exogenously)  by two  hundred  basis  points  starting  in  1988
and  continuing  throughout  the  forecast  period. All  other  exogenous
variables  were  held  the  same  as  in  the  OECDBANK  baseline.  One  reason  for  a
scenario  such  as this  would  be to try  to  avert  a recession  in  the  U.S.
economy  as  the  economy  adjusts  to  correct  the  twin  deficits,  should  the
Federal  Reserve  feel  that  the  risk  of recession  ls  greater  than  the  risk  of
higher  inflation.
In  the  U.S.,  lower  short-term  interest  rates  lead  to  lower
long-term  (nominal  and  real)  interest  rates. In  fact,  while  nominal
long-term  interest  rates  fall  by an  average  of 15.3  percent  over  the
forecast  period.  real  long-term  rates  fall  by an  average  of  43.5  percent
over  the  same  time  period. However,  while  the  percentage  change  in  nominal
rates  increases  each  year  until  the  last,  the  change  in  real  rates  peaks  in
1990  as inflation  starts  to  slow  down.
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As  one  would  *xpect,  this  leads  to  substantially  higher  levels  of
lnvestment  (the  investment  growth  rate  doubles  by 1992). GDP  growth  is
higher  than  in  the  baseline  for  all  years,  but  the  amount  of  change  in  the
growth  rate  shows  a  distinctly  cyclical  pattern  (as  do the  exchange  rate
assumptions  which  went  into  the  forecast).  Domestic  demand  changes  by
about  the  same  amount  as  GDP.
Exports  (volura)  are  expected  to  grow  exceptionally  well  in
1988-1990,  before  slowing  down  and  even  becoming  negative  In  1992. Import
volume  growth  is  very  slow  in  1988-89,  but  quickly  builds  strength  in  the
later  years. Domestic  demand  does  not  seem  to  be growing  by enough  to
warrant  the  large  turnaround  in  imports.
The  excellent  growth  in  export  volume  for  the  next  few  years
translates  into  substantial  improvement  in  export  value  growth  in  the
period  1988-91. Import  value  growth,  which  continues  to  be  high  in  1988,
falls  sharply  by 1990  before  rebounding  in  the  later  years. This  leads  to
an  improvement  in  the  current  account  balance  of  the  U.S.  with  the  deficit
down to  $72.8  billion  in  1990,  before  it  starts  to  build  again. However,
this  is  virtually  identical  to  the  base  case  solution.
This  result  is  very  similar  to  the  result  which  emanated  from  the
Wharton  simulation.  In  both  cases,  expo  - and  import  volumes  are  higher
than  in  the  baseline,  while  the  current  account  worsens  compared  to  the
baseline.
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While  inflation  did  not  increase  significantly  in  the  Wharton
simulation,  the  Interlink  model  is  much  more  sensitive  to (a) the  increase
in  money  supply,  (b) the  lower  interest  rates,  and  (c) faster  growth  in
the  economy.  Inflation  grows  2.6  percent  faster  in  1988,  10  percent  faster
in  1989,  and  83.3  percent  faster  in  1992. This  higher  rate  of inflation
helps  to  slow  private  consumption  in the  later  years  of the  forecast.
Employment  growth,  although  still  slow,  rises  much  faster  than  in
the  baseline.  Net  government  borrowing  improves  to  the  point  where  the
government  is  virtually  at  a  balanced  budget  by 1990  and  is  in  surplus  in
1991  before  returning  to  a small  deficit  in  1992. This  is  largely  due  to
the  increased  revenues  which  are  derived  from  faster  economic  growth,  as
well  as  the  lower  interest  rates  wh!ch  translate  into  lower  interest
payments  on  outstanding  debt.
Turning  now  to  the  cross-country  effects  of  the  U.S.  monetary
ease,  the  effect  on  the  German  economy  is  not  at  all  dramatic,  and  in fact,
the  3ffect  is  even  smaller  than  in  the  Wharton  simulation.  With  exchange
rates  remaining  exogenously  determined,  lower  interest  rates  in  the  U.S.
should  imply  lower  interest  rates  for  Germany.l 6 However,  this  does  not
happen  in  the  OECD  simulation.  German  interest  rates  remain  unchanged  from
the  base  case. Nevertheless,  investment  growth  increases  in  this
simulation  after  the  first  year. Investment  growth  in  Germany  falls  by
five  percent  compared  to the  baseline  in the  first  year,  then  increases  by
ten  percent  in  the  next  three  years.
]i/  With  the  deutsche  mark  unable  to  appreciate,  one  must  assume  away  any
chance  for  capital  flows  from  the  U.S.  to  Germany.
IMASS-11:KXlNG0006/1A1987-93:rk:February  25. 1988  14-O-8.  12:05:00105  *
Both  domestic  demand  and  prices  grow  relative  to  the  baseline  in
the  first  year,  while  all  variables  remain  unchanged  in  the  second  year  of
the  simulation.  Higher  investment  and  stronger  exports  lead  to  a  stronger
growth  in  GDP  by 1990,  with  slightly  higher  growth  in  the  following  years
(see  Table  21).
With  respect  to  Japan,  the  easier  monetary  policy  has  no effect  on
japanese  Interest  rates  either. This  may  be due  to  the  fact  that  the
Japanese  economy  is  rather  insulaxed  from  capital  flows.  Yet,  investment
grows  faster  than  in  the  baseline,  lcading  to  higher  growth  in  GDP  in  all
years. Both  the  Japanese  and  German  current  account  surpluses  increase  in
this  simulation,  probably  due  to  the  healthier  market  for  their  goods  in
the  United  States.
ii. U.S.  Tax  Increase
This  scenario  is  designed  to  simulate  the  effect  of  policies  which
would  balance  the  Federal  budget  in  the  early  1990s.  As expected  with  a
large  tax  increase,  net  government  borrowing  falls  dramatically  in  the
first  year  of the  tax  increase,  and  in  fact,  the  budget  nearly  balances  in
that  year. However,  investment  and  consumption  both  fall  substantially  due
to  the  tax  increase,  and  the  lower  economic  growth,  which  is  sustained
through  1992,  leads  to  a  new  increase  in  net  government  borrowing.  In  this
scenario,  by 1992,  government  borrowing  as a  percentage  of  GDP  is  higher
than  in  1989,  before  the  tax  increase.
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TABLE 21:  OECD
Monetary  Ease  Simulationl
(Difference  from  Baseline)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United  States
Real GDP  0.2  0.6  0.3  0.1  0.4
Employment  0.1  0.5  0.3  0.0  - 0.1
Inflation  0.1  0.5  1.0  1.2  1.5
Current  Account  Balance  - 2.6  - 1.8  1.1  - 1.3  - 3.2
*  Long-Term  Interest  Rate  - 0.6  - 1.1  - 1.5  - 1.8  - 1.8
Japan
Real  GDP  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1
Employment  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1
Inflation  - 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2
Current  Account  Balance  - 0.5  0.0  0.4  0.1  2.0
Long-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Germany
Real CDP  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1
Employment  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0
Inflation  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.2
Current  Account  Balance  1.6  3.0  4.0  5.2  7.0
Long-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
/  A lowering  of the  U.S. Treasury  Bill rate  by 200  basis points for  each
year of the  forecast.
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GDP  growth  rates  fall  to  0.3  percent  in  1990  ,  -0.6  percent  in
1991,  and  -0.7  percent  in  :992  (see  Table  22). Investment  growth  is  also
negative  in those  years.
While  the  low  levels  of  GDP  growth  lead  to  a slow-down  in  the
volume  growth  of imports,  import  volume  growth  remains  large  nevertheless.
The  growth  in  the  value  of imports  declines  a  great  deal  relative  to  the
baseline.  Export  growth,  both  in  volume  and  value  terms,  improves  somewhat
in  the  later  years.
As a  result  of the  slow-down  in  economic  growth,  the  current
account  balance  improves  by $11  billion  in  1990,  the  year  in  which  the
deficit  is  smallest.  Despite  the  upturn  in  the  deficit  after  1990,  due  to
the  appreciation  of the  dollar,  the  deterioration  in  the  current  account
balance  is  not  nearly  as  bad  in  this  simulation  as in  the  base  case. In
fact,  in  1992,  the  deficit  is  still  lower  than  it  was  in  1989.
Nevertheless,  despite  drastically  lower  rates  of inflation,  an
improvement  in  the  current  account  balance,  and  a temporary  reduction  in
the  Federal  deficit,  one  must  note  that  the  strongest  impact  of this
scenario  is  that  the  U.S.  enters  a  major  recession  which  lasts  through  the
end  of  the  forecast  period. During  this  time,  investment  falls,  leading  to
a poor  outlook  for  later  in  the  1990s.
The  effect  of a  tax  increase  in  the  United  States  on the  German
economy  is  to  lower  German  GDP  growth  throughout  the  period. Export  growth
is  not  as  bad  as  one  would  expect  it  to  be,  given  the  economic  condition  of
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TABLE  22:  OECD
U.S. Tax Increasel
(Difference  from Baseline)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United States
Real GDP  0.0  0.0  - 1.4  - 1.3  - 0.5
Employment  0.0  0.0  - 0.5  - 0.9  - 0.4
Prices  0.0  0.0  - 0.3  - 1.4  - 2.0
Current  Account Balance  0.0  0.0  10.7  18.9  23.3
*  Long-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Japan
Real  GDP  0.0  0.0  - 0.2  - 0.4  - 0.3
Employment  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.2  - 0.2
Prices  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.2
Current  Account Balance  0.0  0.0  - 1.3  - 2.8  - 4.1
Long-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Germany
Real  GDP  0.0  0.0  - 0.2  - 0.5  - 0.6
Employment  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1
Prices  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  - 0.1
Current  Account Balance  0.0  0.0  - 3.1  - 6.6  - 8.9
Long-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
/  A 10 percent increase  in the  U.S. personal  tax  rate for each  year of the
forecast,  starting  in 1990.
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the  United States.  Investment  growth  falls  in all of the  years,  whlle the
growth  in domestic  demand is lower  only in  1991 and 1992.  Inflation  is
also lower in these  years.
With respect  to  Japan, the tax increase  in the  U.S. lowers
Japanese  GDP growth,  mainly through  lower  exports.  GDP growth falls  by 6.7
percent  in the first  year of the tax increase,  and  by 15 percent  in each
year after that.  Lower exports  lead to a fall in  employment  growth  of
about  10 percent,  which in turn  leads to substantially  lower  growth  in
domestic  demand.  The fall  in domestic  demand  growth,  however, is  not as
large  as the fall  in GDP growth.
With lower  exports,  the  Japanese  current  account  surplus  declines
by US$ 3.1  billion in the  first  year, US$ 6.6  billion in the second  year,
and US$ 8.9  billion in the final  year of the  forecast  relative  to the
baseline.
iii.  Japanese Fiscal  Stimulus
The Japanese  fiscal  stimulus  involves  a large increase  in  public
sector investment  in 1990  and 1991. As a result,  the  growth rate  of total
investment  in  Japan grows  by 130  percent  in the  first  year and 300  percent
in 1991.  This increase  lifts  GDP, through  domestic  demand,  to  very  high
levels  of growth (see  Table 23).  In fact,  the growth  rate  for domestic
demand  triples  in 1991.
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TABLE 23:  OECD
Japanese  Fiscal  Expansionl
(Difference  from  Baseline)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United States
Real GDP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1
Employment  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
Prices  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2
Current  Account Balance  0.0  0.0  0.9  4.3  5.9
Long-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Japan
Real GDP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2
Employment  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
Prices  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
'urrent  Account Balance  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.9  1.5
Long-Term  Interest  Rate  . 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Germany
Real  GDP  0.0  0.0  1.3  4.1  1.8
Employment  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.8  0.4
Prices  0.0  0.0  - 0.4  - 0.6  0.9
Current  Account  Balance  0.0  0.0  - 3.0  - 11.7  - 14.1
Long-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1/  Increasing  the  growth rates  of Japanese  public  sector investment  over
the  baseline  growth  rates  by 15.79  percent,  25.71  percent  and 0 percent,
respectively,  for the  years  of the forecast.
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Unexplainedly,  this  boost  in  government  spending  also  lowers  the
growth  rate  of inflation  from  the  baseline.  Inflation  is  approximately  25
percent  lower  in  this  scenario  than  in  the  baseline. This  result  is  very
similar  to  the  simulation  using  the  Wharton  model,  and  indicates  that
consumer  demand  is  not  growing  excessively.
The  increase  in  government  spending  naturally  worsens  the
government's  budgetary  account,  and  at  the  same  time,  the  current  account
falls  even  further  than  in  the  base  case. The  increased  borrowing  by the
government  to  finance  the  investment  has  no  effect  on the  long-term
interest  rate,  indicating  that  there  is  no crowding  out  effect  in the
economy.
In  summary,  a fiscal  stimulus  in  Japan,  with  exchange  rates  being
held  exogenous,  generates  a  fairly  healthy  economy  with  few  adverse
effects,  other  than  the  expected  increase  in  net  government  borrowing  and
the  lower  current  account  surplus.
The  reason  for  running  this  scenario  was  to  see  if  a  Japanese
fiscal  expansion  would  help  solve  the  twin  deficit  problem  of the  United
States  by  raising  the  level  of  economic  activity.  However,  the  effect  of
the  Japanese  expansion  on the  United  States  is  minimal.  In the  first  year,
there  are  no  measurable  effects. In  1991,  GDP  growth  increases  by  a great
deal,  largely  because  of increased  export  activity.  This  results  in  an
improvement  in  the  U.S.  current  account  deficit.
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The  effect  on  Germany  is  almost  identical.  GDP  growth  improves  in
the  second  year,  as  do exports.  This  leads  to  a  higher  level  of  surplus  on
the  current  account.  There  are  no  other  measurable  effects.
iv. Combined  Scenario
In  this  scenario,  all  of the  above  changes  are  imposed  on  the
model  at the  same  time,  while  holding  exchange  rates  and  commodity  prices
at their  predetermined  levels.  This  is  the  most  probable  of  all  the
scenarios  attempted  thus  far,  since  one  would  expect  that  if  the  U.S.  were
to  take  action  to  reduce  the  budget  deficit  through  a  major  tax  increase,  a
monetary  policy  would  also  be followed  which  would  reduce  interest  rates  in
an attempt  to  offset  a recession.  In  addition,  it  now  appears  that  the
Japanese  have  begun  a  unilateral  expansion,  which  may  help  to  pull  the  U.S.
through  the  contractionary  consequences  of  a tax  increase.
Monetary  ease  begins  in  1988,  through  an  assumption  that  the
Federal  Reserve  has  decided  to  take  action  to  avert  a recession,  given  the
threat  of  possible  further  falls  in  asset  prices,  rising  interest  rates,
and  possible  further  falls  in  the  dollar.  With  this  monetary  ease  policy
in  effect,  the  new  U.S.  administration  will  set  out  to  reduce  the  budget
deficit,  at  first  through  a tax  increase.  Given  the  time  lag  to  pass  such
legislation,  such  a  bill  would  probably  not  take  effect  until  1990.
Looking  at  the  results  of  this  simulation,  the  first  two  years
give  the  same  results  as the  monetary  ease  scenario.  This  is  not  at  all
surprising,  since  the  other  policy  changes  do  not  take  place  until  1990.
In  1990,  when  the  other  policies  do take  effect,  the  tax  increase
overwhelms  all  of the  other  actions.- 113 -
In 1990, in  the  U.S., GDP growth  falls  to  0.7 percent,  down 59
percent  from the  base cese (see  Table 24).  While the  monetary  ease and
Japanese  fiscal  stimulus  help to ease the  recession  caused  by the tax
increase,  they  only serve  to postpone  a period  of actual  negative  growth  by
one  year.
The increase  in  p-rsonal taxes  in 1990  leads to lower  consumption,
hence lower  domestic  demand,  lower  GDP, and finadly,  lower growth  in
employment. The government  deficit  moves into  surplus  in 1990,  but due to
low  economic  growth,  falls  back into  a small  deficit  by 1992.  Still, this
is far superior  to the 2.3 percent  level  of net government  borrowing  as a
percentage  of GDP that  resulted  from  the  base case.
The  lower  level  of interest  rates from  the  monetary  ease  policy in
1988  and 1989 results  in  a higher level  of inflation  in 1990,  but the tax
increase  and concomitant  lower  economic  growth  lead to  a lower level  of
inflation  in 1992.
The  current  account  balance  improves  a  great  deal  in  this
scenario,  bottoming  out  in  1991  at  $60  billion,  rather  than in 1990  at  $72
billion  as in the  base case.
For Germany,  there  are  very few effects.  In 1991, the  GDP growth
rate falls,  as does the  growth  rate  of domestic  demand  and employment.
There  are  however,  no dramatic  effects  in  Germany (see  Table 24 for  more
detail).
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TABLE 24:  OECD
Combined  Scenariol
(Difference  from  Baseline)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United  States
Real GDP  0.2  0.6  - 1.0  - 1.0  - 0.4
Employment  0.1  0.5  - 0.3  - 0.8  - 0.4
Prices  0.1  0.5  0.7  0.0  - 0.4
Current  Account  Balance  - 2.6  - 1.7  10.6  21.8  26.0
*  Long-Term  Interest  Rate  - 0.6  - 1.1  - 1.5  - 1.8  - 1.9
Japan
Real GDP  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  0.0
Employment  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  0.0
Prices  - 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
CGurent  Account  Balance  - 0.5  0.0  - 0.7  - 0.8  - 0.7
Long-Term .nterest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Germany
Real  GDP  0.1  0.0  1.4  3.7  1.4
Employment  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.7  0.4
Prices  0.0  0.0  - 0.3  - 0.4  1.1
Current  Account Balance  1.7  3.0  - 2.4  - 13.1  - 16.2
Long-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1/  A combination  of the  U.S. monetary  ease,  U.S. tax increase,  and Japanese
fiscal  expansion  policy stocks.
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in  Japan,  the  effects  of the  fiscal  expansion  more  than  outweigh
the  affects  of the  contraction  in  the  United  States.  Although  growth  rates
are  not  quite  as  high  as in  the  Japanese  fiscal  expansion  scenario  alone,
due  mainly  to  lower  imports  by the  U.S.  in  this  scenario,  the  combined
simulation  presents  a  healthy  Japanese  economy  indeed.
C.  LINK
i. U.S.  Monetary  Ease
This  policy  simulation  is  effected  through  a  reduction  by 250
basis  points  of  the  U.S.  Federal  Funds  rate,  which  gives  rise  to  an
approximate  reduction  of  200  basis  points  in  the  Treasury  Bill  rate. This
is  sustained  throughout  the  forecast  period  and  starts  in  1988.
The  outcome  of  this  simulation  is  as  expected.  GNP is  higher
throughout  the  forecast  period,  although  the  increase  in  GNP growth  rates
for  each  individual  year  is  only  of  a  magnitude  of  0.1-0.2  percent  (see
Table  25). The  most  dramatic  outcome  of  this  simulation  seems  to  be the
severe  reduction  in  the  federal  deficit,  from  $85  billion  in  the  LINKBANK
scenario  to  $35  billion  in  the  current  scenario,  a  reduction  of  nearly  60
percent.  This  reduction  in  the  deficit  is probably  due  to two  reasons.
First,  the  reduction  in interest  rates  has  reduced  interest  payments  by
quite  a large  magnitude.  Second,  the  monetary  ease  has  stimulated  economic
growth  to the  extent  that  tax  revenues  are  quite  a  bit  higher.
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TABLE 25:  Project  LINK
Monetary  Ease  Simulationl
(Difference  from  Baseline)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United States
Real GDP  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.2  - 0.2  - 0.3
Current  Account Balance  2.6  1.9  1.8  1.2  0.9
*  Short-Term  Interest  Rate  - 2.0  - 1.9  - 2.0  - 2.1  - 2.0
Japan
Real  GDP  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
-Current  Account  Balance  0.1  0.6  1.1  1.3  3.1
S  Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Germany
Real  GDP  - 0.1  - 0.3  - 0.1  - 0.1  0.0
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.2
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
Current  Account Balance  - 1.2  - 4.1  - 3.6  - 3.0  - 2.2
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
/  Lowering  of the  U.S. federal  funds  rate  by 250  basis points for  each
year of the forecast,  starting  in 1988.
MASS-11:KXNG:0006/T b1X88-82:rk:AprLl  12. 1988 14-OCT-88 15:47:00- 117  -
As expected  with  a  monetary  ease  scenario  which  increases  GNP
growth,  the  trade  balance  is  worsened  compared  to  LINKBANK  for  all  the
years  of the  forecast  period,  due  to the  higher  imports  (both  nominal  and
real)  and  only  slightly  higher  exports  (in  nominal  terms;  in  real  terms
there  is  hardly  any  change).  The  slightly  higher  nominal  exports  are
mostly  due  to  the  somewhat  higher  export  price  index,  which  is  due  to
higher  domestic  inflation  (borne  out  by the  slightly  higher  GNP  deflator)
thus  raising  the  cost  of  production.  The  current  account,  however,
improves  compared  to  the  baseline  for  all  the  years  in  the  forecast  period,
probably  because  the  lower  interest  rates  decrease  the  level  of interest
payments  on  U.S.  securities  held  by foreigners.  This  is  also  the  same,
route  through  which  the  federal  deficit  is  reduced.
The  lower  interest  rates  increase  investment,  for  the  entire
forecast  period. Consumption,  on the  other  hand,  is  only  improved
slightly,  due  to  the  rather  small  increase  in  GNP.
The  effect  of  a  monetary  ease  policy  on the  Japanese  economy  is
quite  small. Japan's  GNP  increases  slightly  over  the  baseline,  with  this
increase  growing  through  the  forecast  period. This  increase  ir  GNP  is  led
by  a  higher  level  of  exports,  which  follows  from  the  higher  demand  by the
United  States. As  a result,  both  the  trade  account  and  the  current  account
improve  somewhat.  Private  consumption  and  private  investment  are  barely
affected,  with  both  showing  very  slight  increases  towards  the  end  of the
forecast  period. The  slightly  higher  GNP  leads  to  a slightly  lower
unemployment  rate.
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There  is  a  larger  and  also  negative  effect  of  a  U.S.  monetary  ease
policy  on  German  economic  growth,  predominantly  due  to  lower  interest
income  from  dollar-denominated  securities  resulting  from  the  lower  U.S.
interest  rates. This  lower  interest  income  in  turn  lowers  the  exports  of
goods  and  services  even  though  the  exports  of  goods  only  is  increased
somewhat  (due  to  higher  GNP  in  the  U.S.). The  lower  exports  of  goods  and
services  lowers  GNP,  which  leads  to  a decline  in  goods  imported.  Hence,
the  trade  balance  improves  as  exports  of goods  increase  and  imports  of
goods  decrease.  The  current  account,  on the  other  hand,  deteriorates  due
to  lower  inflows  of  interest  income.  The  lower  GNP  leads  to lower
infl#tion  and  higher  unemployment.  With  a lower  GNP,  both  private
investment  and  private  consumption  fall. Interest  rates  decline  a little
due  to  the  lower  investment  demand.
ii. U.S.  Tax  Increase
The  U:S.  tax  increase  scenario  is  implemented  by increasing  the
personal  tax  rate  by 10  percent  for  each  year  starting  in  1990. The
desired  outcome  of  decreasing  the  federal  deficit  is  achieved,  but  quite
surprisingly,  not  by as  mucta  as  under  the  monetary  ease  scenario  described
above. The  federal  deficit  falls  to  $42  billion,  which  is  around  a  50
percent  decrease,  compared  to  the  close  to  60  percent  decrease  in  the  easy
money  scenario.  This  is  due  to  the  lower  GNP  growth  which  reduces  the  tax
base  and  hence  has  a suppressive  effect  on tax  tevenues  despite  the
increase  in  the  personal  tax  rate. The  results  of this  scenario  are
summarized  in  Table  26.
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TABLE 26:  Proiect  LINK
U.S. Tax Increasel
(Difference  from  Baseline)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United  States
Real  GDP  0.0  0.0  - 0.3  - 0.2  0.0
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1
Current  Account  Balance  0.0  0.0  3.5  8.9  12.3
*  Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.2  - 0.1
Japan
-Real  GDP  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Current  Account Balance  0.0  0.0  - 0.8  - 2.2  - 3.8
*  Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  0.0
Germany
Real CDP  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1
Current  Account  Balance  0;0  0.0  0.2  - 0.6  - 0.9
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1/  A 10 percent  increase  in the  U.S. personal  tax  rate for  each  year of the
forecast,  starting in 1990.
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GNP  growth  is  reduced,  as  expected,  although  not  by  a significant
amount,  and  in  fact  there  is  no  change  in  the  growth  rate  in  1992,  the  last
year  of the  simulation.  In  level  terms,  obviously,  GNP  is  lower  through
the  years  when  the  policy  is  in  effect.  This  decline  in  GNP  originates
from  lower  consumption  (arising  from  the  highet  personal  tax  rate)  and  then
the  multiplier  effect. The  lower  GNP  also  leads  to  the  lower  investment.
Interest  rates  go  down,  the  resuLt  of  both  the  lower  federal  deficit  and
the  consequent  smaller  "crowding  out",  as  well  as  of the  lower  investment
demand. Both  nominal  and  real  imports  decline,  which  is  to  be expected
given  the  reduced  GNP  growth. Real  exports  remain  more  or  less  unchanged,
but  nominal  exports  fall,  though  only  very  slightly  due  to  the  decline  in
the  export  price  index. The  latter  could  be due  to  the  decline  in  the  GNP
deflator,  a  result  of lower  GNP  growth,  which  could  lead  to  lower  co:ts  of
production  and  hence a lower  export  price  index.  Finally,  with the
decrease  in  GNP  growth,  the  unemployment  rate  increases,  albeit  slightly.
An increase  in  taxes  in  the  U.S.  decreases  Japanese  GNP  growth,  as
expected,  but  only  very  slightly.  The  main  channel  of  the  shock  is,  of
course,  through  the  external  accounts.  Exports  fall,  in  both  nominal  and
real  terms. The  decline  in  exports  leads  to  the  lower  GNP  growth,  which  in
turn  lowers  imports,  again  in  both  nominal  and  real  terms. Together  with
the  decrease  in  the  trade  balance,  the  current  account  also  goes  down.
Private  consumption  decreases  slightly  and  so  does  private  invAstment.  The
GNP  deflator  is  practically  unchanged,  the  unemployment  rate  increases
somewhat,  and  interest  rates  fall  very  slightly  due  to the  slight  decrease
in  GNP.
MASS-.11:IN:00061gBIM1987-93:rk:February  25. 1988 14-OCT-88 12:05:00- 121  -
Turning  now  to  Germany,  the  effects  on  its  economy  are  very
similar  to those  on  the  Japanese  economy.  First  of  all,  GNP  growth  falls
only  slightly,  in  fact  by  the  same  percentages  below  the  baseline  as in  the
case  for  Japan. This  is  a  result  of  the  slightly  higher  decrease  in
exports,  both  nominal  and  real,  compared  to  the  fall  in  imports,  again  both
nominal  and  real. As a  result,  both  the  trade  and  current  accounts
deteriorate  somewhat,  pulling  down  GNP  growth. Private  consumption  and
private  investment  decline,  a result  of the  lower  GNP. Interest  rates  fall
due  to  the  lower  investment  demand. Inflation  deilines  very  slightly,  and
unemployment  increases  somewhat,  both  results  following  from  the  decline  in
GNP  growth.
iii. Japanese  Fiscal  Expansion
This  policy  scenario  is  implemented  by increasing  Japanese  public
investment  starting  1990. The  impact  on  the  U.S.  economy  is  practically
non-existent,  which  is  to  be expected  since  Japanese  imports  from  the  U.S.
make  up  only  a  very  small  fraction  of  U.S.  exports.
The  impact  domestically  on the  Japanese  economy  is  somewhat
larger,  but  still  not  very  significant  (see  Table  27). GNP  increases  and
imports  grow  somewhat,  leading  to  worsening  trade  and  current  accounts.
The  curious  outcome  is  the  slight  decrease  in  real  exports  of  goods  a9d
services.  The  effect  on  raising  inflation  is  only  more  noticeable  by the
end  of the  forecast  period. Unemployment  decreases  throughout  the  forecast
period  given  the  higher  GNP.
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TABLE  27:  Proiect  LINK
Japanese  Flscal  Expansionl
(Difference  from  Baseline)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United  States
Real  GDP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Current  Account  Balance  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1
*  Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Japan
Real  GDP  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Current  Account Balance  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.4  - 0.9
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Germany
Real  GDP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Current  Account  Balance  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Increasing  the  growth  rates  of  Japanese  publlc  sector  investment  over
the  baseline  growth  rates  by 15.79  percent,  25.71  percent  and  0 percent,
respectively,  for  the  years  of the  forecast  starting  in  1990.
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Turning  now  to  the  German  economy,  the  impact  on it  is  almost  as
insignificant  as  that  on the  U.S.  economy.  There  is  barely  any  effect  at
all.
iv. Combined  Scenario
Not  surprisingly,  for  the  U.S.  economy  the  combined  scenario  gives
an  outcome  which  comprises  the  effects  of  the  monetary  ease  and  tax
increase  policies.  This  follows  from  the  fact  that  the  Japanese  fiscal
expansion  policy  does  not  produce  any  notable  effects  in  the  case  when  it
is  imposed  singly,  so  that  it  does  not  have  much  effect  in  the  combined
scenario  either.
In  the  first  two  years  of  the  simulatior.,  1988  and  1989,  since  the
tax  increase  has  not  taken  place,  the  outcome  of the  combined  scenario  on
GNP  is  exactly  that  for  the  individual  case  of  monetary  ease,  that  is,
higher  growth. In  1990,  when  both  policies  are  in  effect,  GNP  growth  is
1.0  percent,  which  is  between  the  0.9  percent  under  the  tax  increase
scenario  and  the  1.3  percent  under  the  monetary  ease  scenario.  This  is,
however,  lower  than  the  1.2  percent  rate  under  the  base  case. So  it  seems
that  the  tax  increase  has  a  higher  weight  in  affecting  GNP  growth  in  that
year. In  1991,  GNP  growth  is  again  somewhere  between  the  rates  from  the
two  policies  implemented  singly,  and  is  also  the  same  as in  the  base  case.
By the  end  of the  forecast  period,  1992,  GNP  growth  has  actually  surpassed
the  base  case  number,  although  it  is  still  in  between  the  numbers  from  the
two  scenarios  implemented  singly.
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In  sum,  the  combined  scenario  raises  the  level  of  GNP  compared  to
the  base  case. This  is  so  despite  relatively  similar  growth  rates  from
1990  onwards,  because  of the  initial  stimulus  from  monetary  ease  in  the
earlier  two  years. The  most  significant  effect  of the  combined  scenario
is,  however,  the  tremendous  reduction  in the  federal  deficit. In  fact,  the
federal  deficit  has  turned  into  a  slight  surplus  by 1992. This  follows
from  the  fact  that  the  federal  deficit  is  already  reduced  under  each
scenario  individually.  Similarly,  the  current  account  deficit  is  also
reduced  the  most  under  the  combined  scenario,  although  the  magnitude  of the
reduction  is  much  smaller  than  that  for  the  federal  deficit.  The  same  also
holds  for  the  trade  account.
The  inflation  rate  increases  and  the  unemployment  rate  goes  down,
results  which  are  as  expected  given  the  higher  GNP (see  Table  28).
Interest  rates  are  lowered  by  quite  a  bit  compared  to  the  base  case,  since
they  decline  under  each  of the  monetary  ease  and  the  tax  increase
scenarios.  These  much  lower  interest  rates  are  in  turn  responsible  for  the
dramatic  reduction  in  the  current  account  deficit,  compared  to the  smaller
reduction  in  the  trade  deficit.  The  lower  interest  rates  also  encourage
higher  investment,  as  reflected  particularly  in  the  higher  level  of
non-residential  investment  under  the  combined  scenario  in  comparison  with
the  base  case. Private  consumption,  on the  other  hand,  is  actually  lower
in  level  terms  under  the  combined  scenario  compared  to  the  base  case,
probably  due  to the  higher  personal  tax  rate. Public  consumption  is  also
lower  as a result  of  the  lower  interest  rates  and  hence  lower  government
outlays  in  the  form  of interest  payments.
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TABLE  28: Proiect  LINK
Combined  Scenariol
(Difference  from  Baseline)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
United  States
Real  GDP  0.1  0.2  - 0.2  0.0  0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
Unemployment  Rate  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.1  0.0  0.0
Current  Account  Balance  2.6  1.9  5.1  10.0  13.4
* Short-Term  Interest  Rate  - 2.0  - 1.9  - 2.0  - 2.1  - 2.0
Japan
Real  GDP  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Current  Account  Balance  0.1  0.7  0.2  - 0.8  1.6
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  . 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Germany
Real  GDP  - 0.1  - 0.3  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.1
Personal  Consumption  Deflator  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.2  - 0.2
Unemployment  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
Current  Account  Balance  - 1.2  - 4.1  - 3.8  - 3.4  - 2.7
Short-Term  Interest  Rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1./ A combination  of the  U.S.  monetary  ease,  U.S.  tax  increase,  and  Japanese
fiscal  expansion  policy  stocks.
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In  sum,  under  the  combined  scenario,  investment  is  encouraged,  and
the  trade  and  current  account  deficits  are  improved,  all  of  which  increase
GNP  despite  the  lower  levels  of  consumption,  both  public  and  private.
The  effect  on the  Japanese  economy  is  a combination  of  the  effects
of  all  three  policies;  the  U.S.  monetary  ease  policy  which  stimulates
Japanese  growth,  the  U.S.  tax  increase  policy  which  decreases  Japanese
growth,  and  the  Japanese  domestic  fiscal  expansion  policy  which  increases
growth. The  net  effect  of  these  three  policies  is  an  increase  in  Japanese
growth,  although  only  to  a small  extent.
Both  the  trade  and  current  account  surpluses  are  reduced  by  the
end  of  the  forecast  period,  1992,  but  only  very  slightly.  Along  with  the
slightly  higher  GNP  growth  are  slight  increases  in  consumption  and
investment.  The  inflation  rate  barely  increases  and  the  unemployment  rate
is  improved  slightly.
As is  the  case  for  the  U.S.,  the  Japanese  fiscal  expansion  policy
has  only  barely  perceptible  effects  on  the  German  economy.  The  effects  of
the  combined  scenario  are  therefore  a  combination  of the  effects  of  just
the  monetary  ease  and  tax  increase  policies  in  the  U.S.,  both  of  which  have
a  negative  impact  on  German  growth. The  trade  balance  improves,  reflecting
the  larger  effect  of the  U.S.  monetary  ease  in  improving  the  German  trade
account  over  the  effect  of the  U.S.  tax  increase  in  lowering  it. The
current  account,  however,  deteriorates,  the  result  of the  effects  of  both
policies,  as  discussed  above. Private  consumption  and  private  investment
decrease.  The  decline  in  GNP  has  the  expected  effect  of  lowering  inflation
and  increasing  unemployment,  as  well  as lowering  interest  rates.- 127  -
VIll. CONCLSIONS
The  first  purpose  of this  paper  was  to  examine  the  IECAP  forecast
for  industrial  countries  in  light  of  the  forecasts  produced  by
organizations  outside  the  Bank. Since  IECAP  has  not  been  relying  on  a
completely  linked  global  macroeconomic  model,  the  question  was  raised  as  to
whether  the  IECAP  forecast  would  be  consistent  with  forecasts  produced  by
linked  models. In  order  to  answer  this  question,  Bank  assumptions  for
exchange  rates  (produced  by IECAP)  and  for  commodity  prices  (produced  by
IECCN)  were  introduced  into  three  global  models  under  the  auspices  of
Wharton  Econometrics  (The  WEFA  Group),  OECD,  and  Project  LINK.
The  result  of this  exercise  showed  that,  even  given  the  imposition
of Bank  assumptions,  differences  existed  between  the  model  results  and  the
IECAP  forecast.  However,  major  differences  also  occurred  between  the  three
linked  models  forecasts,  using  these  assumptions  in  each  case.
Despite  differences  in  the  annual  growth  rates  of  the  key  economic
variables,  the  three  models  produced  forecasts  quite  similar  to IECAP's  in
terms  of the  medium-term  time  path  of  the  forecast.  That  is,  given  the
Bank's  assumptions,  each  model  produced  a small  slow-down  in  1988,  low
growth  in  1989  and/or  1990,  and  a  recovery  in  the  U.S.  in  1991  and  1992.
The  baseline  produced  using  Project  LINK  was  especially  close  to  the  IECAP
forecast,  both  in  terms  of the  magnitudes  of the  growth  rates,  and  the  time
path. On the  other  hand,  the  Interlink  model  produced  a  sustained  period
of low  growth,  with  no improvement  in  the  final  two  years. The  more
sensible  results  produced  by the  LINK  model  may  be  a result  of  both  its
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more  detailed  set  of  equations  for  each  country  than  are  included  in  either
Interlink  or  the  Wharton  World  Model,  and  its  ability  to  produce  quarterly
forecasts  for  the  industrial  countries.  This  quarterly  time-frame  allows  a
more  realistic'pass-through  of  economic  interactions.
In  some  instances,  the  changes  that  were  imposed  on the  exchange
rates  included  fluctuations  that  were  too  much  for  the  models  to  handle  in
a  consistent  fashion  (even  though  these  fluctuations  merely  continue  the
pattern  of  the  recent  past). However,  the  results  in  this  paper  were
presented  with  each  model  having  been  run  in  pure  form,  rather  than  with
adjustments  made  to  fine-tune  the  model  to  produce  a  nice  looking  forecast.
Thus,  results  such  as the  high  rate  of inflation  in  Germany  in  1992,  which
would  be politically  unacceptable  and  which  would  probably  be nullified  by
government  action,  were  not  fine-tuned  in  the  similations  reported  in  this
paper.
The  results  obtained  by running  the  Project  LINK  model  using  the
World  Bank's  assumptions  are  close  enough  to  IECAP's  forecast  that  the  LINK
modal  could  be  used  by IECAP  to  authenticate  its  industrial  country
forecast  and  to  aid  in  producing  its  developing  country  forecast.
In  terms  of the  industrial  countries,  Project  LINK  would  give
IECAP  staff  the  linked  global  model  which  can  help  to  ensure  consistent
results.  For  the  developing  countries  that  are  covered  under  Project  LINK.
IECAP  staff  would  have  access  to  detailed  country  models  which  would
provide  forecasts  based  on  IECAP's  global  assumptions.  A separate  study  is
forthcoming  which  will  look  into  the  feasibility  and  practicality  of
incorporating  Project  LINK  modeling  into  IECAP  work.- 129 -
The  second  purpose  of this  paper  was  to  test  alternative  scenarios
on  each  model  to  see  what  would  be the  effect  of  various  pplicy  actions.
Four  alternative  slmulations  were  run. These  have  been  explained  in  great
detail  in  earlier  parts  of this  paper.  The  major  conclusion  that  can  be
drawn  from  these  four  simulations  of the  models  is  that  the  combined  policy
action  scenario  makes  the  most  sense. While  the  level  of  policy  action
(i.e.,  how  expansive  a  monetary  policy  - how  tight  a fiscal  policy)  was  not
settled  by the  simulations,  clearly  the  world  economy  does  not  suffer  as
much  in  1989/90  with  the  combination  policy  as  with  the  tax  increase  alone.
In  addition,  the  economy  is  far  better  off  in  the  1990s  with  this  sort  of
policy.
The  second  item  of importance  which  can  be gleaned  from  this  set
of  simulations  is  that  while  the  U.S.  po2icy  cnmhination  coupled  with  the
Japanese  expansion  leaves  those  two  countries  in  a  fairly  healthy  state,
the  German  economy  suffers  (in  the  LINK  simulation)  from  the  assumption
that  they  are  not  taking  any  action. It  is  clear  that  an  expansion  by
Germany  would  be  an integral  part  of  any  successful  policy  action  by  more
than  t-he  United  States  alone.
In  summary,  the  use  of  the  WEFA,  OECD,  and  Project  LINK  models
bears  out  the  IECAP  forecast  to  a large  extent. The  exchange  rate
assumptions  are  based  on a  scenario  in  which  the  pressures  that  were
building  in  the  financial  markets  last  summer  will  return. The  reaction  in
the  financial  markets,  while  not  predictable  in  detail,  are  likely  to  cause
an  increase  in  ex  ante  constraints  on  U.S.  borrowing  while  making  the  need
for  such  borrowing  lower  in  future  years. Thus,  with  no  policy-induced
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adjustments,  the  asset  markets  may  be In  for  another  shock. This  could
lead  to  some  combination  of  further  falls  ln  U.S.  stock  and  bond  prices  and
the  (assumed)  further  devaluation  of  the  dollar. The  evidence  from :he
model  simulations  bear  out  that  this  will  lead  to  rising  U.S.  inflation  and
falling  rates  of  compensation  in  real  terms. Real  U.S.  private  wealth
would  then  be expected  to  fall,  which  will  lower  domestic  demand  in  the
United  States  over  time. Long-term  nominal  interest  rates  will  rise,
although  real  rates  may  continue  on  a  downward  trend. These  broad  elements
of the  IECAP  outlook  are  consistent  with  the  results  of calculations  using
existing  world  models,  as  reported  in  this  paper.
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The  IECCM  Division  of  the  World  Bank  forecasts  a  relatively  large
increase  in  wheat  prices  in  1988-89.  Underlying  this  forecast  is  the
assumption  that  world  grain  production  will  fall  in  the  1987-88  period.
Wheat  prices  are  expected  to  decline  in  1990  which  could  be a  result  of
overproduction  undertaken  in  reaction  to  the  higher  prices  of 1988  and
1989.
The  LINK  and  IECCM  forecasts  for  wheat  prices  are  quite  different
from  each  other. IECCM's  forecast  shows  a lot  more  variability  in  the
growth  rates,  with  wheat  prices  declining  by  a large  percentage  in  1987  and
then  increasing  by a similarly  large  percentage  in  1988,  easing  off  in
1989,  declining  again  in  1990,  then  finally  recovering  in  1991. In  effect,
IECCM's  forecast  shows  a  cyclical  pattern  for  wheat  prices. By  contrast,
the  Project  LINK  forecast  shows  first  incrtcases  in  prices  up to 1989,  then
a  decline  in  prices  in  1990  and  1991. For  the  short-run  LINK  forecast,
part  of  the  price  increase  in  1987  is  attributed  to  the  drought  in  India  as
well  as  larger  than  expected  purchases  by  the  Soviet  Union.  However,  the
high  level  of  stocks,  especially  in  the  U.S.,  has  partly  alleviated  the
price  increase.  This  increase  in  wheat  price  is  expected  to  be transitory,
however,  once  production  goes  back  to  normal  levels  afterwards.
The  Wharton  wheat  price  forecast  for  1988  shows  a  decline  from
1987. Wharton  assumes  that  the  current  stock  level  of  wheat  is  high  enough
to  forestall  a  price  increase  despite  the  expectation  of  a  decline  in
foreign  grain  production.  This  higher  level  of stocks  is  also  responsible
for  the  much  lower  increase  in  wheat  prices  in  1989  compared  to  the  IECCM
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forecast.  Wheat  prices  are  expected  to  grow  moderately  in  the  period
1989-1992,  perhaps  because  the  lower  prices  in  the  late  1980s  lead  to  some
underproduction  in  the  1990s.
The  OECD  does  not  provide  a forecast  for  wheat,  but  does  give  a
forecast  for  the  commodity  group  food. The  OECD  price  forecast  for  food  is
for  relatively  stable  growth  in  prices,  averaging  3.9  percent  growth  over
the  projection  period. The  degree  of stability  is  not  surprising,  since
the  aggregated  food  groups  tend  to  cancel  each  other  out. The  growth  in
food  prices  is  expected  to  peak  in  1991  at  5.1  percent,  before  coming  down
to  4.2  percent  in  1993. In  contrast,  when  the  IECCM  price  forecast  is
aggregated  to  include  all  food  groups,  one  finds  quite  fast  price  growth  in
1988  (10.8  percent),  followed  by an  immediate  decline  to  1.3  percent  in
1990. Yet,  on  average,  the  IECCM  growth  rate  for  food  prices  (3.5  percent)
is  very  close  to  the  OECD  forecast.
The  IECCM  other  cereal  price  forecast  follows  in  general  the  path
of its  wheat  price  forecast.  The  recent  drought  in  Southeast  Asia  is
assumed  to  be responsible  for  increasing  the  prices  of  rice  and  maize
substantially  in  the  short  run. The  decline  in  other  cereals  prices  in
1990  may  be  due  to  increased  supply  as  production  recovers  back  to  normal
levels.
The  Wharton  forecasts  for  other  cereal  prices  also  follow  the  path
of the  wheat  price  forecast,  with  continued  positive  growth  up through
1992,  based  mainly  on the  assumption  of  continued  strong  demand. Again,  as
it is  for  the  wheat  price  forecast,  the  Wharton  other  cereal  price  forecast
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does  not  exhibit  a cyclical  pattern  as  shown  in  the  IECC.M  forecast,
probably  because  it  does  not  assume  under  and  over-production  from  one
period  to  the  next.
The  Project  LINK  forecast  for  other  cereals  follows  closely
IECCM's  forecast.  They  both  show  a relatively  large  increase  in  other
cereal  prices  in  1988,  followed  by  a smaller  increase  in  1989,  decline  in
1990,  and  recovery  in  1991. For  the  short-run  LINK  forecast,  the  large
increase  in  rice  prices  in  1988  is  due  both  to  the  drought  in  India  as  well
as  to  low  levels  of  stocks. The  increase  in  corn  prices  in  1988  is  not  as
large  due  to  a  higher  level  of  stocks. These  increases  in  prices  are
expected  to  be transitory  once  production  returns  to  normal  levels
afterwards.
An individual  price  forecast  for  other  cereals  is  not  available
from  OECD.
The  IECCH  forecast  for  coffee,  tea,  and  cocoa  shows  a partial
recovery  in  coffee  prices  in  1988  after  the  decline  in  1987.  After  1988,
prices  are  projected  to  grow  at  a  moderate  rate,  but  not  quite  recovering
back  to  the  1986  high. The  recovery  of  coffee  prices  in  1988  is  probably
due  to  the  reintroduction  in  October  1987  of the  global  export  quota  of the
In.rnational  Coffee  Agreement.  Sustained  increases  in  coffee  prices  are
not  expected  for  the  remainder  of  the  period,  however,  due  to  the  forecast
of  a large  crop  from  Brazil  which  would  counteract  the  restriction  of
supply  by the  quota  agreement.
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The  Wharton  forecast  for  coffee,  tea,  and  cocoa  shows  a  partial
recovery  in  coffee  prices  in  1988  after  a  decline  in  1987,  though  the
magnitude  of the  recovery  is  not  too  large. After  1988,  prices  are
expected  to  grow  at  a  moderate  rate,  but  not  by  enough  to  recover  to their
1986  high  level.
Although  the  OECD  forecast  for  tropical  beverages  does  not  include
a  commodity  by  commodity  breakdown,  it  is  easy  to  see  from  the  forecast
pattern  what  is  being  predicted.  Tropical  beverage  prices  fell  drastically
in  1987,  due  largely  to  a fall  in  cocoa  prices. Coffee  prices  actually
began  to  rise  by the  end-of-1987.  For  the  period  as a  whole,  tropical
beverage  prices  are  expected  to  rise  by a  modest  1.8  percent. The  expected
trend  is  for  good  growth  in  1988  and  1989,  followed  by almost  no growth  in
1991  and  a  modest  recovery  in  the  outer  years. Coffee  price  increases  are
generally  due  to the  agreement  reached  in  1987  among  producers  which  set
export  quotas  for  the  next  few  years. Cocoa  prices  are  expected  to  fall,
however,  due  to  large  and  growing  inventory  accumulation  and  disagreement
within  the  cartel.
Price  forecasts  for  coffee  and  cocoa  are  very  close  between  the
LINK  and  IECCM  models. They  both  show  a recovery  of  prices  in  1988,  from
negative  growth  a  year  before. After  the  recovery  in  1988,  both  show  a
slowing  down  of  the  growth  rate  in  1989,  a  recovery  in  1990,  and  levelling
off  of the  growth  rate  in  1991.
MASS-ltXINRG:0006/IIM1987-93:tk:February  25,  1988  14-OCT-88  12:25:00For  the  short-run  LINK  forecast,  prices  for  the  group  as  a  whole
increase  a  bit  in  1988  because  of the  increase  in  coffee  prices,  since
cocoa  prices  are  expected  to fall  through  1989. These  patterns  for  coffee
and  cocoa  prices  could  be  attributed  to  the  same  reasons  as for  the  OECD
case  discussed  above.
The  IECCM  forecasts  for  oilseeds  and  fats  and  oils  show  prices
going  up in 1987,  with  increases  continuing  through  1990. This  forecast  of
an  increase  in  oil  prices  could  be attributed  to  unexpected  imports  by the
USSR  at the  end  of 1987,  higher  imports  by  drought-stricken  India  for  the
next  few  years,  reduced  supplies  of  copra  and  a  less  expensive  dollar.
Such  price  increases  are  expected  to  continue  up to  1990,  at  which  time
there  would  be a small  decline,  probably  because  the  urgency  of  higher
import  demand  would  have  dissipated.  After  1990,  oil  prices  are  expected
to  grow  at a  moderate  rate.
The  Wharton  forecast  for  oilseeds  and  fats  and  oils  shows  a
decline  in  prices  in  1988. This  is  probably  due  to its  forecast  being  made
prior  to  a large  import  by the  Soviet  Union  which  affected  world  prices.
Steady,  but  non-spectacular  growth,  ranging  from  2  percent  to  4  percent,  is
expected  through  the  early  1990s.
Individual  price  forecasts  for  oilseeds  and  fats  and  oils  are  not
available  for  OECD  and  Project  LINK.
The  IECCM  forecast  for  other  food  prices  shows  a relatively  big
increase  in  1988,  of 8  percent,  followed  by moderate  but  steady  increases
in  prices  for  the  rest  of the  period. This  price  pattern  applies  to  all
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the  commodities  within  the  group  except  for  beef  (that  is,  applies  to
sugar,  bananas  and  oranges).  The  larger  increase  in  1988  for  the  IECCM
forecast  is  due  mostly  to  the  increase  in  the  price  of sugar,  since  the
prices  of the  other  commodities  are  expected  to  experience  only  moderate
increases.  The  increase  in  sugar  prices  for  1988  is  based  on the  forecast
of  lower  production  due  to  bad  weather.  After  1988,  the  IECCM  forecast  is
for  steady  increases  in  sugar  prices,  based  mainly  on the  assumption  of
continued  growth  in  world  consumption  as  well  as restraint  in  production
such  that  stocks  would  be further  reduced.  On the  other  hand,  beef  prices
are  expected  to  decline  throughout  the  1988-1990  period  as  expected  record
meat  production  in  the  US  becomes  available.
The  IECCM  and  Wharton  forecasts  for  other  food  prices  for  the
1987-92  period  are  quite  similar  with  the  exception  of 1988,  for  which  the
IECCM  other  food  price  forecast  is  quite  a  bit  higher. The  Wharton
forecast  shows  moderate,  but  steady  growth  of  other  food  prices  ranging
from  2.5  percent  to 3.5  percent  for  that  period.
Only  a partial  comparison  between  the  IECCM  and  the  LINK  models
could  be given  for  the  other  food  commodity  group,  since  the  LINK  model
only  provided  a  price  forecast  for  sugar,  and  not  for  the  other  commodities
included  by  IECCM  for  the  group. It  is  therefore  not  surprising  to find
that  the  LINK  forecast  gives  the  most  variation.  A large  increase  in  sugar
prices  is  expected  for  1988,  due  to  so:ller  than  expected  crops  in  Brazil
and  drought-related  damage  to  the  South  and  South  East  Asian  crop  such  that
the  prices  of  sugar  rose  at the  end  of  1987  and  are  expected  to  remain  high
for  1988. But  after  1988,  sugar  prices  are  expected  to,  in  contrast  to the
?ASS-11:KING:0006/IMA19S7-93:rk:February  25. 1988 14-OCT-88 12:25:00IECCM  forecast,  first,  level  off  and  then  actually  decline  in 1990,
followed  by  a  recovery  in  1991. This  price  pattern  is  probably  based  on
the  assumption  of  production  returning  back  to  normal  levels  after  1989.
The  IECCH  forecast  for  other  agricultural  non-food  products  shows
a great  deal  of  variation  in  prices,  with  a  big  increase  of  25  percent  in
1987,  followed  by a  decline  in  1988-89,  and  recovery  in  1990-92.
The  cotton  price  forecast  exhibits  the  same  pattern  as  that  for
the  overall  commodity  group;  a  huge  increase  in  1987  followed  by  declines
in  1988-89,  with  recovery  thereafter.  The  rationale  behind  this  forecast
is  that  the  sharp  increase  in  cotton  prices  in  1987  have  led  to  acreage
expansion  and  production  increases  in  the  northern  hemisphere,  and
therefore  result  in  weaker  prices  late  in  1988  and  into  1989. The  price
weakness  may  be intenaified  by the  expected  slowing  of  economic  growth  in
the  industrial  countries  during  1989  and  1990. The  lagged  price  effect  on
cotton  plantings  should  cause  lower  cotton  plantings  in  1989  and  1990,
which  would  facilitate  a recovery  in  cotton  prices  at  the  onset  of  economic
recovery  from  1990  onwards.
The  IECCM  rubber  price  forecast  again  follows  more  or less  the
general  trend  of  the  overall  commodity  group,  with  a  decline  in  prices
forecasted  in  the  medium  term  reflecting  projected  lower  economic  growth.
A recovery  in  prices  is  expected  after  1990  as  economic  growth  is  expected
to  recover.
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Unlike  the  IECCH  forecasts  for  cotton  and  rubber  in  which  1988
prices  are  expected  to  decline  or  remain  the  same,  jute  prices  are  expected
to  increase  in  1988  due  to flooding  in  Bangladesh.  Steady  increases  in  jute
prices  are  forecasted  for  the  remaining  period,  probably  due  to sustained
increases  in  demand.
In  contrast  to  the  IECCM  forecasts,  the  Wharton  forecast  for  other
agricultural  non-food  prices  shows  little  variation  during  the  projection
period,  with  slightly  higher  increases  in  1987  and  1988  of 9.3  percent  and
6.8  percent  respectively,  followed  by  moderate  increases  through  the  end  of
the  forecast  period.
The  OECD  provides  a  comparable  price  forecast  for  the  commodity
category  of  agricultural  raw  materials  which  shows  more  volatility  than  the
IECCM  price  forecast  for  agricultural  non-food.
Agricultural  raw  materials  prices  are  expected  to  average  2.8
percent  growth  over  the  forecast  period  in  the  OECD  baseline. In  1989,
however,  prices  are  expected  to  grow  by only  1.5  percent  due  to the  low
growth  rate  of  GDP  for  industrial  countries  in  that  year. However,  the
Bank  expects  agricultural  raw  material  prices  to  decline  in that  year,  so
the  OECD  forecast  is  still  relatively  optimistic.
Project  LINK  does  not  provide  a  price  forecast  for  this  category.
The  interesting  fact  behind  the  IECCM  forest  product  price
forecasts  is  that  they  are  made  in  terms  of  local  currencies,  since  the
markets  are  Western  Europe  and  Japan,  and  then  converted  into  dollars.  The
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implication  of this  Is,  therefore,  that  aside  from  the  usual  demand  and
supply  factors,  the  forecasts  are  also  influenced  by the  dollar  exchange
rate  against  these  local  (Japanese  and  European)  currencies.  -the  IECCh
forecast  numbers  show  a large  increase  in  1987,  probably  due  to  the  drop  in
the  value  of the  dollar. This  is  followed  by a  smaller  but  still
substantial  increase  in  1988  and  then  yet  smaller  Increases  thereafter.
This  pattern  seems  to  reflect  the  pattern  of the  IECAP  dollar  exchange  rate
forecast,  which  is  a depreciation  of  the  dollar  up to  1989,  followed  by
appreciation.
The  Wharton  assumption  for  forest  product  prices  shows  much
smaller  increases  in  1987  and  1988  when  compared  to  the  IECCN  numbers,  and
even  a slight  decllne  in  1990. After  1990,  growth  in  forest  prices
recovers  and  stays  at  moderate  rates  of  4E4  percent  and  5.0  persent  until
the  end  of the  forecast  period.
The  short-run  LINK  forest  product  price  forecast  shows  an increase
in  prices  in  1987,  due  to,  among  other  factors,  the  recovery  of the  paper
industry  and  strong  demand  from  housing  construction  in  Japan  and  the
United  States. Forest  product  prices  are  expected  to  decline  in  1988
because  of  the  expected  economic  slow-down  in  the  United  States. In  fact,
housing  starts  have  been  falling  sharply  in  the  U.S.  for  three  consecutive
months. Prices  are  expected  to  remain  low  after  1988  also,  probably  due  to
expected  low  demand  as  economic  growth  stagnates  worldwide.
The  IECCM  forecast  is  for  petroleum  prices  to  decline  in  1988  and
1989,  due  to  the  expected  decline  in  real  economic  growth  in  the  OECD
countries  as  well  as the  expectation  that  OPEC  will  not  be able  to  adhere
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to  its  production  quota. This  decline  in  oil  prices  flattens  out  in  1990,
after  which  prices  go  up  again,  probably  because  of the  expected  pickup  in
real  economic  growth  rates  for  the  OECD.
The  Wharton  forecast  for  petroleum  prices  shows  a slowing  of
growth  until  1990,  during  which  growth  is  zero,  and  accelerating
afterwards.  The  Wharton  numbers  reflect  the  underlying  assumption  that  oil
demand  will  remain  fairly  healthy  even  though  world  growth  may  slow  down  in
the  forecast  period.  Another  reason  for  the  higher  Wharton  oil  prices  is
the  belief  that  continuing  tension  in  the  Gulf  will  add  further  premiums  to
oil  prices.
Petroleum  price  forecasts  are  not  provided  by either  OECD  or
Project  LINK.
The  other  fuel  commodity  group  for  IECCM  consists  of  coal  only,
for  which  the  price  forecast  follows  closely  that  for  petroleum.  After  a
decline  in  prices  in  198/  and  1988,  coal  prices  start  to  recover  in  1989
and  are  expected  to  maintain  a steady  and  moderate  growth  rate  till  the  end
of  the  forecast  period. Despite  the  intentions  of  major  exporters  to
demand  higher  prices  on their  contracts,  the  expectation  of  lower  petroleum
prices  in  the  medium  term  should  provide  a strong  negotiating  advantage  to
coal  importers  to  keep  prices  down.
After  the  decline  in  other  fuel  prices  in  1987,  Wharton  forecasts
a  healthy  growth  in  other  fuel  prices  for  the  1988-92  period;  in  the  4.0
percent  to  6.5  percent  range. No  cyclical  pattern  is  exhibited  for  this
commodity  group.- 11  -
Neither  the OECD or Project  LINK provide  price forecasts  for this
other  fuel commodity  group.
The IECCM  metals  price forecast  is for  very strong  growth in
prices in 1987  and 1988,  followed  by a rather  large  decline in 1989  and
levelling  off in 1990,  with recovery  thereafter. Most, though  not all,  of
the  metals  within this  commodity  group follow  the  aforementioned  price
pattern.  The assumption  behind the  short-term  forecast  of a price  decline
is declining  demand  due to the expected  slow-down  in industrial  country
growth  as well as expanded  production.
The  Wharton metal  price forecasts  show little  cyclical
fluctuation,  with moderate  but steady  growth  ranging  from  4.0 percent to
6.0  percent throughout  the forecast  period.
Turning to the  OECD forecast  for metals  and  minerals,  prices are
expected  to rise  by 8.0 percent  in 1988  and average  2.6  percent growth  over
the forecast  period.  The  high rate  of growth  in 1987-1988  is due largely
to the long  period  in the  1980s  when demand  exceeded  supply  and inventories
were drawn  down.  The expected  dropoff  in  the growth  in prices  in 1989 is
due to the  recessionary  environment  which is  envisaged  for  that year.
Prices  are  expected  to  be stronger  in the  1990s,  as the industrial
countries'  economies  recover  from  a period  of low growth.
The trend  of the Project  LINK growth  rates  for the  prices  of
metals  and minerals  follows  in a  broad sense  quite  closely that  of the
growth rates  of IECCM  prices.  However,  in terms  of the levels  of the
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changes,  the  LINK  forecast  is  quite  a  bit  different  from  that  of  IECCM.
The  LINK  forecast  shows  a  high  growth  rate  of  prices  in 1987,  the
consequence  of  a long  period  in  which  consumption  exceeded  production  and
in  which  inventories  were  drawn  down. The  growth  rates  of  the  prices  start
declining  after  1987  and  in  fact  turned  negative  in  1988-89.  This
slow-down  in  the  increase  and  eventual  downturn  in  prices  is  probably  due
to  the  expected  economic  slow-down  of industrial  countries.  Prices  start
to  recover  in  1991  as  these  countries  start  to  recover  economically.
We  now  turn  to  a  discussion  of  the  price  forecasts  for  some  of  the
individual  metals. Individual  metals  price  forecasts  are  not  available
from  OECD.
The  IECCM  forecast  for  copper  prices  is  for  an increase  in  1988,
followed  by  declines  in  1989  and  1990  due  to  anticipated  supply  increases
and  the  economic  slow-down  in  the  industrial  economies.
The  Wharton  forecast  for  copper  prices  is  somewhat  similar  to
IECCM's  with  an  increase  expected  for  1988,  followed  by a decline  in  1989,
due  to the  expected  fall  in  demand  as  global  economic  growth  slows  down  as
well  as to  the  new  production  capacity  coming  onstream.
Turning  to  the  LINK  forecast,  copper  prices  are  expected  to
increase  in  1988,  and  start  declining  in  1989  until  1991,  after  which  they
increase  again. For  the  short  term  outlook,  copper  prices  rose  about  30
percent  in  1987  due  to  stronger  than  expected  demand,  especially  in  the
construction  sectors  in  Japan  and  the  U.S.  and  the  industrial  sectors  in
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the  latter  country.  Inventories  fell  sharply  from  pr( "-us  levels,  a
result  of  disruptions  in  supply  caused  by  strike's  in  Ca.ada  and  Peru,
transportation  problems  in  Zambia  and  bad  weather  and  an  earthquake  in
Chile. In  1988,  however,  prices  are  expected  to  fall  because  of the  fears
of  a recession  and  the  news  of  a  significant  slow-down  in  housing  starts  in
the  United  States. Despite  this  expectation  of  falling  prices,  the  average
copper  price  for  1988  is  still  expected  to  be higher  than  the  1987  average
due  to  the  high  level  at the  beginning  of 1987.
The  IECCM  forecast  for  nickel  prices  is  for  a largb  increase  in
1988,  followed  by a  return  slightly  above  1987  levels  in  1989  and  1990.
The  reason  behind  this  forecast  is:  (1)  technical  problems  leading  to  a
halt  in  USSR  exports;  (2) the  imposition  of  export  taxes  by the  Dominican
Republic;  (3) technical  and  labor  difficulties  at  Inco,  Canada:  and  (4)
lowered  supplies  of stainless  steel  scrap. However,  inventories  of
stainless  steel  as  well  as  potential  new  suppliers  coming  onstream  should
alleviate  the  upward  pressure  on  prices,  and  these  factors  are  probably
responsible  for  the  downturn  in  prices  after  1988.
The  Wharton  forecast  for  nickel  prices  is  very  similar  to  the
IECCM  forecast,  with  a rather  large  increase  predicted  for  1988,  followed
by a  decline.  This  price  decline  is  due  to  the  expected  weakening  of
demand  as industrial  country  growth  slows  down,  as  well  as  due  to  the
expansion  of  production.
Project  LINK  states  that  nickel  prices  rose  sharply  in  1987  due  to
a strong  increase  in  steel  production  and  smaller  sales  by the  Soviet
Union. No further  significant  price  increases  are  expected  as the  U.S.
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economy  is  expected  to  slow  down. Prices  are  expected  to  stay  at  around
the  same  levels  until  1992,  when  they  rise  somewhat,  as industrial  country
growth  recovers.
The  IECCM  forecast  for  aluminum  prices  again  follows  the  pattern
of  the  overall  group,  which  is  an increase  in  1988  followed  by a decline.
This  price  increase  in  the  short-run  is  probably  due  to  a combination  of
the  factors  of  buoyant  demand  and  £trained  production  capacity.  The
decline  in  prices  after  1988  could  be due  to  expected  additional  productive
capacity  coming  onstream.
Wharton  did  not  provide  an  aluminum  price  forecast.
Proiect  LINK  states  that  aluminum  prices  rose  with  copper  prices
up to  the  October  crash,  after  which  there  was  a  considerable  slow-down
that  lasted  until  the  end  of 1987. In 1988  they  started  rising  again  and
have  so  far  reached  levels  comparable  to  copper  prices.
Turning  now  to  lead  prices,  the  IECCM  forecast  is  generally
pessimistic  through  1990,  but  with  a strong  showing  first  in  1987  and  1988.
The  higher  prices  in  the  short  run  are  based  on the  assumption  of continued
increases  in  lead  consumption  but  only  marginal  increases  in  production.
The  decline  in  prices  afterwards  is  probably  based  on  the  assumption  of
weakening  demand  and  expanding  production.
The  Wharton  forecast  for  lead  prices  is  very  similar  to  IECCM's,
with  strong  prices  in 1987  and  1988,  followed  by  a  decline  in  1989  for  the
same  reasons.- 15 
Project  LINK  does  not  provide  a lead  price  forecast.
IECCM  forecasts  for  zinc  prices  are  that  they  would  remain  more  or
less  level  in  the  period  1987-89,  while  those  for  tin  prices  are  that  they
would  register  moderate  increases  in  the  same  period. A large  increase  in
tin  prices  is  expected  in  1990,  whereas  only  a  moderate  increase  is
expected  for  zinc.
The  Wharton  forecast  for  tin  and  zinc  is  for  a  moderate  decline  in
zinc  prices  in  1989  and  a  larger  decline  in  tin  prices  in  1990. The
assumption  behind  the  Wharton  zinc  price  forecast  is  f'at  consumption
combined  with  increased  production.
Project  LINK  states  that  tin  prices  rose  by the  end  of 1987,  as
inventories  came  down  to  more  normal  levels. Even  though  prices  are  still
low  by  historical  standards,  Project  LINK  does  not  expect  them  to  rise  much
due  to  the  general  economic  slow  down,  at least  not  until  1992,  when  prices
are  expected  to  rise  somewhat  due  to  world  economic  recovery.
The  IECCM  short-  and  long-term  forecasts  of  gold  and  silver  prices
have  been  made  on the  basis  of  analysis  combining  the  understanding  of  the
cycles  inherent  in  these  series,  the  relationships  between  inflation  rate
and  exchange  rate  movements  and  gold  and  silver  prices,  and  expectad
changes  in  the  supply  and  demand  for  the  metals. The  expected  decline  in
the  dollar  through  1989  should  have  a  positive  impact  on  gold  prices. The
higher  inflation  brought  about  by the  declining  dollar  will  further  enhance
gold  prices. On the  other  hand,  the  larger  surply  of  gold  brought  about  by
MASS-11?KIG:N0006/IMA1987-93:rk:February  25. 1988 14-OCT-88 12:25:00- 16 -
higher  prices in recent  years  which has spurred increased  exploration  and
production  will exert  a dampening  effect  on gold  prices.  On balance,  gold
prlces are still  expected  to lncrease  in 1988 and 1989.  By 1990, the
appreciating  dollar  and the  concurrent  decline  in the inflation  rate  will
lead  to a lower  gold price.
Since  silver is  produced  mainly as a by-product  of other  metals
and since lead,  zinc  and copper  production  is expected  to increase  in 1989
and 1990, silver  production  is also  expected  to increase  whlch  will depress
prices.  Expected  lower industrlal  demand ln the 1989-90  period  will
further  dampen  prices.  On the  other  hand, the  expected  depreciation  of the
dollar  and the  concurrent  higher inflation  for that  period  will counter
these  prlce dampening  effects.  The expected  outcome  of these  countering
tendencies  is a levelllng  of silver  prLces in  1987-88,  followed  by an
upswing ln 1989  and a decline A4  1990.
Wharton  does not produce  a prlce  forecast  for gold.  It predicts
quite  high rates  of growth for  silver  prices,  8.0  percent to 9.0  percent in
the 1988-90  period, followed  by a sharp  downturn  in 1991  and a moderate
decline  in 1992.
Project  LINK  does not  provide  either  gold or silver  prlce
forecast.
In general,  the  World Bank's  commodity  price forecasts  contain
more year-to-year  fluctuation  than the  Wharton commndity  price forecasts.
This is illustrated  in the following  graphs,  which  compare the  year-to-year
percentage  change in the  nominal  prices  of several  commoditles. Where a
Project  LINK forecast  was available,  this is  also shown.Forec asts  of  Wheat Prices
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